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ABSTRACT  
   
Great disasters can often serve as birthing grounds for national 
transformation. As communities work to recover and rebuild, opportunities to 
reassess of prevailing development theories and programs may arise. As 
traditional development programs, supported by top-down development theories 
and billions in foreign aid, have not changed Haiti's impoverished status, such an 
opportunity has been presented to the Caribbean nation. Just a few months 
removed from the devastating 7.0 earthquake of Jan 12, 2010, this study identified 
the emergent thinking about development as expressed by key informants (N=21) 
from six entity types involved in Haiti's rebuilding efforts – government agencies, 
social ventures, grassroots, diaspora, foreign, and hybrid nonprofits. Findings 
were supplemented by participant observation of a civil society meeting in Port-
au-Prince, Haiti. The Sustainable Livelihoods (SL) Framework was used as a lens 
with which to understand the causes of Haiti's social, institutional, environmental, 
and economic vulnerabilities. Modified grounded theory was used as the 
qualitative data analytical method from which five themes emerged: Haitian 
government, rebuilding, aid work and its effects, Haitian society, and international 
interference. Participants called for a refoundation, the building a nation from the 
ground up, of Haiti. Based on these findings, four transformative processes were 
identified as fundamental to Haiti's refoundation: 1) communication and 
collaboration with the Haitian government, 2) engagement of the Haitian people 
and the Haitian diaspora in the redevelopment work, 3) a broad vision of 
development for the nation, and 4) coordination and collaboration among NGOs. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Problem Statement  
Rebuilding after a great disaster, whether man-made or natural, reminds 
us that development is a process, not a destination. While disasters are 
undoubtedly among the most tragic of occurrences, survivors of these 
communities find themselves free to think differently about development, define 
development as it suits their needs, and approach development work in a way in 
which their vision of community can come to life. Such is the case in Haiti. This 
research seeks to delve into the minds and missions of government agencies, 
social ventures, grassroots, diaspora, and foreign organizations as post-earthquake 
Haitian society works to stabilize, rebuild, and improve itself. 
Historically, traditional development programs have been driven by 
Western capitalist models (Hancock, 1989) which emphasized increasing income 
or financial capital as their goal. This narrow vision of development often 
increases a community’s vulnerabilities, whether economic, social, political, or 
environmental. When the human, social, physical, and natural capitals inherent in 
communities are sacrificed in the attainment of financial capital, an imbalance is 
created. Traditional development projects, which often follow a one-size-fits-all 
model, have also largely been oblivious to the unique livelihood risks and 
vulnerabilities of communities and countries alike. Such oversight can be both 
disastrous and deadly in nations such as Haiti, left without a strong buttress of 
human, social, physical, financial, and natural capitals. Furthermore, development 
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as it has been known does not largely respect or make use of traditional 
livelihoods and knowledge (DFID, 1999) 
Exogenous (originating externally rather than internally) development 
models more often cripples rather than strengthens nations. As evidenced in Haiti, 
this nation’s political and economic decisions are often made "offshore", crafted 
by individuals and/or nations that do not understand the real needs, problems, and 
particularities unique to Haiti. Whether deliberate or just an unfortunate 
consequence, this historical undermining of the vision and voice of the Haitian 
people is now, as a result of the January 12, 2010 earthquake, being called into 
question. So then, where does Haiti go from here? Will development efforts in 
Haiti simply be more of the same? Or will the opportunity for reflection and 
redirection recently afforded them by the disaster be grasped? 
This study purposed to catch a snapshot of organizational thinking or 
approaches (i.e. emerging frameworks) as the monumental task of redeveloping 
Haiti is undertaken. For this study an emerging framework is defined as a new 
approach in thought regarding the quality of life, livelihoods, and the processes by 
which optimum levels of each are defined and reached. 
Pertinence of Study  
Financially born in the red, this Black republic was born in the red and 
has for decades been the focus of development research and discussion. 
Depending on the reporting source and their political affiliation, the blame for 
Haiti's economic and development failures have either been laid squarely on the 
feeble, corrupt Haitian government or on the exploitative, manipulative 
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international aid institutions (Buss & Gardner, 2008). The complicated truth lies 
somewhere in the middle. No matter who is to blame, the January 12, 2010 
earthquake that decimated the island nation's capital and destroyed surrounding 
areas has provided a long-awaited opportunity for re-examining development 
failures and making a drastic directional change in development schemes. This 
work is the first to look at a cross-section of entities currently on the ground in 
Haiti and involved in the rebuilding efforts. Using key informant interviews 
supplemented by participant observation at a civil society meeting in Port-au-
Prince, the transformative processes critical to Haiti’s refoundation are explored.  
An assessment of the types of institutions involved in development work 
in Haiti revealed six entity types: 
(1) grassroots – Haitian created and led organizations 
(2) diaspora – organization led or funded by members of the Haitian diaspora 
(3) government – Haitian government agencies 
(4) foreign – organizations founded, funded, and headquartered outside of Haiti 
(5) hybrid – a mix of two or three entity types 
(6) social ventures – organization using a business model to address economic, 
social, or environmental issues 
A recent article published by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 
lists the major short term and long term priorities that should drive Haiti’s 
rebuilding efforts: food, water, health, shelter, rebuilding (building infrastructure), 
Port-au-Prince (facilities and city planning), transportation and 
telecommunication infrastructures, security, economy, funding, agriculture, and 
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government (BBC, 2010). However, no studies have looked at the new 
frameworks being developed and adopted to address these priorities on an 
organizational level. This is the endeavor of this work. These priorities will 
hereafter be referred to as vulnerabilities to be addressed.  
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Window of Opportunity 
     In its 2004 global report, the United Nations Development Programme's 
Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery ranked Haiti as having high relative 
vulnerability to natural hazards. In recent years, Haiti has been battered with both 
natural and man-made disasters causing an overlapping of crises that have left the 
state and its people overwhelmed in more ways then one.  
 By its sheer magnitude, devastation, and location (urban, i.e. the capital, 
rather than rural area) the 2010 earthquake centered international attention on 
Haiti, creating a unique window of opportunity for national transformation.  
Immediately following a disaster of such magnitude, communities affected are 
left at a development crossroads.  A community can 1) seize the window of 
opportunity created by catastrophe and build back better; 2) build back to their 
former state; 3) stagnate (Rotmans & Loorbach, 2009); or 4) undergo a 
combination of all three (some sectors in society recovering while others falter; 
Hogg, 1980).  In the case of a national disaster, the fourth option is likely to 
occur. In her study of Italy's Friuli region following its 1976 earthquake, observed 
that communities that were geographically and politically best connected with 
capital and assistance rebuilt quicker than their lesser connected counterparts. In 
Haiti's case, how to build a better nation dominates the discussion (Farmer, 
2010; de Córdoba & Forelle, 2010; Richards, 2010).    
The window of opportunity for national transformation following a 
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disaster is brief and once it has past, will not again present itself save another 
disaster. That said, rebuilding or redeveloping the nation is an extremely complex 
endeavor. This sobering reality is not lost on those who seek the betterment of 
Haiti. There are also those who see the earthquake as an opportunity to exploit 
Haiti’s less fortunate (a phenomenon known as disaster capitalism; Klein, 2007).  
"Freedom is not Free" - Anonymous 
 Understanding Haiti's present situation, as with any other nation, first calls 
for an understanding of its history. Particularly important to understanding 
Haitian society's vulnerabilities, laid bare for the world to see by the earthquake, 
is an appreciation of Haiti’s 600+ year recent past. Haiti occupies the western 
one-third of the Caribbean island of Hispañola. On the eastern two-thirds of 
Hispañola lies the Spanish speaking country of the Dominican Republic. Prior to 
the arrival of Spanish explorer Christopher Columbus, Hispañola was inhabited 
by the peaceful Taino Arawak Indian tribe (Dupuy, 1989). On December 5, 1492 
Christopher Columbus happened upon this large island in the Caribbean Sea, 
named it La Española (from which the Latinized Hispañiola is derived) and 
claimed it for the Spanish crown (Katz & Boscov-Ellen, 2010). After years of 
raiding, counter-raiding, and pillaging between the Spaniards, British, and French 
(James, 1963), France officially took control of the western one-third of the island 
under the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697 (Haggerty, 1989). The French and Spaniards 
named their colonies Saint-Domingue and Santo Domingo respectively (James, 
1963).  
By the 1700s West Africans were brought to farm the fertile lands and 
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the colony underwent rapid expansion. The "Pearl of the West Indies" (Girard, 
2005) exported tobacco, cacao, cotton, raw sugar processed from sugar cane, 
(Knight, 2000) and indigo to France. Saint Domingue became one of the richest 
colonies in the French empire at that time (James, 1963).  In 1804, under the 
leadership of runaway slaves Toussaint L'Ouverture, Henri Christophe, and Jean-
Jacques Dessalines, the island populated predominately by African slaves won 
their independence. Fifiteen years of bloody struggle wearied Napolean 
Bonaparte’s forces and Haitians secured their freedom (Knight, 2000). The 205 
years of French occupation on the island effectively ended and Ayiti became the 
first independent Black republic in the Western Hemisphere (Kelley, 1999). 
January 1, 2004 marked Haiti’s bicentennial anniversary (Forsdick, 2008). 
   The successive years following indepdence proved both turbulent and 
violent. European colonizing powers as well as the United States sided with 
France in refusing to recognize Haiti's political sovereignty (Katz & Boscov-
Ellen, 2010). In 1825 France's King Charles X ordered former French slaves to 
pay 150m francs – equivalent to 21 billion dollars – before France would grant 
diplomatic recognition to Haiti. This was an enormous sum. By comparison, in 
1803, France sold the Louisiana Purchase to the United States for 60 million 
francs, in addition to 18 million francs worth of cancelled French debt. The 
Louisiana Purchase however, was a territory 30 times the size of the entire island 
of Hispañola (Katz & Boscov-Ellen, 2010). Recognition of Haiti's sovereignty by 
the powerful European empire meant Haiti, a nation dependent on its export-
oriented economy, could trade its goods freely. Blockading Haitian ports with 
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dozens of naval vessels carrying upwards of 20,000 troops, France gave the then 
Haitian president Jean-Pierre Boyer no choice but to concede. Repaying this 
substantial annual indemnity to France for the success of the Revolution was a 
heavy burden. The embargo, supported by the United States remained in place 
until 1825. Over the years Haiti sent 80% of its wealth to France annually, leaving 
little to develop the country but it was not enough. When French president 
François Mitterrand took office in 1981, Haiti’s debt had still not been fully 
repaid (Farmer, 2003). 
 In an effort to assist, the United States loaned Haiti funds but the 
accumulated debt became impossible to repay. By the early 1900s, Germany 
controlled nearly 80% of Haiti's international trade and both France and Britain 
had made their own investments on the island. Haiti’s key geographical position 
allowed for access to the Windward Passage, a significant shipping route to the 
Panama Canal, made it a coveted location for international investment and foreign 
political interests. On July 28, 1915 the United States Marines landed in Haiti to 
protect U.S commercial interests and stay Germany’s increasing presence in Haiti 
(Farmer, 2003). A U.S.-chosen Haitian President of the Senate and a treaty 
legalizing U.S. occupation for the next twenty years placed Haiti's finances and 
administration under U.S. control (Katz & Boscov-Ellen, 2010). 
      Although several revolts by nationalist peasant militias attempted to 
oust the Americans, it wasn't until nearly two decades later, in mid-August 1934, 
that the U.S. Marines withdrew. U.S. Marine-trained local military were left as 
the only cohesive and effective institution in a position of power. The result was a 
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sequence of military-backed, United States and multi-lateral agency supported 
dictatorships that defined the following 50 years of Haiti's history (Suggs, 2002). 
Historically, however, the Haitian government and elite were no less exploitative 
of the Haitian people than international interests. Governmental mismanagement 
of funds coupled with the growing wealth of the elite, thanks to overtly 
preferential treatment of elite-owned businesses from the government, increased 
the number and plight of Haiti’s poor (Buss & Gardner, 2008).  
 Constant internal struggle for power and international economic, political, 
and military interference left little time or funds to build and maintain government 
infrastructure. Loans from bilateral and multilateral institutions offered 
investment capital, but at a price. Programs such as the International Monetary 
Fund’s structural readjustment loans (called "death plans" by Haitians) popular in 
the 1970s and '80s birthed a culture of industry hyperprivatization and accelerated 
Haiti's increasing debt and decreasing standard of living. Now enslaved 
economically, Haiti's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dropped steadily from 
around $750 in the '60s, to approximately $600 in 1990, and then down to $500 in 
1994 (Katz & Boscov-Ellen, 2010).  
      After the re-instatement of Jean-Bertrand Aristide's government in 1994, 
an agreement with the International Monetary Fund to lower trade barriers 
rendered imported staple products such as milk, fish, sugar, rice, and corn much 
more inexpensive. Subsidized American produce flooded Haitian markets and 
Haiti's agricultural sector was decimated. With the majority of the Haitian 
population involved in agriculture, the move to reduce tariffs effectively 
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extinguished livelihoods of many farmers and increased unemployment and was a 
major catalyst for the daily migration of rural dwellers to the city (Heyde, 2007; 
Katz & Boscov-Ellen, 2010). Leaving their land for the city streets, rural migrants 
took a gamble on their next meal. The phenomenon of "push" and "pull" where 
hard economic conditions push peasants off rural land and elusive promises of 
higher income pull them into the city (Marks, 1989) was evidenced by the 
capital’s swelling population. Port-au-Prince was the destination of the large 
majority of rural migrants and became home to 60% of Haiti's urban population 
(Eberlee, 1999). Migrating to the cities, the new city dwellers further stressed the 
weak infrastructure of these struggling urban communities (Foster & Valdman, 
1984): overcrowded slums bred disease and violence (Willman & Marcelin, 
2010), shoddy construction claimed the lives of school children (Klarreich, 2008), 
and escape from poverty proved difficult, if not impossible.  
     In May 2000, U.S. Congressional Republicans, opposed to the re-
instatement of Jean-Bertrand Aristide as Haitian president, suspended all direct 
U.S. aid to Haiti. Dr. Paul Farmer, an American Harvard professor who has 
worked tirelessly for decades to bring health care to Haiti's Artibonite region 
noted that "the cuts in bilateral aid and the diversion of monies to the opposition 
[of Aristide's government] meant there could be, in a country as poor as Haiti, 
little effort to build schools, health care infrastructure, roads, ports, 
telecommunications, or airports" (Chomsky, Farmer & Goodman, 2004, ¶23.). In 
2001, the Bush administration, working secretly, persuaded the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) to institute a funding freeze to Haiti. Notwithstanding, 
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the IDB required Haiti to pay interest on their loans although no new funds would 
be disbursed (Chomsky, Farmer & Goodman, 2004).  
The world’s most powerful nations joined forces and blocked 
humanitarian assistance and aid to Haiti, worsening the nation’s situation. In July 
2003, Haiti sent over 90% of all its foreign reserves to Washington to pay these 
arrears, with no new aid coming their way. The effect of the freeze, at last lifted in 
2004, had a huge impact on the nation, not the least of which was an increasingly 
unequal society in which a small group of elite owed a disproportionate share of 
the country's wealth (Farmer, 2004; Goodman & Goodman, 2006). 
Haiti Today 
  From 1492 to 1697 Haiti, then Saint Domingue, was under Spanish rule. 
From 1698 to 1803 Haiti was under French rule. The year 2009 marked Haiti's 
205 years of (somewhat) independent rule. This reoccurrence of a 205-year 
change of power cycle in Haiti's history has not gone unnoticed (Fountain, 2010). 
Could January's earthquake be yet another turning point? 
  The death toll of 230,000 people (Huffington Post, 2010), as a result of 
the January 12th earthquake would not have been as high nor the structural 
devastation of Port-au-Prince so crippling were it not for the steady, decades-long 
internal migration of rural dwellers to the capital and lax (if not entirely 
nonexistent) building code enforcement. Any redevelopment effort that focuses 
solely on rebuilding the structures that had collapsed in the earthquake will be met 
with minimal success. The lifeblood of Haiti is found in its rural regions. When 
the needs of rural dwellers are unmet, the stress will be felt throughout the nation 
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- economically, institutionally, socially and environmentally.  
 While the earthquake made dire situations worse, it is hoped that Haiti’s 
the future is brighter than its past. Presently however, the nation is still drowning 
in foreign aid debt, its government seems to be unable to become independent of 
international involvement, and its economy along with its related structures are 
fragile at best. Despite these difficulties, Haiti aims to move forward (Farmer, 
2010; de Córdoba & Forelle, 2010; Richards, 2010). This work will document the 
new thinking surrounding re-development plans for this resilient Black republic. 
Additionally, policy implications for Haiti's development, as identified by both 
the researcher and key informants, will be explored. 
Men Anpil Chay Pa Lou -When the Hands Are Many the Burden is Light 
   Following the January earthquake a glimpse into the thinking that drives 
exactly how entities are planning to tackle the enormous task of rebuilding Haiti is 
of great importance. It has been estimated by the Inter-American Development 
Bank that the cost of post-earthquake reconstruction in Haiti could reach $14 
billion (IDB, 2010) The international community has pledged $9.9 billion to assist 
in the effort (Moore, 2010) and much of that aid will find itself in the hands of 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and Haitian government agencies. For 
this reason, NGOs, the Haitian government agencies, social ventures, diaspora 
and grassroots organizations comprised the entities of choice for the focus of this 
study. The differing histories, missions, and programs of these six entities will 
now be discussed.  
Grassroots Organizations 
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     L'union fait la force (unity is strength or in union there is strength) is more 
than just the motto stitched under the emblem on Haiti's flag, it is, for the 
participants in the Haitian grassroots movement, their aim. At its strongest, 
Haitian grassroots organizing resulted in the ousting of French colonizers a little 
more than two centuries ago. The "Big Sister" of the Caribbean became the only 
slave colony in history to ever successfully win their independence (James, 1963). 
Haitian grassroots organizations in recent history, however, haven't obtained the 
level of efficacy that birthed the nation.  
     Every Haitian, no matter how many generations removed, comes from the 
countryside. Traditionally an agricultural people, Haitian grassroots organizing in 
its most historic form can still be witnessed today in the vast "mountains beyond 
mountains" (Kidder, 2004) that is the Haitian landscape. In her book, When the 
Hands Are Many: Community Organization and Social Change in Rural Haiti, 
Jennie Smith (2001) describes the many activities of the organized paysan or 
country dwellers in rural Haiti. Historically, outsiders have believed the 
Caribbean to have a "weak sense of community cohesion" with local communities 
"but loosely organized" (Wagley, 1961, p199). Mintz (1966) noted "many 
research workers in Caribbean societies have been struck by the relative absence 
of community-based activity in daily life (p932-3). These cultural biases are 
exposed by Wilson (1969) when he states in a rather tongue-in-cheek manner that 
"in spite of this non-community aspect of communities, most ethnographers have 
carried out their research in communities, which one assumes are not figments of 
their imagination" (p80). These self-run social organizations provide voice, 
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structure, and community to Haiti’s rural dwellers. Activities range widely - 
social service projects, business meetings, combite or agricultural work parties, 
religious ceremonies, and song sessions are just a few. The concept of yonn ede 
lòt, reciprocal sharing and cooperation, is at the core of rural life.   
 Grassroots efforts in urban areas of the island are a natural extension of 
what Haitians have been doing for centuries. Haitian grassroots organizations 
have sprouted up in a wide number of sectors within Haiti: education, agriculture, 
technology, and microfinance to name a few. As such grassroots organizations are 
a vital part of Haitian society and the nation's rebuilding efforts. Due to their 
relatively low level of international visibility however, they have often been 
overlooked or marginalized in development efforts. Melinda Miles, co-founder 
and executive director of the grassroots organization Konbit Pou Ayiti 
(KONPAY) traveled to the United States to testify before the U.S. Congress in 
hopes of shedding light on the ineffective practices that were handicapping 
distribution of earthquake aid in Haiti. Miles believed the international 
distribution system lacked the community building characteristic that has allowed 
Haitian community organizers (known as animators) to effectively participate in 
relief efforts (Charlotin, 2010). Haiti's grassroots organizations, with their hand on 
the pulse of Haitian communities, will no doubt have much to share by way of 
emerging thinking on Haiti's redevelopment. 
Diaspora Organizations 
     Wyclef Jean, Grammy-award winning musician and producer turned 
philanthropist, is probably the most famous member of the several million strong 
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Haitian diaspora. Yéle Haiti, co-founded by Jean, provides Haiti’s poor with 
access to education, sports, and the arts (Piazza, 2010). The Haitian diaspora have 
accomplished much in the areas of business, sports, public service, the arts and 
academia (Vilsaint & Heurtelou, 2008). Jean is just one of many Haitian diaspora 
who, after achieving success abroad, are giving back to their native land.  
 Haitian expatriates send over $1 billion annually in remittances to Haiti 
along with an estimated $400 million in goods such as clothing, food items, and 
electronics in higher proportion than any other national group anywhere in the 
world. Eighty-one percent of Haitians living in the United States and Canada send 
money home on a regular basis. Remittances also come from diaspora living in 
France, Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, Martinique, Guyana, and Spain. 
These remittances figures are truly impressive when comparatively only 60% of 
Mexican expatriates and 30-34% of Europeans regularly send money home to 
relatives (Delva, 2007).  
 So strong is the tie between Haiti and the Haitian diaspora that in 1991, 
then Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide created a cabinet-level ministry 
called the "Tenth Department" (Haiti is divided into nine departments) that would 
formally coordinate the assistance received from diaspora hometown associations 
and other diaspora groups. Efforts to create dialogue between the diaspora and the 
government about Haiti's economic development were halted when Aristide was 
overthrown (Perito & Maly, 2006). 
     Some members of the diaspora, not content with just sending funds and 
goods to family members, have started nonprofit organizations and foundations to 
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assist Haiti's poor through a variety of projects and programs. Diaspora nonprofits 
have built churches, schools, hospitals, orphanages, clinics, and homes. Other 
nonprofits are working to bring alternative energy technology to the island, create 
youth camps, strengthen and expand education, send aid and other goods, 
organize mission trips, and support public sanitation efforts among other 
projects. Yet still others work as advocates of Haiti-related causes.  
     The invested interest of the Haitian diaspora in the future of Haiti and its 
people is undeniable. This group's vision of a better Haiti is no doubt fueled by a 
personal attachment to their place of birth. A long list of studies has realized that 
the immense potential for diaspora to be development partners (Newland & 
Patrick, 2004; Merz & Dunn, 2006; MacLaren, 2010). Identifying and 
documenting the emerging redevelopment frameworks of diaspora organizations 
in the aftermath of Haiti's largest natural disaster is then of high importance.  
Government Agencies 
 Newly freed in 1804, Haitian revolutionary leaders found themselves 
completely daunted by the monumental task of ruling an independent state of ex-
slaves and mulattos. The Haitian government never gained a firm political footing 
within in its own shores or abroad. The history of Haitian heads of state is 
succinctly summarized Buss and Gardner (2008, p21): 
"...there have been fifty-five “presidents” of Haiti since 
1804, when the country gained its independence. Of these, 
three were assassinated or executed, seven died in office 
(one by suicide), and twenty-three were overthrown by the 
military or paramilitary groups. Two—Henri Namphy and 
Jean Bertrand Aristide—were overthrown twice. Only nine 
completed full presidential terms. Thirty-one held office for 
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two years or less. In 1946 and again in 1988, a military 
junta ruled without a president. Nearly all presidents either 
were military officers or were closely affiliated with the 
military. Throughout Haiti’s history, many presidents have 
attempted to become rulers for life. Every president has 
exploited Haiti’s impoverished people and its resources, for 
political gain or personal aggrandizement or both. There 
have been very few months in its history when Haiti went 
without a revolt, uprising, riots, political murders, or mass 
killings. During the twentieth century, the United States 
compelled five presidents to leave office." 
 
     According to Transparency International's latest Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI), Haiti ranks a low 168th of 180 countries (2009). Haiti's government 
history of poor financial management practices, together with the blind eyes of 
international aid institutions have encouraged corruption. Ironically, the very 
accounting practices international aid donors helped to instill in the Haitian 
government is later used as their reason for their hesitation in giving the 
government control over aid financing. International aid therefore often bypasses 
the Haitian government entirely, going directly to foreign NGOs. Additionally, 
endemic to the Haitian government structure are vacancies in some key 
government posts. The Haitian government has been largely left out of the 
development equation. According to Buss & Gardner (2008), the Haitian 
government shirks its responsibility to meet the needs of Haitian citizens and 
leaves the duty instead to the Haitian diaspora (through remittances) and NGOs 
(through aid).  
A longstanding lack of political will on the part of government officials 
and a tendency to protect the interests of the Haitian elite and foreign investors at 
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the expense of the people has greatly injured government/constituent 
relationships. A corrupt judiciary and ineffective police force also mar relations 
(World Bank, 2007). Notwithstanding, it is not lost on the Haitian people that 
foreign forces have worked and are working behind the scenes to bring about 
political changes in the Haitian government that would benefit their foreign 
agendas. The Haitian musical group Carimi in their popular song Ayiti (Bang 
Bang) sing these words:   
FBI... CIA... m zanmi...  
(FBI... CIA... have mercy) 
Peyi mwen tounen toukou yon fim koboy… 
(My country has turned into a western) 
Peyim pa yon jwt sispan jwe av… 
(My country's isn't a toy, stop playing with it) 
Sakap Pase CIA… 
(What's up CIA?) 
Yo pran peyi muen, men yo controle muen… 
(They took my country, their hands control me) 
Sak gen lakay FBI… 
(What's up FBI?) 
Yo pran peyi muen, men yo controle muen… 
(They took my country, their hands control me) 
         
      (Carmi, 2002, track 2) 
 
While there are civil servants and even entire government agencies that 
shirk their duties, there are many who solemnly undertake their responsibilities 
and genuinely seek the well-being and betterment of their constituents and the 
nation. Although the shortcomings of the Haitian government are numerous, 
history lacks an instance in which a nation developed independent of the support 
and inclusion of the central government.  
Foreign Organizations 
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  For the past half-century thousands of NGOs have been established in 
Haiti. Their mission is to help. As time has proved, "help" came in varying 
degrees and in some cases, who was being helped - the Haitian people or the 
NGOs- themselves was not quite clear. Before the earthquake there were 
approximately 10,000 NGOs on the island (Fatton, 2010), the highest number of 
NGOs per capita in the world. Dubbed "a republic of NGOs" (O'Neill, 2010), the 
nation nonetheless has been steadily getting poorer. Haiti has long been in need of 
aid and thousands of foreign NGOs have entered the country with the intent to be 
of assistance. These well-meaning entities have been doing "development work" 
(Fatton, 2010) for the last several decades. Yet for all their work, a stronger, more 
self-sufficient Haitian nation has not emerged. 
     It has been established that the greater the number of NGOs in a country, 
the less developed the country is (Global Policy Forum, 2010). However, a more 
accurate observation might lie in the type of aid rendered and not necessarily the 
number of NGOs present. The majority of NGOs in Haiti are working to assist 
Haitians to obtain basic goods and services such as health care, education, 
housing, and employment. This fact is most telling about the day-to-day struggle 
of many Haitians. In this light the rise in the number of NGOs in Haiti is then to a 
large degree understandable. 
   As deep-seated as Haiti's needs are, heavy NGO presence may help in the 
short term but "aid" turns crippling in the long term when there are no exit 
strategies for these organizations. There are several drawbacks of a strong NGO 
involvement in Haiti. First, NGO presence indirectly encourages learned 
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helplessness not only on the part of the indigenous government but also on the 
part of communities that are receiving direct assistance. Second, an inundation of 
free care or goods can drastically diminish, if not effectively put an end to, local 
industry, as has recently been evidenced in Zambia. Zambia was recently 
inundated by second hand clothes, which put its clothing factories out of business 
and brought to an end the local clothing industry (Bloemen, 2001). Third, NGO 
presence in all aspects of society creates parallel state-like structures that, to a 
large extent circumvent rather than work with the Haitian government. Today, 
NGOs are involved in every sector of Haitian society with budgets that dwarf 
governmental counterparts by comparison (Barry-Shaw, 2008). NGO hyper-
presence in Haiti have some thinking that "the cure has become worse than the 
disease" (“Unthinkable? Curb Aid in Haiti”, 2010, Conclusion section) since their 
presence seems to have the net effect of actually hindering development and 
thwarting the nation's efforts to become self-sustaining (Global Policy Forum, 
2010). 
 The exasperation and frustration of some Haitians at the presence of 
NGOs is palpable. Haitian businesses and aspiring business owners find 
themselves as "outsiders to NGO-land" (Cave, 2010, n.a. ¶14), and have no 
organized structures within which to operate. Animosity towards foreign NGOs 
has arisen when Haitians witness the work of NGOs causing more damage than 
good. Tales of unfinished projects that leave Haitians hanging are not rare 
(Davidson & Joffe-Walt, 2010). In his exposé of the international aid business, 
twenty years ago, Graham Hancock (1989), wrote that "the ugly reality is that 
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most poor people in the most poor countries most of the time never receive or 
even make contact with aid in any tangible shape or form" (p190). It is not gone 
unnoticed by the Haitian people that the majority of aid funds work their way 
back into the pockets of foreign donors by way of staff salary and associated 
personnel costs, contracts awarded to foreign firms, and purchase of foreign 
materials such as supplies and parts (Davidson & Joffe-Walt, 2010).  
 Conversely, in some Haitian communities, outside aid and aid workers are 
better received and at times overtly preferred to any assistance from fellow 
Haitians (Fountain, 2010). This dependence on foreigners or blan is worrisome to 
those who want so desperately for Haiti to be independent.  
     Due to the sheer amount of funds raised, received, and managed by 
foreign NGOs in the redevelopment of Haiti, it is of special interest to ascertain 
what development frameworks are emerging among this group. 
Social Ventures 
 Social ventures are entities that use a business model to address economic, 
social, or environmental issues. Borrowing skills and techniques from the private 
sector, these entities pursue mission-related goals through income-generating 
activities (Larson, 2002). Social ventures are increasingly filling market gaps 
between private enterprise and the public sector (Haugh, 2007) in the developing 
and developed world alike. Bypassing the conventional funding strategies for 
nonprofits allows social ventures to have more flexibility in their finances. Should 
competition arise, needs change, or new service opportunities arise, social 
ventures are not dependent on outside sources of funding as are traditional 
  31 
nonprofit organizations (Larson, 2002). 
Hybrid Organizations 
 Hybrid entities are comprised of two or more of the aforementioned 
entities. The globalization of nonprofit work has naturally pulled together people 
from various backgrounds to create hybrid organizations in an effort to help Haiti.   
Understanding Haiti's Vulnerabilities 
    The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SL), the research framework for 
this study, identifies four key dimensions of sustainability – economic, 
institutional, social, and environmental sustainability – needed for development 
(Carney, 1999). In the aftermath of the January 2010 earthquake, these areas 
constitute the major overarching areas of vulnerability for the nation. 
Additionally, these areas of vulnerability are also highly interrelated with the 
improvement or degradation of one affecting the others. In order for the 
redevelopment efforts to be successful, Haiti’s vulnerabilities must be addressed. 
This section will explore the operationalization of the four vulnerabilities in the 
context of Haiti.  
Economic Vulnerability  
 Haiti's economic vulnerability is made obvious regardless of the economic 
indicator used whether gross domestic product (GDP), industrial production 
figures, minimum wage, or similar measures. Eighty percent of the population is 
living under the poverty line and 54% are in abject poverty (CIA, 2010). As 
previously discussed, foreign aid has helped alleviate poverty for some Haitians 
but the nation remains impoverished. Much like the inundation of secondhand 
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clothing has put an end to the clothing industry in Zambia, (Bloemen, 2001). 
Also, the vast supplies of free foreign rice (Haiti's staple food) after the 
earthquake have caused the price of Haitian rice to plummet, further exacerbating 
the already poor Haitian farmers (Davidson & Kenney, 2010).  
 Traditionally, interventions to move Haitians out of poverty have focused 
on the privatization of services and foreign investment by way of factories and 
plants. Both methods have proved a failure, yet even now, some in the 
international community believe these methods are viable solutions to Haiti's 
economic slump seek their re-implementation (Ives, 2010). The privatization of 
sanitation services, education, and health care put these services out of the reach 
of the majority of the Haitian population. As a result, the standard of living has 
decreased and the gap between the poor and the rich (who can pay for such 
services) has increased (Kidder, 2004).  
    The latest move to increase foreign investment has emerged from the 
Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Acts (HOPE I of 
2006 & HOPE II of 2008) aimed to revive the Haitian garment industry (Seelke & 
Hornbeck, 2008). Haiti has had a somewhat long history of factory assembly. 
Foreign apparel (Collier, 2009), sporting equipment, shoes, leather goods, 
furniture, and electronics (Arthur, 2007) industries have all profited from the 
capable hands of Haitians. HOPE I & II were patterned after the Africa 
Investment Incentive Act of 2006 which allows preferential treatment to apparel 
articles produced in developing countries. Via Export Processing Zones (EPZs), 
HOPE I & II open US markets duty free to Haitian textiles produced from any 
  33 
third country (namely Asian) fabrics.  
 Export Processing Zones (EPZ) are direct beneficiaries of the HOPE II 
Act and it has been argued that their numbers should be increased in Haiti in order 
to establish a market economy, eliminate barriers to US trade and investment, 
create policies to reduce poverty, create a system to combat corruption, and 
implement internationally recognized worker rights (Collier, 2009). According to 
The World Bank EPZs have three primary goals: 1) provide a country with 
foreign exchange earnings by promoting nontraditional exports, 2) create jobs and 
generate income, and 3) attract foreign direct investment, technology transfer, 
knowledge spillover, demonstration effects, and backward linkages. 
 Shamsie (2009) studied such interventions and has come to the conclusion 
that EPZs are “unlikely to decrease poverty in any significant way or alleviate the 
country’s socioeconomic inequalities” (p649). Products from EPZs would serve 
only one trade partner - the United States. Should relations sour and a trade 
embargo takes place (which happened as recently as the 1990s; Katz & Boscov-
Ellen, 2010), Haiti’s economic situation may suffer.   
     The fallacies of both privatization and EPZs are their focus on increasing 
Haitians' incomes, rather than increasing wealth. Income is defined as the 
“amount of money or its equivalent received during a period of time in exchange 
for labor or services, from the sale of goods or property, or as profit from 
financial investments” (The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language, 2009).  Income differs from wealth.  Wealth is defined as “all goods 
and resources having value in terms of exchange or use” (The American Heritage 
  34 
Dictionary of the English Language, 2009). Wealth, then, is more than purchasing 
power since purchasing power simply moves money between individuals or 
businesses (which is what income affords). Guatemalan-based nonprofit As Green 
As It Gets (AGAIG) proposes that increase in wealth, not simply income, is what 
pulls individuals out of poverty (Voorhes, n.a.). 
  AGAIG proposes that economies based on native undervalued industries 
and assets are more offer a much more culturally sensitive and sustainable 
approach to economic development. The key process in such an economy is to 
keep the value-generating manufacturing steps on home soil and have complete 
control of the production processes (see Appendix D). 
 Native industries that do exist are plagued by the lack of infrastructure and 
maintenance which is seriously hindering economic progress. Entrepreneurs from 
both the island and the diaspora feel their businesses would grow if the 
government would build and maintain roads, shipping ports, and airports. One 
such individual, a diaspora vetiver producer and exporter from Haiti's southern 
city of Leys Cayes, is frustrated with the Haitian government's "lack of 
entrepreneurial vision" (Pierre, 2009, ¶8). Vetiver grass is cultivated in Haiti for 
its oil that is used in perfumery. He and others feel Haitian government officials, 
both past and present, have contented themselves with pursuing international aid 
rather than making real efforts to promote national production. "You need to have 
infrastructure before inviting people to invest in your country, even if it is 
entrepreneurs from the Haitian diaspora" (Pierre, 2009, ¶8).  
     Fifty-three percent of the Haitian government's budget is dependent on 
  35 
foreign aid dollars (Bigg, 2010). Also, the Haitian economy is very integrated 
with that of the U.S. (Dupuy, 2010). As such, foreign entities seem to have more 
say in government affairs than do the Haitian people. A change in  these 
conditions must quickly take place if Haiti is to have a sovereign and 
economically strong future.  
Institutional Vulnerability  
Without reiterating the shortcomings of the Haitian government, it is 
reasonable to posit that an honest assessment of Haiti’s situation would reveal that 
the nation’s history and future is in large part in the hands of its government.  A 
fragmented, crippled, and dependent government begets a fragmented, crippled, 
and dependent society. That being said, their formidable task of redeveloping 
Haiti is no easy process.  
Haiti’s redevelopment should be spearheaded by the Haitian 
government and informed by the needs and wants of the Haitian people. At 
present, this is not the case. Educated Haitians have been invited to participate in 
meetings on Haiti’s redevelopment held by foreign governments and NGOs but 
feels their inputs are neither heeded nor welcomed, “They just want a couple of 
Haitians at the table for decoration. To quote one Port-au-Prince ophthalmologist, 
“We’re there so they can keep on getting their money” (Fountain, 2010, 51:00). 
 The business of aid, its agenda, its state-undermining policies, and some of its 
racial undertones have been expertly documented in works such as Hancock’s 
(1989) Lords of Poverty: The Power, Prestige, and Corruption of the 
International Aid Business and Perkins’ (2005) Confessions of an Economic Hit 
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Man. These implications, touched upon somewhat earlier, will be further 
discussed later in this study.  
Haiti’s institutional vulnerabilities can only be addressed when its 
central governing system is strengthened. A crucial element to achieving this is 
government fiscal sustainability. To fund government operations and provide 
public services the government needs to find innovative ways in which to 
generate taxes. And once taxes have been collected they should be invested in the 
improvement of Haitian society. Additionally, these improvements must be 
visible and tangible to the average Haitian – not to mention that they should also 
be maintained.  
The World Bank’s (2007) assessment of Haiti’s judicial system found it 
to be in need of immediate reform. The ministry of justice has been plagued by 
collapsing physical infrastructure, poor court records, weak case filing systems, 
often lost court documents, and accusations of fraud and human rights violations. 
Most of Haiti’s population is excluded from the formal justice system since 40% 
lack civil identity documentation needed to have legal standing in court. A barely 
operating état civile or civil registry is to blame. For those able to even receive a 
court hearing there are long delays in the administration of justice (World Bank, 
2007). As a result, victims or their family members have been known to take 
justice into their own hands. The state of the island’s judicial system illustrates 
how Haitians are not really provided for by the judiciary.  
Serious growing pains are no doubt on the horizon, should the Haitian 
government change its course. Such is the path however, towards a sovereign and 
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united state. Building Haiti’s institutional capacity is the cornerstone to Haiti’s 
redevelopment.  
Social Vulnerability 
Dupuy’s (1989) study of Haitian society revealed chasms between the 
Haitian black majority, the Haitian government, and the Haitian mulatto 
bourgeoisie. Since colonial times, ruling powers on the island have used 
differences in skin color to pit the inhabitants of the island against each other. The 
U.S. military occupation of Haiti in the early 1900s was no different. Dupuy 
found that U.S. society's own racist ideals led them to favor mulattoes for 
presidency, cabinet, administrative and military posts under their supervision. In 
response, the black middle class and black elite presidential candidate, Dumarsais 
Estimé, won elections in 1946 giving birth to black nationalism or noirsm. Under 
the François "Papa Doc" Duvalier dictatorship, mulattoes were removed from all 
key government, state, and army posts. However, the Duvaliers did not attempt to 
transform the class structure of Haiti or readdress the economic dominance of 
mulatto and diaspora elite (Dupuy, 1989) setting the stage for Haiti's present 
system of social stratification that ascribes preferred status on the basis of family 
of origi n, skin color, and the ability to speak French (Perito & Maly, 2006). 
Racism has also been the cause of division between Haiti and its Latin 
neighbor the Dominican Republic. Some economic interventions, such as the EPZ 
in Ouanaminthe, Haiti, have capitalized on this unfortunate strained relationship. 
This garment factory sitting close to the Haitian-Dominican border employs 
Haitians as laborers and Dominicans as supervisors (Duvillier, 2004; Demaret, 
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1999). Insensitivity to the island's history increases animosity between these 
neighbors. 
According to the World Bank (2007), Haiti's social vulnerability is also 
increased due to its corrupt judicial system. Mutual trust in society is discouraged 
since wrongdoing often goes unpenalized threatening security and welfare. 
Any redevelopment approach in Haiti must be a socioeconomic one 
since these two areas are so closely related. Interventions must be culturally 
sensitive, community-building focused endeavors that draw upon Haitian's 
inherent strengths.  
Environmental Vulnerability  
The Climate Change Vulnerability Index (CCVI) points to Haiti as the 
second most vulnerable nation to climate change. The Maplecroft's 2009-2010 
Climate Change Risk Report rates nations on their capacity to mitigate risks and 
the resulting effects on ecosystems of natural hazards, such as floods, droughts, 
storms and sea level rises. Haiti's rising risk of food and energy insecurity and 
declining water quality contribute to its very poor rating (Maplecroft, 2009).  
While Haiti and the Dominican Republic may share one island 
geographically, the environmental wealth is not evenly shared. Hispaniola’s rains 
come mainly from the east offering the Dominican Republic with more rain which 
supports higher rates of plant growth. Hispañola’s highest mountains are on the 
Dominican side and the rivers from those high mountains mainly flow eastwards 
into the Dominican Republic. The Dominican side has broad valleys, plains and 
plateaus, as well as much thicker soils.  
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In contrast, the Haitian side is much drier due to the barrier of high 
mountains blocking rains from the east. Compared to their neighboring country, a 
higher percentage of Haiti is mountainous with thinner, less fertile soils create 
lower capacity for recovery. By the mid-19th century, the French had largely 
stripped Haiti’s lowlands and mid-mountain slopes. All the French ships that 
brought slaves to Haiti returned to Europe with cargos of Haitian timber. In its 
early history, Haiti was the wealthiest colony of the French empire (1525-1844) 
and boasted a rich agricultural economy early in its history. Such high national 
production came at the expense of Haiti’s environmental capital of forests and 
soils (Diamond, 2006).  
By 1978, Haiti has been reduced to a forest cover of 6.7% due to 
agricultural clearing and the use of wood for fuel (Stevensen, 1989). Today, that 
figure has dropped to an estimated 3% (Dolisca, McDaniel, Teeter & Jolly, 2007). 
Deforestation has caused a reduction in the soil's capacity to absorb water 
therefore despite steady rainfall; water runs off the hillsides which offer little 
benefits to crops and doesn't replenish groundwater supplies (Kreimer & 
Munasinghe, 1991).  
Two-thirds of all Haitians depend on the agricultural sector for their 
livelihoods, not to mention the wellbeing of the nation as a whole is tied to the 
success of its rural areas. Haiti's countryside remains vulnerable to damage from 
frequent natural disasters which, as previously discussed, are exacerbated by the 
country's widespread deforestation (CIA, 2010). After decades of neglect by the 
Haitian government, the influx of displaced Port-au-Prince residents to the 
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countryside following the earthquake will no doubt further stress the fragile 
ecosystem. The increase in natural disasters is a worldwide phenomenon, a trend 
that by all appearances will continue. Strategies focused on staying and reversing 
Haiti's environmental degradation are urgently needed.  
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Chapter 3 
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (Figure 1) was created by the 
United Kingdom's Department for International Development in 1997 to assist in 
the elimination of poverty in poorer nations (Carney, 1999). This framework 
offers a holistic means from which we could understand why traditional 
development has not yielded broad, positive and sustainable results. The basic 
structure of the framework and its components is presented in Figure 1. The SL 
Framework places people, not just their income, at the center of development. At 
the core of this framework lies an Asset Pentagon, which recognizes and takes 
into account the human, social, physical, financial, and natural capitals inherent in 
all communities. Additionally, this approach recognizes that poverty is 
multidimensional and uses community-identified indicators of poverty to 
cooperatively create development initiatives. The SL framework also offers a 
more culturally sensitive approach to community development.  
For this study, the SL framework provided an understanding of the 
possible implications of the emerging thinking or approaches on the 
vulnerabilities of Haitian society. In this regard, the first three elements of the 
framework (vulnerability context, livelihood assets, and transforming structures 
and processes) were used as the guiding constructs for this work. Lastly, the SL 
framework principles and inferences were used as guidelines in the creation of the 
research instrument. 
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According to this framework “a livelihood comprises the capabilities, 
assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a 
means of living: a livelihood is sustainable which can cope with and recover from 
stress and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets… both now 
and in the future (Carney, 1998, p4), or… while not undermining the natural base 
(Scoones, 1998, p5). 
 
Figure 1. Sustainable  Livelihoods Framework       
 
Note. From Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets (Section 1.1) Department 
for International Development, 1999, London, England: Author.  
 
The SL framework in particular focuses on increasing the well-being of individual 
or household livelihoods but recognizes that community and national well-being 
is determined by that of individuals and households. The SL framework stresses 
that local livelihoods are acknowledged and respected. Local “buy in” of 
development projects is critical as is having development success indicators 
determined by the locals themselves. Thus, within the SL framework it is 
understood that the higher the levels of commitment on the part of the 
community, the higher the rates of success.  
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Of particular note to this study is the framework’s more comprehensive 
measurement of sustainability that includes income as well as wealth.  Increase in 
income has typically been the de-facto means of determining if an economic 
intervention has been successful. This has historically been the case with 
economic interventions in Haiti. Many economic development programs in 
targeted at developing nations claim to be “increasing the income of the target 
group,” “raising persistently low incomes,” or some similar income-denominated 
objective (Wright, 1999; Dreze and Sen, 1989) despite the fact that increase in 
income does not necessarily mean a reduction in poverty.  
Poverty is the result of diminished capital and income poverty is only one 
type of poverty (Reardon & Vosti, 1995). The SL framework’s Asset Pentagon 
(also referred to as Livelihood Assets) illustrates that human, social, physical, 
financial, and natural capitals are a key component for sustainable development. 
Human capital encompasses individuals’ health, their ability to work, and the 
knowledge and skills acquired from observation or passed down from previous 
generations. Additionally, education can improve the capacity of individuals to 
better use existing assets and create new ones. Social capital refers to the way in 
which people work together. Social obligation, trust and mutual support, and 
reciprocal exchange can all play a critical role in sustainable development – 
particularly in times of crises.  Physical capital includes access to tools, 
equipment, and infrastructure such as ports, roads, airports, market facilities, 
water supply, and health care facilities that will influence the one’s ability to earn 
an adequate livelihood. Financial capital, as previously mentioned, is often the 
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focus of development interventions. While financial capital is an important 
dimension of sustainable development, it is just one of many. Financial capital is 
derived from a conversion of production into cash. Additionally, financial capital 
may include use of formal or informal credit to supplement other financial 
resources. Natural capital includes the land, water, forest resources, and livestock 
key in food production and income generation. Access to and health of these 
natural resources is also important. A diminished capital, whichever it might be, 
impoverishes that individual, household, community, or nation not only in that 
particular regard but may have implications for other capitals as well. It must be 
noted, however, that robustness and/or depletion of capital varies in definition 
depending on the individual, household, community, or nation. A simplified 
example would be a city dweller trading some natural capital (such as land in a 
rural area) for more financial capital (higher income in the city) whereas a rural 
dweller might find the converse ideal.  
Flanking the Asset Pentagon on either side is the Vulnerability Context 
and Transforming Structures and Processes. A community’s transforming 
structures and processes (government, private sector, and other institutions) have 
a direct influence on that community’s vulnerability context (link highlighted in 
red, Figure 2) which in turn affects the strengthening or depletion of one or more 
assets. The six entity types included in this study (social venture, government 
agency, foreign, diaspora, grassroots, and hybrid organizations) were asked to 
share their perspectives on how the transforming structures and processes, as well 
as on whose roles, responsibilities, and processes, can either augment or 
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(preferably) decrease Haiti’s vulnerability context as it relates to the rebuilding 
efforts.  
 
Figure 2. Transforming Structures and Processes Linked to Vulnerability Context 
 
Note. From Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets (Section 1.1) Department 
for International Development, 1999, London, England:Author.  
 
In the SL framework, structures represent entities and processes. Processes 
include policies, societal norms, incentives, and laws. Access, control, and use of 
assets are greatly influenced by structures and processes in a society. These 
structures and processes link micro (that is individuals, households and 
communities) to macro (such as government, private enterprises, or nonprofit 
groups) levels. The vulnerability context of a community is increased when 
livelihoods are threatened by shocks, trends, and seasonality. Conversely, 
vulnerability contexts can be decreased through strengthening assets and 
increasing the ability of communities to bounce back (Carney, 1999).  
This framework was chosen as a guide for this study because it allows for 
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a more comprehensive understanding of the situation in that Haiti currently is 
experiencing Haiti’s vulnerabilities (economic, institutional, social, and 
environmental) are a direct result of the neglect and depletion of Haiti’s assets. 
These assets, for one reason or another, were not safeguarded or their growth 
encouraged by the various entities in Haiti (transforming structures and processes) 
throughout its history.  
Several alternative SL frameworks have been created for various projects 
such as the Agrisystems SL Framework, the Khanya SL Framework, Brazilian SL 
Framework, and the Imperial College Framework (Carney, 1999). The original 
SL framework was the model of choice for this study because of its more 
universal application.  Additionally, the SL framework has been used extensively 
in planning, assessments, and programs around the world. Carney (1999) lists 
some examples of the variety of projects that have used this framework: 
• National-level planning (e.g. Uganda’s) 
• DFID country program preparation (e.g. Cambodia) 
• Development of large-scale poverty eradication strategies (e.g. South 
Africa) 
• Input into participatory poverty assessments (e.g. Indonesia & Vietnam) 
• Structuring a large-scale living standards survey in Mongolia 
• Responding to an emergency (e.g. DFID’s response to the Orissa Cyclone) 
• FAO vulnerable group profiling  
• Development of multi-country sectoral partnership (25 West African 
countries) 
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• Project planning (e.g. Bangladesh & India) 
• Community-based planning (e.g. South Africa & Nepal) 
• Monitoring and evaluation (e.g. India, Bangladesh & Kenya) 
• Review of existing programs (e.g. Pakistan) 
• Institutional analysis (e.g. Southern Africa) 
• Structuring research and teaching (e.g. Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, Kenya, 
South Asia & Southern Africa  
• Policy process analysis (e.g. Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Malawi, Nigeria, 
Zambia, & Zimbabwe) 
• Sectoral reform (e.g. Uganda & Indonesia) 
The types of entities included in this study represent the institutions that, 
in some way or another, have a say in Haiti’s future. The SL framework reflects 
the fact that institutions that govern and/or are involved in impoverished societies 
are complex. It is no wonder then that the issue of poverty and its related 
vulnerabilities is also complex. What isn’t addressed directly by the framework is 
whether the presence of vulnerability brings about the creation of these 
institutions or if the presence of institutions creates vulnerabilities in a society. 
Both scenarios are no doubt correct. What is clearly discerned from the 
framework is that dysfunctional institutions increase a society’s vulnerability 
context (Cahn, 2002).  
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Chapter 4 
METHODS 
Instrument 
Instrument creation was informed by the SL framework principles and 
inferences. Appendix A illustrates and summarizes how research questions were 
derived from the framework.  
In essence, this study sought to answer the following eight research 
questions: 
(a) What are the redevelopment frameworks or thinking emerging in your 
entity? 
(b) To what degree are traditional development frameworks or thinking 
being abandoned or reframed?  
(c) To what degree are new frameworks or thinking being created in other 
entities?  
(d) How are new frameworks or thinking focused on helping to minimize 
the vulnerabilities of Haitian society?  
(e) What are some challenges to and victories of collaborative efforts 
between entities?  
(f) What do organizations perceive as the greatest barriers to Haiti's re-
development?  
(g) What do organizations believe are Haiti's greatest strengths and how 
do they envision these strengths playing a role in the re-development 
effort? 
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(h) What implications do these new frameworks have on development 
policy-making? 
The research questions were first written in English and then translated to 
French by a Haitian contact in the field. The research instrument (Appendix C) 
consists of three sections. The first section asked participants about their 
organization/agency’s characteristics. Examples include mission, length of service 
in Haiti and date of establishment (questions 1-5). The second section consisted of 
13 questions (questions 6-18), some with sub-components. Two of the questions 
in this section asked participants to identify the degree which they see old 
development thinking/approaches being abandoned or reframed in the current 
work of redeveloping Haiti (question 7) and the degree to which they see new 
thinking or approaches to development being created (question 9). The third 
section consisted of demographic questions. Examples include participants’ age, 
organizational role, and place of birth (question 19a-19f). These items yielded the 
capacity to document the diversity of the participants in this study.  
 Sampling Strategy 
Snowball sampling, also known as chain referral sampling or participant-
driven sampling, is a nonprobability purposive sampling strategy. This strategy 
was utilized to build the sample of key informants representing each of the 6 
entities that were to be explored in this study. Key informants are “knowledgeable 
individuals who can supply valuable information” (Padgett, 2008, 89). The 
snowballing methodology entails first identifying individuals with the targeted 
characteristics and interviewing them or asking them to fill out a questionnaire. 
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These participants are then asked for referrals of other individuals that they 
considered to have common attributes and are perceived as potentially willing to 
participate in the study (Berg, 2009).  
Purposive sampling or nonprobability sampling is the "deliberate process 
of selecting participants based on their ability to provide the needed information" 
(Padgett, 2008, p53). Purposive sampling, like other qualitative studies, does not 
seek to represent a larger population but rather to understand the sample itself 
(Coyne, 1997). Of the various purposive sampling techniques, snowball sampling 
best suits this study due to its referral component. 
The researcher served as data collector and resided in Haiti from July 6, 
2010 to September 30, 2010. The initial pool of key informants was identified via 
family contacts in Port-au-Prince. These participants in turn provided referrals to 
other individuals. The goal of the researcher goal was to interview at least one 
individual from each of the six entity types (social venture, government agency, 
diaspora, grassroots, foreign, and hybrid organizations).  
A total of twenty-one entities were interviewed for this study (Table 1). 
Of the 21 entities interviewed, six were foreign nonprofits, five were grassroots 
nonprofits, three were Haitian government agencies (two former employees and 
one current employee), one was a diaspora nonprofit, two were diaspora social 
ventures, and four were hybrid nonprofits. 
The researcher was also able to attend one community meeting in Port-au-
Prince, Haiti where several civil society organizations met weekly. Haitians and 
foreigners alike attended this meeting.  
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Table 1. Entity Types and Distribution 
Entity Type Entity Distribution 
Hybrid Nonprofit 2-diaspora/grassroots 
1-diaspora/grassroots/foreign 
1-diaspora/foreign 
Grassroots Nonprofit 5 
Foreign Nonprofit 6 
Government Agency 3 
Diaspora Social Venture 2 
Diaspora Nonprofit 1 
                21 Entities Total 
 
The researcher chose to key informants from organizations rather than 
community members for two reasons. First, organization key informants represent 
a whole, in this case, an organizing body, with a fixed mission with resources and 
a structure by which to fulfill that mission. Interviewing individuals in the 
community who have no organizational affiliation would no doubt be just as 
insightful, however, they would be speaking for themselves (rather than a whole 
community) and their viewpoints therefore, would not have as broad of an 
implication for Haitian society. Second, according to the SL framework, the work 
of transforming structures and processes, represented in this study by the four 
organizations, are directly linked to the reduction or increase of a community's 
vulnerability context. As such, it is of great interest to the researcher to see if the 
emerging re-development frameworks include or exclude measures to address 
vulnerabilities (i.e. shocks, trends, and seasonality; Carney, 1999). 
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Four methods were used to invite participants to take part in this study: 
email, telephone, face-to-face, and “cold” visit (Table 2). Through the assistance 
of family contacts in Port-au-Prince, a list of possible key informants were 
identified, none of which (save one former government official), upon the 
researcher’s arrival in Haiti were able to participate in the study. An Internet 
search yielded several lists of government agencies, grassroots, foreign, and 
diaspora organizations. Entities with email information listed were then contacted. 
Electronic invitations to participate in the study were sent in either French, 
English, or both depending on the organization.  Emails included the interview 
consent statement and interview questions in the appropriate language. A search 
on facebook® for organizations working in Haiti was also an avenue through 
which possible study participants were recruited. In all, approximately 250 
entities were contacted via email. Through another family contact in the Haitian 
capital, some nonprofit offices were located and four were “cold” visited. 
Approximately eight nonprofits were contacted via telephone. One government 
agency was asked in a face-to-face conversation to participate in this project. Of 
those contacted, twenty-one in all were interviewed.   
 
Table 2. Study Invitation Methods 
Entity Type Study Invitation Method Referred 
diaspora/grassroots 
hybrid nonprofit 
email no 
grassroots nonprofit email no 
grassroots nonprofit email no 
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grassroots nonprofit telephone yes 
community meeting N/A yes 
government agency face-to-face no 
foreign nonprofit telephone yes 
diaspora/grassroots/forei
gn hybrid nonprofit 
email no 
foreign nonprofit email no 
diaspora/grassroots 
hybrid nonprofit 
email no 
diaspora social venture email yes 
diaspora social venture email yes 
foreign nonprofit email no 
diaspora/foreign hybrid 
nonprofit 
email no 
foreign nonprofit telephone yes 
foreign nonprofit email no 
government agency telephone yes 
diaspora nonprofit telephone no 
grassroots nonprofit email no 
grassroots nonprofit email yes 
government agency email no 
foreign nonprofit (x2) “cold” visit no 
 
Entity Demographics 
The dates of organizational establishment varied widely among the 
nonprofits and social ventures varied widely (Table 3). The oldest entity, a foreign 
nonprofit, had been in operation since 1982. The youngest entity was a 
diaspora/foreign hybrid nonprofit which was birthed in March 2010 in response to 
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the earthquake. Entities were headquartered in the U.S., Haiti, or Europe.  
 
Table 3. Entity Headquarters and Dates of Establishment  
Entity Type Entity 
Headquarters 
Date of 
Establishment 
diaspora/grassroots hybrid nonprofit United States 1999 
grassroots nonprofit Haiti 2004 
grassroots nonprofit Haiti 1995 
grassroots nonprofit Haiti 2006 
foreign nonprofit United States 1982 
diaspora/grassroots/foreign hybrid 
nonprofit 
United States 1994 
foreign nonprofit United States 1997 
diaspora/grassroots hybrid nonprofit United States 2008 
diaspora social venture United States February 2010 
diaspora social venture United States 2009 
foreign nonprofit United States 2000 
diaspora/foreign hybrid nonprofit United States March 2010 
foreign nonprofit United States 2008 
foreign nonprofit United States 1974 
diaspora nonprofit United States January 13, 2010 
grassroots nonprofit Haiti 2005 (2009 official 
registration) 
grassroots nonprofit Haiti 2001 
foreign nonprofit (x2) Europe 1994 
Note: Table excludes government agencies and community meeting 
 
Entity missions varied considerably, encompassing a variety of issues 
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and concerns (Table 4). Three organizations (a diaspora/grassroots hybrid, a 
diaspora social venture, and a foreign organization) focused on connecting and 
encouraging collaboration between organizations. Three grassroots nonprofits 
sought to prepare Haiti’s next generation of civil servants through education 
and/or youth leadership training. Several grassroots as well as one 
grassroots/foreign hybrid nonprofit worked to strengthen Haiti’s civil society as a 
whole by supporting democratic processes and political auto-determination. Three 
entities interviewed (two foreign and one diaspora/grassroots hybrid) identified 
themselves as faith-based Christian organizations. One nonprofit (a 
diaspora/foreign hybrid) sought to promote Haitian arts and culture as a means for 
social, cultural, and economic development. Several others focused on improving 
Haiti’s economic situation through a variety of means, namely entrepreneurship, 
job creation and job training. Two foreign nonprofits addressed the educational 
and security needs of Haitian children. See Table 4. The missions of the 
government agencies that participated in this study were not included to protect 
the anonymity of the participants and ensure the confidentiality of their responses. 
 
Table 4. Entity Types and Missions 
Entity Type Entity Mission 
diaspora/grassroots hybrid nonprofit advocate for and connect Haitian 
diaspora organizations 
grassroots nonprofit educate Haitian youth to be civil 
servants and Haiti’s future leaders 
grassroots nonprofit fight foreign political interests (neo-
liberalism) that eclipse Haiti’s own 
grassroots nonprofit work to establish peace and 
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development of the nation by 
organizing and empowering Haiti’s 
civil society 
community meeting provide a weekly open forum in 
which members of Haiti’s civil 
society can meet, discuss and address 
issues pertaining to the well-being and 
advancement of the nation 
foreign nonprofit Christian resource organization for 
individuals working in agriculture and 
development 
diaspora/grassroots/foreign hybrid 
nonprofit 
support the democratic movement in 
Haiti by strengthening it’s civil 
society 
foreign nonprofit partner with Haitians in building and 
maintaining community initiated 
development projects 
diaspora/grassroots hybrid nonprofit provide jobs, training, and business 
start-up funds for communities in 
Haiti using Christian values and 
principles 
diaspora social venture strengthen and expand Haiti’s middle 
market entrepreneurial ventures 
diaspora social venture facilitate collaboration between 
organizations, business, or other 
entities in Haiti 
foreign nonprofit facilitate coordination between 
various Christian groups in Haiti; 
publish reading material in Creole 
diaspora/foreign nonprofit promote Haitian arts and culture as a 
means for social, cultural, and 
economic development 
foreign nonprofit provide education and security for 
disadvantaged children in Haiti 
foreign nonprofit provide Christian education for 
children in Haiti 
diaspora nonprofit collaborate with existing 
organizations to address the 
educational and developmental needs 
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of Haitian society 
grassroots nonprofit improve Haiti’s socio-political 
situation through youth leadership 
training and mobilization of civil 
society 
grassroots nonprofit support and empower Haiti’s next 
generation of farmers 
foreign nonprofit (x2) improve community well-being 
through community health, peace-
building, and education 
Note: Excludes government agencies’ missions to maintain anonymity 
Participant Demographics 
Data on gender and age of the study participants are reported in Table 5. 
The majority (18 out of 22) of study participants were male. Similarly, more 
males than females (5 out of 6) participated in the interviews conducted in Haiti. 
Of the 22 participants, the average age of participants was 44 years of age. The 
average age of male participants was 41 years old. The oldest male participant 
was 60 years old. The youngest male participant was 28 years of age. The two 
individuals from the diaspora social ventures were 31 and 33 years of age. The 
average age of female participants was 36 years of age. The most mature female 
participant was 47 and the two youngest female participants were 26. See Table 5.  
Table 5. Participant Gender and Age 
Entity Type Participant Gender Participant Age 
diaspora/grassroots 
hybrid nonprofit 
female 44 
grassroots nonprofit male 37 
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grassroots nonprofit male 45 
grassroots nonprofit male 58 
community meeting more males than females varied 
government agency male 55 
foreign nonprofit male 56 
diaspora/grassroots/forei
gn hybrid nonprofit 
female 26 
foreign nonprofit male 60 
diaspora/grassroots 
hybrid nonprofit 
female 26 
diaspora social venture male 33 
diaspora social venture male 31 
foreign nonprofit male 57 
diaspora/foreign hybrid 
nonprofit 
male 46 
foreign nonprofit male 45 
foreign nonprofit male 56 
government agency male 53 
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diaspora nonprofit female 47 
grassroots nonprofit male 28 
grassroots nonprofit male 50 
government agency female 37 
foreign nonprofit female 39 
foreign nonprofit male N/A 
 
Table 6 illustrates participant length of time employed and position 
within entity. Study participants varied in the length of time employed at their 
respective organization, agency, or venture. The longest serving individuals were 
a former government official (25 years), a foreign nonprofit (20 years), and a 
diaspora/grassroots hybrid nonprofit (11 years). The participant who was most 
recently employed, as of May 2010, was from a foreign nonprofit. Four entities 
were created in 2010: two diaspora social ventures, one diaspora/foreign hybrid 
nonprofit, and one diaspora nonprofit. 
Position or titles of participants were broad in range (see Table 6). 
Seven individuals were a founding member, founder, co-founder, owner, or 
managing partner. Five participants were president or executive director of their 
nonprofits. Two individuals served as board or executive committee members in 
addition to other duties. 
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Table 6. Length of Time Employed and Position within Entity 
Entity Type Length of Time 
Employed 
Position or Title 
diaspora/grassroots hybrid 
nonprofit 
11 years (co-founder) executive director 
grassroots nonprofit 9 years (founding 
member) 
president 
grassroots nonprofit 4 years program director 
grassroots nonprofit 4 years general coordinator 
government agency 5 years (elected 
official) 
* 
foreign nonprofit 5 1/2 years agricultural consultant 
and technical writer 
diaspora/grassroots/foreign 
hybrid nonprofit 
3 years digital outreach manager 
foreign nonprofit 20 years executive director 
diaspora/grassroots hybrid 
nonprofit 
2 years president and founder 
diaspora social venture since February 2010 1 of four managing 
partners 
diaspora social venture less than 1 year ago founder and webmaster 
foreign nonprofit 10 years owner 
diaspora/foreign hybrid 
nonprofit 
since March 2010 cultural executive director 
foreign nonprofit 2 years country program director 
and board member 
foreign nonprofit 6 years administrator 
government agency 25 years * 
diaspora nonprofit since January 2010 co-founder 
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grassroots nonprofit since January 2009 member coordinator and 
non-voting member of 
executive committee 
grassroots nonprofit 25 years technical consultant and 
member of project 
planning committee 
government agency almost 3 years * 
foreign nonprofit May 2010 emergency coordinator 
foreign nonprofit N/A N/A 
*Not reported to maintain confidentiality 
Participant place of birth and citizenship reveal some predictable 
patterns in relation to the entity they were affiliated with (Table 7.) As expected, 
the majority of participants from grassroots nonprofits, 4 out of 5, were born in 
Haiti. The one exception was born in Paris, France. Similarly, two out of three 
government agency participants were born in Haiti while the third was born in 
Belgium. Both diaspora social venture participants, now American citizens, were 
born in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Of the participants from foreign nonprofits, 5 out of 
6 were born in the United States. The lone exception was born in Haiti.  
Table 7. Participant Year of Birth, Place of Birth, and Citizenship 
Entity Type Place of Birth Citizenship 
diaspora/grassroots 
hybrid nonprofit 
Gonaïve, Haiti American 
grassroots nonprofit Jacmel, Haiti Haitian 
grassroots nonprofit Haiti (northeast) Haitian 
grassroots nonprofit Cap-Haïtien, Haiti Haitian 
government agency Jacmel, Haiti Haitian 
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foreign nonprofit St. Louis, Missouri American 
diaspora/grassroots/forei
gn hybrid nonprofit 
Las Vegas, Nevada American 
foreign nonprofit Akron, Ohio American 
diaspora/grassroots 
hybrid nonprofit 
USA American 
diaspora social venture Port-au-Prince, Haiti American 
diaspora social venture Port-au-Prince, Haiti American 
foreign nonprofit Macon, Georgia American 
diaspora/foreign hybrid 
nonprofit 
Haiti American 
foreign nonprofit Cap-Haïtien, Haiti American 
foreign nonprofit N/A American 
government agency Jacmel, Haiti Haitian 
diaspora nonprofit Tiburon, Haiti American 
grassroots nonprofit Paris, France Haitian 
grassroots nonprofit Les Cayes, Haiti Haitian 
government agency Belgium Haitian 
foreign nonprofit Chicago, Illinois American 
foreign nonprofit Haiti Haitian 
 
Table 8 lists the participant’s field of study in which they received a 
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college degree. Twenty out of 21interviewees reported a field of study. Of those 
20 participants, all had received formal education and had, at a minimum, attained 
a university degree.  
Table 8.  Participant Field of Study 
Entity Type Field of Study 
diaspora/grassroots hybrid nonprofit Macro social work 
grassroots nonprofit Communication, law, and 
administration 
grassroots nonprofit Political science 
grassroots nonprofit Philosophy and Social communication 
government agency Agronomy 
foreign nonprofit Horticulture and plant breeding 
diaspora/grassroots/foreign hybrid 
nonprofit 
International development 
foreign nonprofit Political science and marketing 
diaspora/grassroots hybrid nonprofit Business management 
diaspora social venture Biology 
diaspora social venture Business 
foreign nonprofit Electronic engineering and accounting 
diaspora/foreign hybrid nonprofit Art, painting and fine arts 
foreign nonprofit International economics, business 
education and instructional 
technology 
foreign nonprofit Divinity 
government agency Computational linguistics and 
educational planning 
diaspora nonprofit Nursing 
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grassroots nonprofit Law 
grassroots nonprofit Agriculture 
government agency International affairs and political 
science 
foreign nonprofit English literature and art history 
foreign nonprofit N/A 
 
Data Collection 
                 The primary data collection method used was a semi-structured, in-
depth interview of key informants. Semi-structured interviews require the use of a 
set of open-ended questions to be asked in sequence. However the interviewer can 
typically deviate from the prescribed set in order to pursue other topics of interest 
that were situational to the interview. Thus, the interviews were more dialogic in 
nature than interrogative (Padgett, 2008). 
Consent to participate in the study (Appendix B) was obtained in 
writing or verbally for each participant. Verbal interviews were audio-recorded to 
facilitate transcription and translation. Of a total of 22 interviews, seven were 
face-to-face interviews. Five of the seven face-to-face interviews took place in 
Port-au-Prince, Haiti. All interviews took place in locations relatively free of 
distractions. Of the interviews done in Port-au-Prince, 3 took place at the 
organization’s headquarters, one took place in a business office, and one took 
place in a restaurant. The remaining 2 face-to-face interviews took place in the 
state of Florida. One took place at the organization’s headquarters, the other in a 
private home. Two interviews were conducted by telephone. The remaining 10 
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interviews took place via Skype®. Interviews ranged from just under 30 minutes 
to a little over two hours. 
Three participants chose to reply in writing (one in print and one via 
email). Of the three, one also agreed to a telephone interview. Two participants 
supplemented their interviews with additional information in writing on their 
organizations. One set of documents was received via email, the other furnished at 
the time of the interview. 
The participant who offered responses in print form chose to answer 
only questions 8 through17, omitting information about organizational 
characteristics and participant demographics. This participant offered responses 
through a coworker with whom the researcher conducted a face-to-face interview. 
The lone participant who responded exclusively via email sent his responses in 
segments. Three separate emails were received, each addressing one of the three 
sections of the instrument (Appendix C). One participant, a former government 
employee, requested to skip questions 9 through 15 (second section) because he 
felt a bit too out of touch with his former employer to respond well to these 
particular questions. 
Interviews were conducted in English, Haitian Creole, and/or French, as 
the participants preferred (Table 9). The majority of interviews (17 of 22) were 
conducted in English, either partly or entirely. Of the five interviews that took 
place in Haiti, three were conducted in French, one was done in English, and one 
was done in both English and French. Of the two face-to-face interviews that took 
place in Florida, one was conducted in English, the other in French, English, and 
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Creole.  Of the two participants who chose to reply in writing, one replied in 
English, the other in French. One Skype interview was conducted entirely in 
French while the other 10 Skype interviews were conducted partially or entirely in 
English. Individuals who participated in the community meeting attended in Port-
au-Prince switched often between French and Creole.  
Table 9. Language Used in Interviews 
Entity Type Language used in 
Interview 
Data Collection Method 
diaspora/grassroots 
hybrid nonprofit 
English, Creole, French Skype® 
grassroots nonprofit French face-to-face 
grassroots nonprofit French face-to-face 
grassroots nonprofit French and English face-to-face + 
additional information in 
writing 
government agency French, Creole, English face-to-face 
foreign nonprofit English face-to-face 
diaspora/grassroots/forei
gn nonprofit 
English telephone 
foreign nonprofit English telephone 
diaspora/grassroots 
hybrid nonprofit 
English Skype® +  
additional information in 
writing 
 
diaspora social venture English Skype® 
diaspora social venture English Skype® 
foreign nonprofit English Skype® + email 
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diaspora/foreign 
nonprofit 
English Skype® 
foreign nonprofit English and Creole Skype® 
foreign nonprofit English Skype® 
government agency French Skype® 
diaspora nonprofit English Skype® 
grassroots nonprofit French Skype® 
grassroots nonprofit French email 
government agency English Skype® 
foreign nonprofit English face-to-face 
foreign nonprofit English in writing (print) 
Note: Table excludes community meeting attended. 
The face-to-face individual interviews as well as telephone/Skype® 
interviews took place in a private, quiet location where the researcher and 
participant could dialog free of interruptions. As anticipated, specific interview 
locations varied due to a number of unforeseen factors. One participant in Port-
au-Prince, for instance, asked to have the interview in a restaurant. Individual 
interviews, rather than focus groups, allowed the researcher to best capture the 
stories of each participant.  
Data Management 
Data was managed using Google Docs®, a digital IC Recorder®, and a 
Skype Call Recorder®. The IC Recorder® was used to record, store, and facilitate 
transcription of audio-recorded interviews. The recordings on Skype Call 
Recorder® served only as backup should the IC Recorder® fail for whatever 
reason. Interviews on Skype Call Recorder® can only be accessed on the 
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researcher’s laptop which is password secured. Interview transcriptions were 
saved to separate Google Docs® documents using pseudo names as identifiers 
and which can only be accessed by the researcher. While most participants 
indicated their names could be used, the researcher has chosen to assign pseudo 
names to all participants. 
Data Analysis  
A modified grounded theory analysis was used for this study (Padgett, 
2008). Grounded theory entails cycling between data collection and analysis of 
interview transcripts, comparing text to literature and theories, and contrasting 
data across participants, settings, and situations in order to create a conceptual 
framework. Due to the exploratory nature of this research, grounded theory 
methods will only be used to analyze data and not create theory and as such, was 
considered “modified”. 
Several stages were involved in data analysis. The first stage involved the 
collection of raw data, which included the digital recordings of interviews and 
whatever documentation was supplied by participants. The second stage consisted 
of partially processed data, which included interview transcripts, translations, 
field notes, and interviewer observations.  The third stage involved developing 
themes and codes from the raw and partially processed data.  
Themes are defined as broad concepts derived from the data. They break 
the data in “analytically relevant ways” (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996, p31) allowing 
for text interpretation. Codes are smaller units of concepts within larger, 
overarching themes. Parallel to these three stages of data analysis, memo writing 
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was done to keep to record personal reactions, concerns, and biases as well as to 
keep track of data analysis progress.  Interviews done in French and/or Haitian 
Creole were transcribed directly into English by the researcher although key 
phrases, idioms, and expressions were kept in French or Creole to preserve the 
tone and expression of participants’ responses.  
Data analysis focused more heavily on manifest rather than latent content 
of interview transcripts. Manifest content refers to surface descriptions or face-
value information supplied by participants. Latent content refers to the 
interpretation of hidden or underlying meaning(s) that go beyond face-value 
information (Boyatzis, 1998). To accomplish this, open coding was used where 
chunks of text (ranging in length from a short phrase to a paragraph) were 
assigned labels during the first reading of the transcripts (Ryan and Bernard, 
2000). Several strategies were used to identify codes and develop themes. The 
transcripts were read line-by-line and key-words-in-contexts (KWIC) or words 
that frequently emerged in various contexts were coded. The main question asked 
using this technique was “What’s the context?” The second technique used was 
the compare and contrast technique in which the question “What does this remind 
me of?” was repeatedly asked to tie relevant text from transcript to transcript. The 
third technique was searching for connectors such as because, since, and as a 
result or if, then, rather than, and instead of which indicate relationships such as 
cause and effect. The last coding technique used was pawing where transcripts 
were re-read several times to make sure nothing was overlooked. The question 
driving this technique was “Was anything missed?” (Bernard & Ryan, 2003).  
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Focused coding was then applied to winnow down the codes (Charmaz, 
2006) and then group like codes into themes. For example, open coding yielded a 
list of text that mentioned the Haitian government in several contexts.  Using 
focused coding, those texts were then categorized into narrower, more specific 
codes such as “government efforts”. Where possible, in vivo codes, words or 
word-for-word phrases used by participants were used as code labels. Several 
rounds of focused coding resulted in the final edition of the codebook. Saturation, 
when no new codes or themes emerge, was reached after the first 12-14 
interviews (Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006).  
After three or four transcripts had been coded, a codebook was created 
where short but detailed descriptions of each theme, subthemes, and underlying 
codes from the narratives were compiled (Ryan & Bernard, 2000). Table 10 
provides an illustration of a codebook entry.  
 
Table 10. Codebook Excerpt 
HAITIAN GOVERNMENT (Theme) 
            Encompasses perception of the roles and responsibilities of the Haitian 
government before, during, and after the January 12th earthquake. Includes areas 
in which the Haitian government has made efforts to better Haitian society in the 
past and present as well as its failures in addressing key needs of the Haitian 
people. Also includes references to the upcoming presidential elections, the 
Rebuilding commission, and Haiti’s overall political culture. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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•HAITIAN GOVERNMENT EFFORTS (Sub-theme) 
            Includes descriptions of the work the Haitian government has undertaken 
to move the nation forward economically and socially. These include the 
government’s priorities and strategic plans either before or after the earthquake. 
•FAILURES OF THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT (Sub-theme) 
            References to the participants’ perceptions of the Haitian government’s 
failures to think and act on behalf and in the best interest of the Haitian people. 
Includes references to neglect of nation’s education system. 
 
Strategies for Rigor and Trustworthiness 
Four research strategies were applied to enhance the rigor trustworthiness 
of this study from the perspective of the researcher, participants, and audience. 
They were: reflexivity, negative case analysis, peer debriefing/support, and audit 
trail (see Table 11). These strategies were used to limit researcher bias and 
increase credibility of findings. 
 
Table 11. Strategies for Rigor and Trustworthiness 
Strategy Lens of 
Researcher 
Lens of Study 
Participants 
Lens of 
Audience 
Reflexivity X - - 
Negative Case Analysis X - - 
Peer Debriefing/Support X -  
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Audit Trail - X X 
 
Trustworthiness connotes the credibility, transferability, auditability, 
and confirmability of the researcher, the research procedures, and the subsequent 
findings. Credibility refers to a harmony between the participants’ views and that 
which the researcher has described and interpreted. Transferability speaks to the 
generalizability of the research findings. Auditability refers to the documentation 
trail of the study’s procedures. Lastly, confirmability of a study can be 
demonstrated by a strong link between the findings and the data (Padgett, 2008).  
To enhance rigor and trustworthiness of this study, the author left an audit 
trail, a detailed written account of procedures including the raw data collected 
which will be open to review by the academic community. Due to the researcher’s 
potential bias as a Haitian-American, exercises in reflexivity were undertaken. To 
achieve this, accountability checks were done. Accountability checks challenged 
how the researcher came to know what she knows and interpretations of the data 
were corroborated and verified by the narratives rather than relying on memory or 
assumptions (Berg, 2009).  Negative case analysis entails giving “equitable 
attention to differing points viewpoints and avoiding favoritism and lopsided 
interpretations” (Padgett, 2008, p191; Morrow, 2005). Peer debriefing and 
support was sought from the author’s committee members with whom the 
researcher met independently to discuss the study’s methods and findings to 
ensure the author’s observations and conclusions make sense and are self-
reflective.  
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Limitations 
  Face-to-face interviewing is the most common data collection method for 
qualitative researchers as it is generally understood that face-to-face rather than 
telephone interviews may yield better results. Jordan et al. (1980) found that 
qualitative research, telephone interviews had more response bias and evasiveness 
than interviews conducted face-to-face. Other research, however, concludes that 
telephone interviews can be used just as productively in qualitative research 
(Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004; Miller, 1995). Nonetheless, it must be noted that 
there is a potential for participant bias to emerge in telephone as opposed to face-
to-face interviews.  
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Chapter 5 
NARRATIVE OF FINDINGS 
Five themes or overarching categories emerged from this study: Haitian 
government, rebuilding, aid work and its effects, Haitian society, and international 
interference. Under each theme are several sub-themes with supporting participant 
observations. Table12 summarizes the five themes and their sub-themes emerging 
from the study.  
 
Table 12. Themes and Subthemes 
Themes Subthemes 
1. Haitian Government a. Haitian Government Efforts 
b. Failures of the Haitian Government 
c. Working with the Haitian Government 
d. A Call for Strong Leadership 
e. Haiti’s Political Culture 
2. Rebuilding a. Earthquake a Watershed Moment for Haiti 
b. Haitian Responsibility 
c. Diaspora 
d. Shaping Haiti’s Future 
e. Translating Talk Into Action 
3. Aid Work & Its 
Effects 
a. Paternalism of Aid and Culture of Dependency 
b. Counteracting the Culture of Dependency 
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c. Aid and Its Effects on Haiti’s Economy 
d. True Aid 
4. Haitian Society a. Haitian Culture and Psyche 
b. Haitian Civil Society 
5. International 
Interference 
a. The Hand that Gives is Always Above the Hand that 
Receives 
b. NGOs: Une Cacophonie la Plus Totale 
c. You Untie the Hands to Tie the Feet 
 
The dialogic nature of the interviews allowed participant narratives to be 
woven together into a storyline form. What follows is a narration of participant 
thoughts and observations formatted in a way that gives the impression 
participants were conversing with each other and were observed by, rather than 
speaking to, the researcher. As if they were characters in a storybook, participants 
have been assigned pseudo names and details such as age, place of birth, field of 
study, the entity they worked for and profession have been inserted to add 
richness and multi-dimensionality to the characters. In some instances tone of 
voice, facial expressions, and body language add emotion to what participants 
shared and have been included in the narrative. Words or phrases that were 
stressed by the participant were italicized for emphasis. Table 13 lists the cast of 
characters and their entity affiliation. 
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Table 13. Entity Types & Participant Pseudo Names 
Entity Type Participant Pseudo Names 
Hybrid Nonprofit 2 diaspora/grassroots 
               Marie 
               Elsie 
1 diaspora/grassroots/foreign 
               Virginia 
1 diaspora/foreign 
Leo 
Grassroots Nonprofit 5 
                Josué 
                Jelsen 
                Andrew 
                Jean 
                Raul 
Foreign Nonprofit 6 
Able 
Tom 
Daniel 
Paul 
Martine 
Raymond 
Government Agency 3 
Jude 
Samuel 
Josette 
Diaspora Social Venture 2 
Maxime 
Bernel 
Diaspora Nonprofit 1 
Esther 
 
Theme 1. Haitian Government  
The theme “Haitian Government” encompasses entities’ perceptions of 
the roles and responsibilities of the Haitian government before, during, and after 
the January 12, 2010 earthquake. The themes included comments about areas in 
which the Haitian government has made efforts to better Haitian society in the 
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past and present as well as its failures in addressing key needs of the Haitian 
people. Also included in this theme are references to the upcoming presidential 
elections, Haiti’s Rebuilding commission, and Haiti’s overall political culture.  
 Participants from nearly every entity (only two exceptions: one foreign 
organization and one diaspora social venture) commented in one way or another, 
on the Haitian government. Grassroots nonprofits, diaspora nonprofits, and 
members of the community meeting were particularly vocal about the 
performance of the government.  
1a. Haitian Government Efforts 
Of the 20 participants who commented on the work of the Haitian 
government, only two (a foreign nonprofit and a Haitian government employee) 
noted that efforts on the government’s part to move ahead with reconstruction 
efforts were commendable. These two participants described some of the work the 
Haitian government has undertaken to move the nation forward economically and 
socially. Participants noted in particular the Haitian government’s expressed 
priorities and strategic plans both before and after the earthquake. 
Employed at her current government post for almost 3 years, Josette 
shared that when it comes to development, “the Haitian government knows what 
should happen. It has at least since the Préval administration.” She outlined the 
three main policies of focus for the government:  
“Rebuild the infrastructure [so] that you can provide roads 
to the rural areas so that commerce can flourish and people 
get access to market. Energy. There was a lot of work being 
done on energy. And agriculture. It’s the international 
policy towards Haiti that killed our agriculture. [Working 
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to] regain food security.” 
 
Martine, an emergency coordinator from the foreign nonprofit noted 
that the Haitian government has been working to sort out zoning, a difficult task 
and one of the reasons for stalled rebuilding projects. Her organization manages 
several tent camps, explaining that their proliferation 6 months after the disaster 
was due to the tremendous undertaking of discerning what land belonged to 
whom, ascertaining if the land owner was still alive, and finding the landowner 
before the government can purchase and then build on the lot(s). She shares that 
“the biggest thing is territory adjustment” and notes that these issues have to be 
addressed and “approved before moving forward”.  
Josette also pointed out that the government, already weak before the 
earthquake, needs time to get its bearings. She shared,  
“The center of the country was destroyed so I think it’s 
going to take some time for the government itself to get 
back on it’s feet because literally it’s building[s] were 
destroyed, its records were destroyed but its workforce also 
perished. They were not immune to the earthquake. Many 
civil servants, high ranking, low ranking perished in the 
earthquake so the capacity of the government which was 
already weak is even weaker now... We’re at a point where 
we’re trying to get back standing up... but it’s not easy 
because a lot of the funds that are already there are in the 
hands of the NGOs... ” 
 
1b. Failures of the Haitian Government  
The majority of participants and several community meeting attendees 
expressed their observations of the Haitian government’s failure to think and act 
on behalf and in the best interest of the Haitian people. 
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Participant complaints concerning the government centered stemmed 
from the perception that the Haitian state had long failed. Leo, from a 
diaspora/foreign nonprofit believed “we’ve had a history of pretty much 
nongovernance.” The Haitian state was “an institution... that was already broken 
down. Therefore you have a government that wasn’t governing,” said Andrew, a 
58-year-old grassroots participant. He did not, therefore, expect a different type of 
government after the earthquake. He went on to share that “the government is 
absent” and missed an opportunity for “rallying everyone under the flag” 
immediately after the disaster. Furthermore, he believes all three branches of 
government perform poorly. “The judicial system has gone bankrupt [an 
expression meaning failed] in Haiti. The executive branch isn’t doing anything 
serious. The Parliament... you know what they’re about,” he shared with a tone of 
disappointment. Raymond, a Haitian working with a foreign nonprofit, wrote, 
“The weakness of the justice system is a major obstacle (no security of human 
being[s], private wealth and investment; no concern to better redistribute the 
wealth of the nation).” Jude, a former elected government official noted that the 
“internal strife between the executive and legislative branches of the government 
at this particular time has left the bulk of the rescue and reconstruction work to 
the nonprofits.” 
Another grassroots participant, Josué, whose organization educates 
Haitian youth to be civil servants and Haiti’s future leaders noted that “the state 
doesn’t really take charge. Yes, the population wants to change their situation. 
They look and look and look, but don’t find. It’s the leaders [who are missing]” 
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He also shared that the state may be “thinking, but they’re not thinking of action.” 
Similarly, Esther, a 47 -year-old nurse, said that the Haitian “leadership has no 
vision, but even if they had vision, they don’t know how to implement. 
Leadership skills are lacking in that they cannot take the people from A to Z.” 
“The Haitian government is just not up to the task,” concludes Jude. 
“It’s not that we’re a poor country,” he continues, “it’s that we’re a country that 
isn’t properly managed.” Three other individuals, a former government employee, 
a participant from a diaspora/grassroots/foreign hybrid organization, and a 31 -
year-old diaspora social venture webmaster, identified lack of government 
structure as the real problem. Bernel from a diaspora social venture could not 
envision progress without “good government structure that’s going to make sure 
that things happen smoothly.” Virginia, a 26 -year-old digital outreach manager 
noted, “pretty much everyone’s aware of the very weak structure of the 
government. It’s pretty volatile.” Tom, a foreign nonprofit executive director saw 
economic and social progress as being “very difficult when government is as 
weak as it is.” For him, the absence of government structure was evidenced in the 
lack of “urgency to get the right structures in place to make sure that the country 
is rebuilding the right way.”  
Jude believes that “had development of the country advanced the way it 
should have, there would not have been as many deaths as there were the 12th of 
January.”  Paul, whose work entails providing education to Haitian children, also 
noted the lack of infrastructure in the nation, and the way in which “the Haitian 
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diaspora who formerly worked for the Haitian government but is currently 
working for a foreign nonprofit, this was explained by the  
“tendency for the government not to plan on a long term 
basis. In Haiti, this is obsolete. This is a rare commodity. 
Severe lack of planning turns government employees into 
machines. They perform daily routined actions. People are 
evaluated, assessed on how well they perform these little 
things, these basic tasks as opposed to rewarding them for 
their thinking, their intelligence, their efforts, like project 
management skills for instance... You go to work, you do 
what your boss asks you to do, and you go home and you 
have a job. They don’t care about future promotion. They 
don’t care about efficiency, productivity, this is not their 
concern. Their concern is to perform these little tasks on a 
daily basis...” 
 
Samuel, another former government employee also attests to these observations 
saying, “There was no defined plan for the country... I’ve never come across a 
defined, outlined plan. Which is why the country hasn’t developed. They haven’t 
given it much thought.” Josette, a current government employee contests that 
indeed they have, citing the government’s “push for key elements” in 
redevelopment. Josué noticed the government’s difficulty in communicating its 
intentions, particularly on the topic of redevelopment, to their constituents. He 
observed, “The Haitian people don’t know about it. The government doesn’t 
know how to sell its plan.” 
Jude is of the opinion that the “government should be the intermediary 
between the nonprofits and the private sector, in the interest of the nation.” The 
government seems to have lapsed in this role according to Paul, a 6-year foreign 
nonprofit administrator, most notably in that “there’s not really any oversight 
among these thousands of ministries in Haiti.” Andrew also spoke to that point, 
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noting that when the international community arrived after the earthquake, there 
was no response or direction given to them by the government. This amounted to 
a “governmental blockage” as Jean, a 28-year-old Haitian, called it. He went on to 
share that the Haitian government has “never had a plan, a vision for themselves. 
So when they were faced with this natural catastrophe, they were not capable to 
even react in the most minimal of ways,” which for him, explained why after the 
earthquake “the current government was unable to respond. Everyone was 
destabilized [but] as a leader you should have risen above that and made 
decisions.”  
 Elise, from a diaspora/grassroots organization, believes the Haitian 
government needs “to go back to being what a democratic government is 
supposed to be about which is to be the voice of the people.” Andrew, whose 
work entails organizing and empowering Haitian civil society, could not 
understand why the Haitian government has not engaged the Haitian people nor 
sought their input after the earthquake. He said, “We’re here! We’re available, we 
offered our help to them. I’ve gone on the airwaves and said ‘You have but to call 
us. We’re here and we don’t even need to be paid!’”  
           Tom, from a foreign nonprofit, pointed out the Haitian government has a 
reputation for instability and corruption. Jude, himself a former civil servant, 
concurred that government corruption was an issue. With ten years of service 
under his belt, Peter, from a foreign nonprofit, didn’t foresee great steps forward 
in development “while the corruption remains and there is every evidence that 
rather than being rooted out, it’s becoming more entrenched.” 
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Several participants were of the opinion that the Haitian government 
had especially neglected the nation’s educational system. “We don’t know how to 
value the human being. If we did, we would never allow, ever, ever, not one 
single Haitian government would allow for children to not go to school and have 
access to education,” said Marie.  “The budget that they give the National 
Ministry of Education, you can’t do anything with. Our government is showing us 
that education is not a priority,” shared Josué. “The public schools system is weak 
but we feel [it’s] not possible for a developed country not to have a public school 
system where people who are the poorest can still send their kids to school,” said 
60 -year-old executive Tom. “Education empowers,” said Able emphatically and 
was seen as the cornerstone of Haitian progress. “Education is the foundation of 
everything to start development in this country,” continued Jacmel, Haiti native 
Josué, “There must be a revolution in the educational system of Haiti. That is 
important. If we don’t have that, we’ll be in this situation for much longer.” Jude, 
a former government employee added, “There must be a system of education so 
that they [Haitian people] can be qualified and assist in the redevelopment effort. 
We have [...] educational structures but they need to be strengthened with the help 
of national and international assistance. We have to revamp our education 
system.” He went on to say that “university systems should be incubators for new 
innovations and solutions that can be used by the public.”  
1c. Working with the Haitian Government 
 Several participants shared their experiences in trying to collaborate with 
the Haitian government on a few projects.  Nine participants mentioned working 
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with or expressly avoiding collaborating with the Haitian government. 
Participants spoke of some successes and the difficulties they encountered in 
building relationships with the government. 
 Of the nine participants who commented on working with the Haitian 
government, four were from grassroots nonprofits, three were foreign nonprofits, 
and two were hybrids (diaspora/grassroots and grassroots/diaspora/foreign). Six 
of the nine participants have made attempts to work with the government and of 
the six only two reported successful collaborations or positive relationships with 
the Haitian government (Table 13).  
 
Table 13. Attempts to Work with the Haitian Government 
 
 
 
 
Entity Type 
 
 
 
 
Entity Mission 
 
 
 
Attempt to Work 
with Government 
Successful 
Collaboration 
or Positive 
Relationship 
with 
Government 
grassroots nonprofit educate Haitian youth to 
be civil servants and 
Haiti’s future leaders 
Yes No 
grassroots nonprofit fight foreign political 
interests (neo-liberalism) 
that eclipse Haiti’s own 
No No 
grassroots nonprofit improve Haiti’s socio-
political situation 
through youth leadership 
training and mobilization 
of civil society 
No No 
grassroots nonprofit work to establish peace 
and development of the 
nation by organizing and 
empowering Haiti’s civil 
society 
Yes No 
foreign nonprofit facilitate coordination 
between various 
Christian groups in 
No No 
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Haiti; publish reading 
material in Creole 
foreign nonprofit partner with Haitians in 
building and maintaining 
community initiated 
development projects 
Yes Yes 
foreign nonprofit improve community 
well-being through 
community health, 
peace-building, and 
education 
Yes N/A 
diaspora/grassroots 
hybrid nonprofit 
advocate for and connect 
Haitian diaspora 
organizations 
Yes No 
grassroots/diaspora/forei
gn hybrid nonprofit 
support the democratic 
movement in Haiti by 
strengthening it’s civil 
society 
Yes Yes 
  
Josué and his organization believed progress “can only happen through 
relationships” with the government. However, his attempts to collaborate with the 
state have, thus far been unfruitful. A bit frustrated by it all, he said, “If you have 
a project and you go and share it with them, it just sits there. If you have an event 
and you invite a government representative, they don’t come.” Marie, from a 
diaspora/grassroots organization, has a similar experience. Some years ago she 
visited Haiti and had an opportunity to visit the Ministry of Education where she 
proposed helping to set up a national internship program for Haitian students. She 
says with dismay, ‘They didn’t take it seriously! They didn’t take it seriously! 
And I travelled for just that reason, I paid for my airfare... this work is so hard.” 
Jelsen, from a grassroots organization bent on curbing the tide of foreign political 
interests in Haiti, said outright “we don’t collaborate with the government.” His 
reason was that the Haitian “government has integrated policies that support 
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neoliberalism” a philosophy opposed to that of their organization’s mission. 
 Peter, a 57 -year-old American, shared that “we do everything we can not 
to touch the political state because we realize that it’s just so corrupt and there’s 
no working with it in terms of helping the Haitian people themselves.” Similarly, 
Jean, from a grassroots nonprofit doesn’t “really work with the current 
government.” However, his reason differs from that of Peter in that he believes 
“what they’re doing is mostly demagoguery more than anything else, whereas 
we’re not about flattering words and speeches but action.” 
 Andrew, a general coordinator for a grassroots organization focused on 
empowering civil society, said that  
“As an organization we reacted very quickly following the 
earthquake... and we made recommendations for our 
government... what frustrates me to no end is that while the 
physical infrastructure of the government has been flattened, 
the government thought to continue functioning as before 
with it’s clique. While in the meantime we’re here [civil 
society]! We’re available, we offered our help to them.” 
 
Virigina, from a grassroots/diaspora/foreign nonprofit, noted their 
struggle in “just working with the government as a whole” but concedes that 
“everyone kind of understands that there needs to be that communication with the 
government and some sort of trust with the government.” This has been a change 
of heart for the organization since “in the past ——— has has taken the stance of 
really distancing itself from the government because it’s so volatile.” 
Tom’s foreign organization has had the must success in collaborating 
with the Haitian government. This organization has strong grassroots ties in 
Haiti’s rural communities and as a rule of thumb they’ve “always kept the 
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government informed of what we’re doing.” They have partnered with the 
government to address education and potable water needs in several communities 
where, upon project completion, they “turn it over to the community or the 
national Haitian government.” Some of their projects have been so successful that 
the government has “declared that future [project] should be done according to the 
model we’ve created.” Raymond’s observation mirrored Tom’s experience in 
which organizations “through clusters and partnerships with government 
organizations... could impact policy making.” 
1d. A Call for Strong Leadership 
Seven participants made comments addressing the absence of leadership 
within the Haitian government. This subject also came up a few times by 
attendees of the community meeting. The bulk of references spoke to the lack of 
leadership capabilities of the state as understood either through conversation with 
government officials or government action (or the lack of it).  
One the community meeting attendee said, “before the 12th of January, 
during the 12th of January, after the 12th of January, we didn’t have a leader.” 
Martine, an American who moved to Haiti just months after the earthquake also 
noted Haiti’s “lack of political leadership.” Marie who heads a diaspora/ 
grassroots organization noted that “the leadership in Haiti is extremely weak.” 
Esther linked weak leadership, particularly that of the president, to the nation’s 
lack of progress saying, “there has not been a leader with any purpose in mind... 
no real decision maker. Lack of leadership. Since the beginning we were in that 
position.That is why Haiti has not progressed.” The co-founder of a diaspora 
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organization, she traveled to Haiti soon after the earthquake and met with several 
government officials.  
“When I asked, ‘Well, where do we go from here?’ Their 
response was ‘We’ll talk about it next year’. I replied that ‘I 
don’t have next year put down [in my calendar] therefore I 
want to talk about it now.’ And they said, ‘Well, if next 
year is not good enough for you, what about 2013?’ That 
was the answer that I got. It’s not because those that I 
spoke with were not involved and did not have the will to 
help, it’s because they are waiting on a leadership that is 
nonexistent.” 
 
Marie felt the Haitian government voice was missing at the international 
level. To counteract this, she believes the “Haitian leadership must be at the table 
where policies were enacted for Haiti.” Adding that “there must be true, real 
leadership within that [reconstruction] committee to do that.” However, she 
believed the office of president was a disturbing distraction for Haitian leaders. 
She says they are “more concerned about becoming president rather than seeing, 
understanding, and working towards what must be changes.” Esther, echoing 
similar sentiments believes Haiti needs “a leadership that is conscious of the fact 
that they are put in place to serve the people of Haiti primarily- not for their own 
games, not for the sake of having power.”  
Esther returned from her trip to Port-au-Prince with the impression that 
the leadership was “literally oblivious to the people’s needs.” Leo, a 46 -year-old 
cultural executive director was very vocal about his definition of political 
leadership. According to him, “the leader has to delegate, give people the 
resources and authority to do their work. Have a plan going forward.” He went on 
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to add that Haiti needs “a very dynamic leader. One who is not selfish, who 
doesn’t have a huge ego, who can lead!” In his email correspondence, Raul, a 50 -
year-old Haitian with 25 years of grassroots movement experience expressed a 
similar opinion saying, “we need leaders who inspire confidence.”  
Grassroots nonprofit member coordinator Jean considered the Haitian 
government devoid of leadership even “in the most minimal of measurements.” 
He went on to say that “in any country you have to have strong leadership, 
capable of making tough decisions” and the capability to make tough decisions 
should extend to the state’s international dealings. He believes its “the same thing 
with going out and borrowing funds. The government was always afraid of 
upsetting the electorate. But that’s not the way to govern. You need capable 
individuals, competent, honest, and able to make good decisions for the Haitian 
people.” Raul likened Haiti to “a bus being driven very slowly” because its 
chauffeurs “are wicked, lousy, and incompetent.” 
Maxime, a 33 -year-old who started a diaspora social venture, was a 
little less harsh in his view on the matter. There is a “shortage of leadership but I 
can imagine the amount of stress upon them [government] so I understand its 
very, very challenging,” he said.   
1e. Haiti’s Political Culture 
The participants reported deep divisions in Haiti’s social and political 
spheres that somewhat explained the nation’s complex political culture. 
Participants also mentioned Haiti’s presidential elections, scheduled to take place 
on November 28, 2010, and their impressions of its implications on the 
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reconstruction efforts. Perceptions of the function and legitimacy of Haiti’s 
Rebuilding commission was also discussed, including whether or not the 
committee is usurping the Haitian government’s role, excluding the voice of 
Haiti’s civil society, and the implications for development following the 
installation of a new government administration. 
Nine participants mentioned the complicated nature of Haiti’s political 
scene. Interestingly, of them, a former government official, a current government 
employee, a diaspora/grassroots nonprofit, a diaspora social venture, three 
grassroots organizations, and two foreign nonprofits. Several members at the 
community meeting were particularly vocal about the upcoming November 
elections.  
Marie, a macro social worker, could not understand why Haiti, a  
“tiny country like that [had] over 50 parties trying to have 
power and they cannot show you one single proof of their 
ability... their experience... You’re not just saying, ‘Look at 
me, I’m tall’ or ‘I’m light skinned’ or ‘I’m beautiful’ or ‘I 
speak English’ or ‘I speak Spanish.’ It’s not about what you 
look like and what you speak. It’s what’s your parcourt 
[platform]. What have you done? And why do you think 
your party can do it [lead the nation]? And so this is a huge 
defect that we have in that society. And for me I would like 
to see all that to be changed. Totally changed, totally 
revamped. From the perspective of ‘What I would like to 
do’ to ‘[Look] at what I have already done’... a party is 
going to be based on what’s your worth. What is your 
worth? What is your history of creating jobs, of creating 
schools, of solidifying clinics and health centers? What is 
your history of making community development grow? Of 
creating the arts, the culture? As a group, what is your 
history of talking to people in terms of knowing your rights 
and values as citizen[s]? And then at the end, what is your 
ideology?” 
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What she witnessed instead was a political climate where those who lost 
were “very, very, very committed to making sure that whoever wins, fails.” 
Samuel observed that “if you’re not from a certain political party [that in power] 
and you are educated, you’re competent, you have experience [...] they put you 
aside.” Similarly, at the community meeting, one member stated “there are sectors 
of power in this country that may [decide], ‘In order for the elections to be in my 
favor, people can’t be allowed to vote.’” 
“What you’re seeing are competing factions trying to take over rather 
than [say] ‘Ok, let’s put our heads together and figure out how we’re going to 
solve these problems.’ So when, if the money comes through we can rebuild a 
stronger nation,” said Bernel, founder and webmaster of a diaspora social venture. 
An example of competing factions was supplied by a member of the community 
meeting who noted the tendency for the bourgeoisie in Haiti to block certain 
reforms, such as raising minimum wage. Samuel, a 53 -year-old Haitian, added 
that the elites had also blocked an education reform that he believes “would have 
been a good reform but it was boycotted.” 
Marie shared that she was starting to see “a number of parties trying to 
bundle up and see how they can strengthen and becoming just one party. But it’s a 
slight beginning. It’s a little thing that they must start building on and doing 
much, much, much more of that.” 
The process and outcome of the upcoming November elections were at 
the forefront of many individuals’ minds at the community meeting. “How can we 
expect people to come out and vote when they don’t have documentation? That is 
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the first problem... The majority [of people] have lost their cartes électorales,” 
said one.  Another was adamant that “we’re not ready. The nation isn’t ready to 
speak about elections.” One member foresaw that “we’ll have even deeper 
division in the country because elections will divide the people... Elections divide 
the people. Before and after an election the people are more divided than ever.” 
He went on to predict that “the coming political earthquake can surpass [in 
damage] the natural earthquake.”  
One grassroots participant lamented the missed opportunity for dialogue 
between the state and the people in this year’s election process.  
“We should have the type of election process where each 
running party has an opportunity to present to the Haitian 
people their plan of reconstruction. But that isn’t an option 
now since the reconstruction plan has already been decided 
and there’s already in place a commission in charge of it. 
And that is why we have the imperialist and humanitarian 
strategies dominating”  
 
in Haitian society. According to him, imperialist models of development were 
“known for their neoliberalism and dependent capitalism that rely heavily on 
zones franches [export processing zones], on export agriculture, and on tourism” 
and the humanitarian strategies of development he equated to the proliferation of 
NGOs on the island. Neither of which, he concluded, are sustainable. 
Similarly, attendees at the community meeting saw the upcoming 
elections as a time to educate the public on the election process. One member 
shared, “this is a process [educating public about elections] of not only global 
reflection on the country but also of transformation of consciences.” Another 
member exclaimed, “Not voting is voting! And the masses may not realize that! 
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When you don’t vote, you’ve voted!” Someone else added,  
“We live in a society where people don’t know what voting 
really signifies. People just hear of person X, person Y and 
they put up a billboard for them [supporting their 
candidacy]. It is our imperative to shed light on the history 
of the vote and stress that it’s an ideology in and of itself 
because [...] they don’t really fully understand the 
significance of the vote. We also need to do this work of 
education [on the topic]... Thing is, the discussion 
surrounding the elections should not be a political one, nor 
does the discussion belong to politicians - elections are a 
civil society matter. It’s the citizens not the political parties 
that really matter. The political parties are only vying for 
power. Those that really have the deepest interest to have 
fair elections are the citizens.” 
 
In regards to Haiti’s Rebuilding Commission, three participants offered 
their diverse opinions. Daniel, a 45 -year-old diaspora from Cap-Haïtien, shared,  
“We have a majority of Haitian technicians on board such as the prime minister, 
Jean-Marc Bellerive. These are the types of things we need to start seeing.” 
Jelsen, who studied political science and now serves as program director for a 
grassroots organization, did not speak well of the commission.  
“There’s a [reconstruction] committee that has to approve 
all the decisions made by the Haitian government. [...] This 
interim committee never existed before. They’re the ones 
who decide where the money goes, what the projects are, 
what gets done, etc. They are here for 18 months. The 
implication is what does the government itself do? What is 
its role? We’re about to have elections shortly, what will the 
new administration’s stance be on this committee and 
reconstruction efforts as a whole? A new government 
arrives and there’s already an entity that calls the shots? 
Either way this commission is illegal and unconstitutional.” 
 
Josette, who also studied political science in addition to international 
affairs, was more diplomatic in her opinion of the commission. “People are 
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saying, ‘Well, we’re giving away our nation. This is something that is headed by 
Clinton.’ But its headed by Clinton and the prime minister. It’s better than just 
foreigners heading the reconstruction. You have to look at it in the flip side. 
Usually, we’re not at the helm of development [initiatives].”  
Theme 2. Rebuilding  
The theme of rebuilding encompasses Haiti’s social, economic, and 
environmental situation before and after the earthquake and the crossroads in 
which the nation finds itself after the disaster. Participants shared what they 
perceived to be the strengths and barriers to redevelopment as well as the key 
players and industries considered necessary for national advancement. 
2a. Earthquake a Watershed Moment for Haiti 
 Participants took account of the losses Haiti suffered in the earthquake – 
such as whether life, physical infrastructure, institutions, and economic systems –
and the crossroads in which the nation now finds itself. Several participants also 
shared their insights on debates that exist between the use of the terms 
redevelopment, reconstruction, and refoundation when discussing Haiti’s future. 
 Quite a number of participants noted the critical juncture at which Haiti 
found itself after the earthquake. “A collective awakening took place just after 
everyone lost everything in just seconds,” said Jean, a 28 -year-old Haitian. 
Diaspora/grassroots nonprofit executive director Marie likened this time to a 
“cornerstone” in Haiti’s history. Similarly, Able, a 56 -year-old agricultural 
consultant and technical writer, saw this moment as “a new birth for Haiti.” 
Virginia, of the diaspora/grassroots/foreign hybrid organization called it “a 
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watershed moment for Haiti.” Esther, who co-founded a diaspora nonprofit a 
mere 24-hours after the earthquake said it was “a wakeup call for a lot of people.” 
Sharing the same sentiments, Josué, a Jacmel, Haiti native added that the 
rebuilding strategy should include the youth, teaching them “that they have a 
responsibility to take another path. Not simply because our grandparents or our 
parents have gone down a certain path that we need to follow.”  
In terms of rebuilding the nation, Josué remembered that  
“for me, the 12th of January was a time to think, to rethink, 
to build a country - at all levels. Reconstruction, the term I 
don’t like. Why? Because when talking about 
reconstruction, look, we can simply reconstruct what we 
had before. We need to build. That’s the word we should be 
using. When you look at it, it’s a country that needs to be 
changed altogether, remade - completely. Completely.  
 
Jelsen’s views followed the same vein. 
“We can either reconstruct what we had or construct 
completely differently. And not just about physical 
reconstruction but economic reconstruction, in addition to 
social reconstruction. The reconstruction should encompass 
restoring all of that. Not to mention the public 
administration has also been gravely affected. Refoundation 
goes farther. It demands us to go deep. And in our inner-
most being, it’s the nation. In our inner-most being, it’s the 
history of this country. In our inner-most being, it’s the birth 
 of this nation. In our inner-most being, it’s the values that 
our people contribute. So we have to humbly do an 
evaluation of what lies in our inner-most being. That is what 
national refoundation entails. We cannot build the same 
things... our brothers and sisters who have passed away. For 
their honor we need to build another Haiti.” 
 
 Similarly, members at the community meeting expressed that 
“refoundation is the key, not reconstruction... rather than build how we have in 
the past, let’s reevaluate and build better.”  In addressing this topic, Raul, who 
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works to support and empower Haiti’s future generations of farmers, said,  “I 
must reject the emerging redevelopment thinking. Let’s talk instead of ‘the 
redefinition of a strategic plan for development.’” 
2b. Haitian Responsibility 
 The most pointed references to Haitians’ responsibility in the nation’s 
problems came from Haitian and diaspora participants. “We don’t really have the 
will. Because if we did, we’d get things done. Before having money, you need the 
will,” said 37-year-old Josué. When asked if the “we” referred to the Haitian 
government or the Haitian people he replied, “Since the state is the result of the 
population, it’s the people.” Andrew, who has been working for four years to 
organize and empower Haiti’s civil society concluded, “It’s the division that ruins 
us. So the first thing we need to do in terms of development is to cut down 
divisions. Put at an end division.” Similarly, Josué noted that “our problem is 
coming to a consensus, working together toward one goal. Working together is 
key.” 
Diaspora Marie wanted to know “how can you ask people not to enact 
policies for Haitians, wanting Haitians to do it when the Haitians themselves 
cannot sit together at the same table and talk? They’re in contention with each 
other everywhere, for anything, and about everything.” Esther, also a member of 
the diaspora said,  
“Change starts at home. We can’t expect the other people 
not to take advantage of us, we can’t expect them not to use 
us to gain unless we are, ourselves, stopping that within our 
own country. When you are oppressing your own people, 
what do you expect [from] other people that come? No 
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matter what happens here, at the end of the day, this is a 
Haitian problem.” 
 
Josette, employed with the Haitian government for nearly three years, echoed 
Esther’s observation and believes that Haitian disrespect of self was an obstacle to 
be overcome before development could take place.  
 In reference to Haitians’ roles in shaping their future, Jean believed his 
people were “ready now to have a new life, a new way of thinking. This is a key 
moment to make a fresh start, whether it’s economical or social.” Andrew adds 
that Haitians aren’t incompetent. On the contrary, “we have competence in Haiti. 
We have it in abundance.” 
 Virginia, an American whose hybrid organization works mainly with rural 
Haitian communities, said,  
“I hopefully don’t sound too cliche but I find it to be 
incredibly true to its people. They have such a brilliant 
strength to them and perseverance and desire to see Haiti in 
a vision that I don’t think many people outside [Haiti] can 
envision. They see Haiti to be strong and powerful and 
doing amazing things. They’ve got the hopes, and the 
dreams, and the desires and that’s really the power of it 
all.”  
 
 Whatever the future path of the nation, Jelsen was insistent that “it has to 
come from the people and it has to be in the interest of the people. By and for the 
people.” Marie noted that, these days, “everyone is having the same discourse 
anyway - ‘nous besoin met tête ansanm’ [Creole call for solidarity].” Jean recalled 
how  
“L’union faisait la force [unity was our strength]. 
That came back [after the earthquake]. That type of 
community action needs to continue. If we become 
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divided again into the groups rich, poor, mullato, 
black... After the earthquake we didn’t see that. 
There was perfect unity between Haitians. We can’t 
always depend on foreigners. They help 
tremendously where we can’t do it ourselves but as 
a people we have to be able to come together and 
get it done ourselves and not wait for someone in 
the international community help us. We won’t 
survive as a people if we do. It comes down to 
Haitians coming together with the aim of moving 
forward in a spirit of honesty, of real development, 
in a collective to try and redistribute the wealth. So 
from there with the help of the international 
community we can move forward.” 
 
2c. Diaspora  
 As with the previous theme, Haitians and Haitian diaspora participants 
were most vocal about the will and work of the diaspora as it relates to the 
advancement of Haiti. One foreign nonprofit did also share an observation about 
the diaspora.  
 Marie, who works chiefly with diaspora nonprofits, believed the diaspora 
had “a legitimacy in terms of ‘this is my home country, that’s where I grew up, 
now I feel like it’s time to give something back.” Similarly, Able, an American, 
observed how the diaspora felt “God is calling me back” to work on behalf of 
their native land. Haitian-American Maxime is convinced that the diaspora “gotta 
start taking care of our own.” He shared his experience prior to the earthquake of 
being  
“on the conveyor belt to be assimilated into the American 
culture. That was my destiny. Along with millions of other 
Haitian entrepreneurs. Following the earthquake there is a 
vibrant, resonating fiber - everything within me says, ‘I 
can’t walk away from this. I must go through that process 
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to help my people so I’ve embarked on the journey to do 
that.”  
 
He wasn’t alone in feeling a call to help Haiti. “Pretty much every singe person 
that I’ve come across in one way or another have decided to go back or put in 
some extra work... so they could do more back home [Haiti],” shared the 33-year-
old Haitian-American Bernel. 
“The huge majority of Haitians living outside of Haiti are working - 
whether in the financial, educational, or something else - in a different society 
toward the good of that different society,” laments Marie. Likewise Jude, a former 
government employee made the observation that “Haiti is a country that finances 
other countries. Every year, we lose many of our young people by way of 
immigration to other countries. So we invest in them only to have them leave and 
go help find solutions to the issues that trouble these other countries.”  
“How can a country be developed if all its doctors, nurses, 
professionals, engineers, everybody coming out and leaving the country?” 
continued Marie.   An active member of Haiti’s civil society, Andrew noted “84% 
of [Haiti’s] educated population live abroad. We have professionals outside of the 
country. That is why I believe we should extend dual citizenship to the Haitian 
diaspora.” Leo, a Haitian-American artist agreed saying, “Give the diaspora what 
they’ve been asking for which is the dual citizenship.” 
 In terms of rebuilding the nation, Leo was of the opinion that “we should 
be counting on our people. We have the capacity to do it.” The Haitian 
government should “immediately enlist the Haitian diaspora,” he added. Cap-
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Haïtien native Daniel agreed stating, “I don’t think we should run the risk of 
leaving the diaspora out of the picture again. That’s a big mistake. They can be a 
major part in the development of Haiti.” Grassroots organizer Raul considers the 
Haitian diaspora partners in development saying, “They have to participate. Israel 
has called upon their diaspora. India does the same thing.” For Marie, the diaspora 
have skills useful to the rebuilding efforts. “The country needs different expertise, 
different abilities, different strengths to come together to that one purpose,” she 
shared.   
 The diaspora want to help and are “wanting to give back” as Marie put it 
but run into difficulties when it comes to collaborating. “A lot of people are 
saying ‘What about the diaspora?’ But the diaspora was not necessarily an 
organized group before [the earthquake]. People are talking about the diaspora as 
though it is an organization that should react, it’s people who have their own 
individual lives,” expressed government employee Josette. “We could organize 
and make an impact, but I’m sorry to say it, we’re not doing it. We want to do it, 
we are dreaming of doing it, we are talking of doing it, but we have a long way to 
do it,” shared Marie woefully. “They want to see better for the country. 
Unfortunately, we’re not good at working together,” observed 26 -year-old Elsie. 
Leo had similar views, “We in the diaspora need to organize better. When you 
look at Haitian organizations, we’re all small. We’re like 1-4 people, we’re not 
well organized, we’re not well funded. The current way we’re working is not 
going to work long term.” When it came to foreign organizations, Esther had this 
to say, “Are they doing work? Yes. Are they helping? Yes. But Haiti is not their 
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number one priority.” As such, she was of the opinion that “the diaspora need to 
stop funding other organizations. They need to start funding their own 
organizations to take care of their own people.” As a result of the earthquake 
however, the “Haitian diaspora is realizing more and more the importance of 
collaborating, of working together, of pulling resources,” remarked Leo.  
2d. Shaping Haiti’s Future 
 This subtheme contains a compilation of participants’ descriptions of what 
is needed to ensure Haiti has a promising future. Participants shared what they 
perceived as the barriers to redevelopment and Haiti’s greatest strengths. 
Participants noted the need for unity among Haitians, a decentralization of the 
capital, increased measures toward self-sufficiency, increased use of Haiti’s 
resources and strong political leadership. Participants also suggested that patience 
was imperative while conducting the work of development. 
 The international community’s solidarity with Haiti after the earthquake 
was especially moving for some participants. “When I see how the entire world 
showed its solidarity with Haiti, I said, ‘There’s hope,’” shared grassroots 
program director Jelsen. The “illustrations of deep benevolence that surfaces in 
the face of cataclysmic events and crises” did not go unnoticed by one community 
meeting attendee. Leo observed that “there are people who really care and love 
Haiti and they’ve been giving for a long time so they are a part of this as much as 
Haitians are.” Josette remarked how “especially after the earthquake a lot of 
Americans were truly moved and really and truly wanted to help and donated a lot 
of money. Really a lot of money. I think it’s the highest level of private donations 
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[to such a cause].” Similarly, Jean noted that “we have an international 
community that wants to help. Is able to help.”  
Twenty-six -year-old Elsie, however, believed the international 
community “miss[es] a huge opportunity when they come in with their mentality 
that ‘I know you problem and I know your solution’ instead of actually working 
with the people in the area to come up with a solution to their problems.” Able 
had similar sentiments.  
“The Haitian people, they are the ones that best now their 
situation. They are the ones to have input as to what should 
be done. Then when you have experts from the outside of 
Haiti, then they can say, ‘Yes, but to build this house we 
need to do this to the cement to make it stronger. We need 
to make it in this type of construction.’ And then they 
[Haitians] can see, ‘Ok, we can do that.’ And you’re given 
those options. But they, the Haitians, had the initial input. 
‘Ok, this is our problem, we can fix this, but we need this 
resource from the outside.’ If they can feel that they have 
the ownership and they are the managers, then they’d be 
more open to suggestions from the outside. When you’re 
the manager, you’re the one with the power.” 
 
Elsie, a Haitian-American, insisted on the fact that “most people know their 
problems better than anyone from the outside does and they have the best 
solutions. People know what to do. They just need the resources and the support to 
get there.” Leo, who co-founded a diaspora/foreign organization, believed 
“foreign assistance should come in terms of money, at the beginning, and 
resources that we don no have like equipment, for example. As for the intellectual 
capital, we have that. In terms of human capital, we have that.”  
 Diaspora/grassroots/foreign organization employee Virginia pointed out 
that foreigners aren’t the only ones to blame.  
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“There’s the government and the people with a lot of 
money, the ones that say where the money gets to go. 
They’re really overlooking the Haitian voice and forgetting 
to ask the questions of ‘What do you need?’ and ‘What do 
you want for rebuilding?’ and more kind of dictating what 
needs to be done.” 
 
 Three participants perceived the inclusion of the Haitian voice was key to 
a promising future for Haiti. “Allow them to have a chapter in the history that is 
currently being written,” is Jelsen’s petition. “Haiti has to have its voice. The 
neoliberal dynamics that pervade policy are driving us straight into a wall. We 
need alternatives,” he concluded. “It’s about how they [the Haitian people] want 
to build their country,” observed Virginia. In that vein, her hybrid organization is 
“working to really advocate for the Haitian voice and what the Haitians’ needs are 
and what they envision for rebuilding.” Daniel, a foreign nonprofit country 
program director recognized “the beneficiaries themselves... have to be able to 
fashion their reality and their futures.” Key for his organization’s work, he said, 
was to “make sure that we have a heavy participation [of] the beneficiary 
community in the planning process of all our projects. That’s the most important 
thing. That has been absent from the picture [in the past]. We [foreigners] just 
decide for them. We don’t even know what they want.”  
A number of participants pinpointed areas of importance in 
redevelopment efforts. “First, its education, health and environment, and then 
community development,” listed Jelsen. “The people need to be self-sufficient in 
terms of growing their own food and maintaining their own political community,” 
said 57 -year-old Peter from a foreign nonprofit. For Daniel, self-sufficiency and 
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sustainable development went hand in hand. His organization “strongly believe[s] 
in self-sufficiency and sustainable development and targeted interventions.” He 
went on to say that “Self-employment... [is] a part of the Haitian culture. They 
don’t like to be dependent on somebody else. They don’t want to be dependent on 
jobs [provided by foreigners].” Self-sufficiency in food production was key for 
grassroots technical consultant Raul. “Haiti has the ability to produce enough to 
feed its inhabitants and export the excess,” according to him.  Diaspora social 
worker Marie also believed Haitian agriculture to be of fundamental importance 
considering it “the basic value, the cornerstone of the economy to feed your 
people and to grow from there.” Likewise, Jelsen shared, “We need to work to be 
able to feed ourselves. We have to be autonomous when it comes to agriculture 
and what we eat. We have the resources to do it.” Former Haitian government 
elected official Jude said, “We have enough land to produce what we need and fill 
the gaps. But agriculture is not as valued as it should be.” In Jelsen’s mind, 
“we’ve got to change that and make use of our agricultural production.” For Raul 
it was imperative for Haiti “to improve the performance of our agricultural 
sector.” Peter, a 57 -year-old from a foreign nonprofit, asserts that “if things were 
properly cared for and watched over, it could be the breadbasket of the Caribbean 
just like it was a hundred years ago.” 
In regards to Haiti’s economy, one diaspora social venture owner said 
people are “starting to realize that we need to engage the locals and source things 
from them to support the local economy instead of buying things from somewhere 
else and dumping down [in Haiti].” Similarly, Daniel believed “sustainable 
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development requires that all sectors of a society be in sync. You can’t say, ‘Well 
I’m going to go to tourism because that’s where the money is, [forget about] 
education. [It’s a] fallacy to rely on just one sector.” He went on to say the 
emphasis should be to “create financial and social development from below in 
Haiti... just the opposite of the trickle down economy. We want to empower the 
base by providing them with access to investment and cash and loans,” such as 
through micro-credit. He was happy to report that “we see people embracing more 
holistic approaches of Haiti’s redevelopment.”  
Thirty-three-year-old entrepreneur Maxime sees a possible new 
development funding strategy that can be used in Haiti. The “different approach is 
to allocate profits from these various companies [local ventures] to social efforts,” 
he shared. Social entrepreneurship “creates innovation” on a larger scale, 
something Bernel hopes to encourage through his social venture. Cultural 
executive director Leo is in agreement and supports the push for social businesses 
as a way of “eradicating a lot the problems that Haiti has” further insisting that we 
need to “talk about the economy from a cultural perspective.” 
A few participants expressed the need for Haiti, namely her capital of 
Port-au-Prince, to be decentralized. Marie thinks “a huge decentralization 
movement” is necessary “because after the breakdown of Port-au-Prince, 
everything started to shift toward the Dominican Republic because there was not 
even one single other town that could serve as [or] take the place of Port-au-
Prince”- a real loss for the Haitian economy. One community meeting attendee 
pointed out that “the centralized schema of Haiti makes it difficult for many and 
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hampers true development.” Likewise, Leo, a Haitian-American couldn’t 
understand “why they haven’t decentralized Port-au-Prince all these years.”  
Change and progress however, are not only going to take time but some 
getting used to according to foreign nonprofit executive Tom and country 
program director Daniel. “There are no magic wands... I see this all over the 
place... People believe in magic. There is no magic wand, there is no silver bullet, 
there is no simple solution. It’s going to take time. Things just aren’t going to 
happen overnight. And there are going to be mistakes because nobody’s got the 
answer,” said Tom. There has been an “overall acceptance of change that we’re 
seeing now. Even if we are a society that is really resistant to change but at least 
people are talking about change. People are talking about doing things differently. 
It’s like a kumbaya moment, you know?” Daniel, a Haitian-American, shared 
laughing. 
Also mentioned was the need for unity among Haitians. An attendee of 
the community meeting stated, “The one thing we need to combat in this nation is 
exclusion.” Moving forward as a nation requires Haitians to work “together, not 
an elite of intellectuals and specialists deciding the agenda but all Haitians who 
want to have a say. So that the country can advance, together, not just a select 
group advancing,” according to grassroots member coordinator Jean.   
 Haiti has a wide a variety of resources that participants felt should be at 
the core of the nation’s redevelopment. “Haiti does have resources that people can 
work with,” said Able. “We should look into ways in which Haiti can be viewed 
differently by the world and Haitians themselves by focusing on her potentials,” 
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offered Jacmel, Haiti native Jude. Leo’s organization was looking at ways in 
which they could “export [Haitian] culture so that we can even make it into an 
economy... the arts and our culture. Those are the things we really need to pay 
more focus on that [and reverse] the loss of cultural assets in Haiti.” Along the 
same line, Raymond, a Haitian working for a foreign nonprofit wrote, “The 
Haitians are very popular for their arts, particular[ly] paint[ings], sculpture, etc.” 
Andrew, an active member of Haiti’s civil society, said Haitians had a facility 
with art “that one can only dream of [including] have Haitian dance, Haitian 
culture, Haitian music, [and] Haitian cuisine.” 
 Gonaïve, Haiti native Marie called for “knowing what our resources are 
and how we can build on what we already have to push to make those resources 
grow.” Raymond included “bauxite, copper, calcium carbonate, gold, marble, and 
hydropower” as natural resources that were not to be overlooked.  
No surprise since Haiti is located in the Caribbean, participants noted 
how Haiti’s natural resources could be used to increase tourism. “Haiti’s coastal 
and marine environment... and good climate [...] could be used to develop the 
tourism industry,” wrote Raymond. “Our beaches. We have a great resource right 
there. We [also] have a sunny climate,” shared Marie with a sigh of nostalgia. 
Andrew, spoken with equal sentimentality, said, “We have beautiful beaches. We 
have extraordinary climate.” Peter, an American who first visited Haiti ten years 
ago remarked, “The charm of Haiti is like no other country in Caribbean.” “We 
have many advantages in Haiti but we need to figure out how to use them and 
apply them,” concluded Josué.  
  108 
Josué, president of a grassroots nonprofit that educates Haitian youth to 
be civil servants and Haiti’s future leaders, was insistent that redevelopment 
thinking be big.  
“Our vision needs to be much larger. We’ve got to start 
thinking about constructing zones and communities. We’ve 
got to stop thinking about itty bitty houses. We’ve got to 
think big. That’s what I think. If we’re going to build a 
road, we should think big. We shouldn’t think of building 
for structures that last 20 years but we should be thinking 
50 years, 100 years. Therefore building a two lane road, it’s 
doesn’t make sense. In Haiti we need 4 lane, 5 lane roads. 
That’s how we should think. We’ve got to change the way 
we think and reflect. What I see in terms of how things are 
going here in Haiti, whether looking at the ONGs, the 
State, the civil society, and all that, their thinking is very 
limited. Very limited. We’ve got to see the way in which to 
construct... Even those [organizations] with money, when 
they go to build, they’re talking about building small 
homes. Everything is ‘ti’ [small in Haitian Creole]. So 
we’ve got to get that out of our thinking.” 
 
Thinking ahead and rebuilding with the future in mind was important to several 
participants. Jacmel, Haiti native Samuel pointed out, “We need to not only look 
at short term goals but also longterm goals.” Leo asked of the reconstruction 
taking place, “Are we building because we have a vision for the country? What 
does Haiti look like 5 years from now, 10 years from now, 50 years from now? 
What is it going to be known for?” Jean shared, “Apparently there will be other 
earthquakes to hit Haiti and we don’t want to be caught unprepared.”  
“What we need is the political will. We need political reform and 
modernization of the State... that’s needs to be our fundamental priority, political 
reform. We need to reestablish the authority of the State. Development depends 
on political, social, and economic stability that must be safeguarded by the State,” 
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shared grassroots activist Raul. For Esther, a better future for Haiti means having 
leadership “with vision and the power to accomplish that vision. We are resilient 
and right now if we have a leadership that is going to take that and work it in the 
favor of the people we will go forward.” For artist Leo, progress meant a 
“government that will keep things stable” and at times say no to foreign aid. 
“New government needs to make the decisions for ourselves. ‘We thank you, but 
this is how we’re going to do it. If you want to help, here’s how you can help,’” 
he commented. In that same vein, former government employee Samuel wants to 
see “Haitians support their country [by] limiting the role of NGOs and backing up 
the various ministries of the government responsible for the development of the 
country in different domains.” He added,  
“if reconstruction is to take place in Haiti, we think to 
redefine and well define the duties and roles of the ministry 
with funds and a well-defined mission. If we are to 
reconstruct, we have to strengthen these four ministries: 
agriculture, public services, health, and education. We must 
reinforce them and give them a well-defined mission if we 
plan to reach a particular level of development in this 
country.” 
 
When it came to identifying Haiti’s greatest barriers to redevelopment 
Marie, who founded a diaspora/grassroots nonprofit 11 years ago, observed, “You 
cannot say it’s one thing is the greatest barrier to Haiti’s development because it’s 
a whole set of things that’s very intricate. They are mixed together. They are 
woven together. You can’t disconnect them.” Table 15 lists the greatest barriers to 
redevelopment shared by participants.  
 
 
  110 
Table 15. Greatest Barriers to Redevelopment 
Entity Type  Participant  Greatest Barriers to Haiti’s Redevelopment 
diaspora/grassroots 
nonprofit 
Marie 
(diaspora) 
“It’s the history of the people. There you 
have it. Do not forget. We are great, great, 
great grandchildren of slaves” 
foreign nonprofit Tom 
(American) 
*“Internal:  
corruption - [The] inertia of existing power 
structure. dealing with people who have 
power and it serves them and whatever 
power relationships they are in, financial or 
ego power. 
cultural dysfunctions- [I] attribute most of 
this to inherited culture of slavery that Haiti 
had to initially deal with and that the people 
had dealt with. 
consequences of poverty- All sorts of 
consequences of poverty including lack of 
infrastructure itself. It’s like catch 22. You 
can’t have development until you have good 
roads, but you can’t have good roads because 
you can’t afford to tax people enough to pay 
for the good roads and pay for the 
maintenance of them. The chicken or the 
egg? All consequences of poverty. 
 
External: [I’m] talking about us [Americans] 
basically, people that aren’t in the country 
[of Haiti]  
impatience- when you can’t quickly use your 
money or you quickly get a solution well it 
looks good to accomplish something so you 
give stuff away. Do it and then walk away. 
cultural ignorance- we don’t speak the 
language, know the culture, get in the 
mindset and really get [them]. 
prejudice- various forms of racism in one 
form or another. I’ve known missionaries 
that say, ‘here’s the Haitian bathroom and 
here’s ours’. And they’re missionaries! 
imperialism- ‘we know better’, ‘here, let me 
show you how to do it’. Sort of throwing 
your weight around, throwing your money 
around, being insensitive and superior. 
inadequate- so there’s an inadequate 
commitment to being there for the long haul. 
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There’s inadequate oversight on projects, so 
things don’t get done.” 
diaspora/grassroots 
nonprofit 
Elsie 
(diaspora) 
“Greatest barriers are 1) the people, 2) the 
government, 3) I’d also say nonprofit 
organizations. Everyone has a blame in this. 
It’s not one party.” 
diaspora/foreign 
nonprofit 
Leo 
(diaspora) 
“Greatest barrier is [...] the government.” 
foreign nonprofit Daniel 
(diaspra) 
“Number one is absence of long term 
planning. No shared vision, too much 
individualism. And that’s killing Haiti. If we 
can go one notch up that step, we have a 
better chance to be successful. But now we 
are in a ditch. [Need] of shared vision 
[where] all Haitians see themselves not only 
being beneficial to myself but to a whole 
society. Lack of partnership. In all areas - 
private/private, public/public, etc. Lack of 
effective leadership. That’s one thing that 
missing there. We need people who can do 
things. People who have the know-how. 
Bottom line is we lack organization. We 
need to be better organized.” 
foreign nonprofit Paul 
(American) 
“Two hundred years of voodoo has been bad 
for the country. For two hundred years its 
been their mother’s milk. For two hundred 
years its created a certain ethic, a certain 
worldview of our problems, and solutions to 
our problems... spiritual heritage of [...] 
nation is fundamental.” 
government agency Samuel 
(Haitian) 
“Obstacles are the lack of objectives for the 
country. The biggest handicap is the 
multiplication of NGOs. It seems like the 
NGOs have replaced the State in Haiti. 
Whether national or international. They’re 
everywhere, addressing education, social 
issues, health, agriculture, everything, 
absolutely everything.  But we don’t see any 
results.” 
foreign nonprofit Raymond 
(Haitian) 
“[Barriers are] multidimensional, but they 
[are] mainly dominated by the lack of 
political leadership that should normally 
create an appropriate environment to attract 
investments. [The] diminished capacity to 
develop a comprehensive development 
  112 
framework that should govern agencies and 
private sectors, and develop sustainable 
projects that bring nationwide changes. The 
weakness of the justice system is a major 
obstacle. In addition [to] secondary 
constraints including lack of human and 
financial resources, political instability and 
lack of basic infrastructures such as roads, 
electricity, safe water system, sanitation 
facilities, crop productivity factors, etc.”  
* Underlined emphases added.  
Fourteen participants, representing all entity types, listed the Haitian 
people as Haiti’s greatest strength in the redevelopment efforts. “We have a 
history of an extremely proud people... we are people we believe in what we can 
do,” said Marie. “We have [...] well-educated people in Haiti. A number of them,” 
that should be put to use at this time, pointed out Daniel. Josué brought attention 
to the fact that “the majority of the population is young. These are advantages. We 
also have people who love this country, who want to work, who are willing to 
sacrifice themselves for this country. We need to call upon them.” Former elected 
government official Jude likewise noted that “Haiti has a very young population.” 
Jelsen determined that “the Haitian population is very courageous. They showed 
their courage after the earthquake when they used their bare hands, without 
equipment to pull survivors out of the rubble. They also took it upon themselves 
to organize transportation out of the city.” Andrew was no less generous in his 
praise of the Haitian people. “Haitians are assiduous. Very, very, very assiduous. 
Haitians are intelligent. Haitians are artistically gifted. Haitians are hard workers. 
Haitians will go anywhere, risk anything, dying at sea [...] all to look for work.” 
Bernel was of the same opinion saying,  
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“The greatest strength are the people. No where else will 
you find - and I am biased I guess, I can say no where else 
[but even partners, when they go to Haiti or see Haitians 
they say that too - that Haitian people they work really 
hard. They’re really hard workers... A lot of people here in 
this country [United States] or elsewhere, you can’t say that 
about. Haitian people work hard, that’s one thing I can 
say.”  
 
Jude remarked,  
“Haiti has capacity. She’s used her capacity to help liberate others. She’s 
filled ships with her people and sent them to help a significant number of Latin 
American countries to win their independence. Haiti is bold. Even when the only 
other independent nation in the region, the United States, refused to help them out 
of cowardice, Haiti defied the powers that be anyway.” 
“The Haitian people themselves, particularly through the church,” were 
seen as Haiti’s greatest strength in Able’s eyes. Tom observed,  
“The people themselves are very resilient... they do what is 
in their best interest intuitively and they do it well, given 
their resources and given their opportunities which are very 
limited. Very hardworking, very committed to their 
children. [They] have a lot more patience and forbearance 
for sure, having lived through tough times from day to day, 
so they are highly motivated.” 
 
He went on to say, “Haitians are great entrepreneurs and great problem solvers 
with the limited resources that they have so, they do really well.” Paul, a 56 -year-
old administrator in a Christian foreign nonprofit noted with a sense of awe,  
“Look at how the people [Haitians] handled it [the 
earthquake]. If that happened here in America, where one 
third were crushed in a moment, you’d find out how violent 
we could be and how ruthless we could be. We think we’re 
not capable of doing things but we’re more capable than we 
think. To have the patience with government that the Haitian 
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people have had...If Americans were placed in the same 
position, there would be rioting in the streets, there wouldn’t 
be enough UN troops to stop us. I wouldn’t do it, but I’m 
telling you what the American people would do. They 
would burn down Washington, DC. They would never 
remain as patient or long-suffering as the Haitian people 
have remained not just since the earthquake but for [...] 
centuries.” 
 
 Esther, whose family moved from Haiti to the United States when she was 
17 years old, remarked that Haitians “have a lot of dignity.” She also commented, 
“I have never been in a country where I had so many entrepreneurs. I have never 
seen so many people - you give them $20 and they start a business. The sense of 
‘I can help myself’ is there.”  
 Government employee Josette shared, “I think we are very proud. I think 
our key strength is that we just won’t give up.” She was however, forthright of her 
dislike of the word ‘resilient’ being applied to Haitians.  
“I don’t like the term [resilient] and I’ll tell you why. A 
donkey is resilient. I don’t think we’re donkeys. [laugh] I’m 
really sick and tired of that term resilient. Every time I hear 
it I feel like we’re donkeys or cows making it through the 
storm. Because it sort of weakens the human dimension of 
our people. Resilient. What does that mean? Does that mean 
you can keep beating us with a stick and we’ll still keep 
plowing along? I don’t really like that.” 
 
2e. Translating Talk into Action 
Josué, president of a grassroots organization said, “If we’re just dealing 
with development ‘thinking’ there is no shortage. [But what] we don’t see 
concrete action on the part of the government -not on behalf of men, or women, 
and even less on behalf of the youth.” He continued,  
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“Yes, it’s true that we have to think first but it’s been 200 
years that we’ve been thinking. It’s time that we move on 
the action. If it were solely for new thinking or new 
approaches, listen, Haiti would have already been 
developed… We have so many projects filed away, Haiti 
would have already been developed. So if it were up to just 
thinking, Haiti would be a world power. The problem is 
how to switch over to the doing phase. There were some 
things they government said they would have done in 
March and here we are in July and it hasn’t been done.”  
 
Marie, a diaspora in the field of social work saw “a lot of talk of 
change” and wants to see more work being done. “No matter what the amount of 
good or money that have been polled together for Haiti, that has to be translated 
into reasonable movement, action, toward fixing the country,” she shared. She 
does appreciate the talking phase of development, but to a point. “Beautiful talks 
are important, research, study, they are necessary. But they are only the first step 
toward determined, specific action toward change,” she emphasized.  
Virginian, a 26-year-old American, saw both sides of the coin, “I’ve 
heard a lot people complain that there have way too many meetings and not 
enough action. I think with that complaint there is a little bit of validity in that 
there really is a great need for collaboration and working to assess what is being 
done in Haiti and what needs to be done, who can to do what, etc.” Josué, 
however, seems tired of waiting. The “population awaits many things. 
Development that is. There’s a lot of hope but we’re still waiting,” he said. “We 
can talk about change,” he said with slight sarcasm, “we were better off before the 
earthquake so we can talk about change - negative change. The Haitian society, 
the professors, the students, are waiting for what’s next but don’t find anything. 
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They are thirsty. Thirsty for a new life, thirsty for everything new, but they’re left 
hanging.”  
 Jelsen, a grassroots political activist, points the finger at “NGOs that 
haven’t appropriately used the funds, given in good faith by the international 
community. Because today, the 9th of July, there are still people living in tents in 
the conditions you see. That’s scandalous. When you calculate all the donations 
given to Haiti to help these people. It’s scandalous. It’s dishonest.” A full 
transition from relief work to development work hasn’t yet taken place. Raymond, 
working for a European organization, noted in his correspondence received in 
July 2010, that “most of the organizations are doing relief and early recovery.” 
Andrew lays the blame for long talks and little action by way of development at 
the feet of his nation’s government saying, “After 6 months the impression you 
get [from looking around] is that the earthquake took place yesterday. That shows 
the government is incompetent.” Josué, however, doesn’t know who’s at fault. “In 
terms of development, there’s nothing happening. Since the 12th of January 
there’s nothing. I don’t know if it’s the government or the international 
community that is keeping the Haitian population in concentration camps,” he 
remarked bitingly.  
Theme 3. Aid Work and its Effects 
In this theme participants shared their perception of the paternalistic 
system of international aid, past and present, and its effects on Haitian economy, 
Haitian psyche, and Haitian politics. This theme also includes the lessons learned 
regarding a growing culture of dependency and ways in which it can be 
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countered. Participants also expressed clear distinctions between relief and true 
aid. 
3a. Paternalism of Aid and Culture of Dependency  
Eleven participants shared their observations on the paternalistic 
attitudes, policies, and activities of NGOs that have routinely disregarded the 
Haitian culture and the Haitian voice(s). They noticed a shift in Haitian collective 
psyche towards passive reception of assistance due to the traditional top-down 
approach of aid. Of these eleven, some participants shared their experiences of 
witnessing learned helplessness in the Haitian community. In this sub-theme, 
participants were comprised of three hybrid (two diaspora/grassroots and one 
diaspora/grassroots/foreign), four foreign, one grassroots, one diaspora, and two 
diaspora social ventures. 
“Paternalism in development is disastrous. What it is, paternalism is 
giving to somebody or community or doing something for somebody or 
community without their official permission and causing them to develop a 
dependency,” said Able, an American agricultural consultant and technical writer. 
To illustrate, he related this story:  
“We went to evaluate an irrigation program that was done 
by one of our networking organizations. Visited three 
communities and inspected their systems and we talked 
with the people to see how they were doing, if there were 
any problems, what they were doing to alleviate the 
problems and such. One thing that stood out for us when 
we went is that when we asked about their situation -and 
each community had a different situation- but in each case 
when I asked ‘What are you doing to prepare or to resolve a 
problem’, each one said ‘We’re poor, we can’t do it, its up 
to the organization.’”  
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He considered this a red flag.  
“This organization had gone in and said ‘Yes, we need to 
help you out’ so they put in the wells, they put in the well 
pumps, they put in the systems to help it irrigate. And the 
problem was that those systems never belonged to the 
people. The people didn’t take ownership. They always felt 
‘this belongs to the organization’. So when it came down to 
providing fuel for the pumps, they called on the 
organization. When it came down to building cisterns for 
water storage and pressure, they called on the organization.” 
 
Marie defined culture of dependency this way: “Culture of dependency 
there is an element of ‘I’m going to be there waiting for you Miss Élise and Mrs. 
———  to come and show me the way,’” she said imitating a helpless voice. 
“And that is a big, huge hindrance. How are people going to be fully the leaders 
they want to be if they are just the small, little child that is waiting for that help to 
come? This is not a good thing,” she said and equated it to “a form of 
subordination.”  
Maxime, a Haitian-American entrepreneur remarked, “There is the 
mentality of ‘We’re waiting for the Americans to come and do this for us’. The 
model of development is ‘Ok, the foreigners to come and do it for Haiti’, they 
owe it to us. Or ‘Venezuela will come do it for us.’ And nothing gets done unless 
a large sum of money comes in.” Similarly, Marie noted the “wave of giving to 
Haiti or helping the people of Haiti, those things basically cripple Haiti, literally. 
[So now] we’re always looking for somebody else to do those roads for us, those 
bridges, those huge infrastructures that we can’t do.”  
Daniel, a Haitian working for a foreign organization focused on 
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education saw paternalistic approaches of aid influence even the Haitian 
government. “This mentality has affected even government itself. It has crippled 
the drive and effort to become less dependent on foreign aid. These paternalistic 
approaches of the donating countries [have] perpetuated the problem [of 
poverty],” he said. Bernel, another Haitian-American entrepreneur made similar 
observations saying,  
“Pretty much [its] the international community that is 
shouldering a lot of things. Even if you read their [Haiti’s] 
development plan, it pretty much says ‘We’re gonna rely 
on people giving us money’. It’s not a plan where they say 
‘We’re going to do X, Y, Z that’s going bring revenue to 
recreate the country and make us stronger where we can 
produce and do things for ourselves.’ That’s a major 
problem area.” 
 
“When you give someone $500 to do something, they feel that, to say 
that they are your slave is too strong, but they feel like you are the boss, you are 
the parent, and they are just a child. And in a sense that is dis-empowerment at 
best,” shared Marie, a member of the diaspora. She linked this disempowering 
“culture of giving” to “the neocolonialism framework whereby Haiti was mostly 
in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries like a child of the French. We were basically 
there, the slaves where there doing what the masters wanted, when they wanted, 
how they wanted.” 
Tom, an American who studied political science and marketing was 
convinced that, “When you stop and think about it, even though they [NGOs] are 
trying to be helpful it’s like borderline insulting in the sense that is not allowing 
them to do things on their own.” He thought part of the problem was that relief 
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work has long been disguised as development work. He says “a distinction 
between relief and development” needs to be made. “Relief work is more top 
down. People give things away and do things for people involved.” It should be 
“done in an emergency but in Haiti the majority of organizations operate like 
that,” he continued, “[They] go in and do the stuff for the people and the people 
just sort of receive it [and] it creates a dependency actually.” He related his 
organization’s hard-learned lesson,  
 “We learned this, it’s not that we’re smarter than other 
people, we just paid attention to what the impact was from 
what we first did. We drilled a well and ignorantly assumed 
that people will maintain it on their own, not realizing that 
first of all, they don’t know how to do it; second of all, they 
don’t know where to get the parts; third of all they don’t 
have the money to do it. We started to address the whole 
picture, before we were just addressing the fact that ‘Oh, 
water. We can do that. We can drill wells’ and ‘Here you 
go, here’s your well.’ Then it becomes our well, not theirs. 
It breaks down in 6 months and we’ve done surveys and 
most wells done that way, within a year 40% of them 
would be broken. So all the resources that went into drilling 
the well and the cost that went into drilling the well was 
completely lost and people go back to the river or 
whatever.” 
 
Marie noted that often, paternalistic aid did not allow for Haitians to 
make the big decisions. “We need to build institutions. Period. We don’t have 
that. So an organization like  ———  and anybody that is working in Haiti, if 
they don’t build institutions with full legitimacy to operate with their own 
[Haitian] directors, their own [Haitian] managers, and [instead] they keep them as 
babies, they [foreigners] are the one leading the game.... it won’t work,” she 
lamented. She believed “the foreigners helping in Haiti are tailoring their 
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[Haitians’] own clothes to their [foreigners’] own size and ‘They should do it this 
way.’ I don’t want the Haitians to tell them ‘Papa, mama, blan [foreigner], come 
and do what you want.’ Sadly, Elsie observed just that taking place. She shares,  
“People view them [nonprofits] as ‘Oh, you’re my savior’ 
and yes, they’re coming to help you but at the same time 
you also have to look at it a different way. In the long run, 
how are they helping the system? How are they helping the 
economic system? How are they helping the social system? 
Other than giving you a piece of bread, are they helping 
you and your family to buy bread, or make bread, so you 
can earn?”  
 
Maxime, a 33-year-old entrepreneur, also noticed the encroaching 
culture of dependency in Haiti. “The international community does it [and] the 
mentality is [...] ‘It must be created for us,” he said and added that “historically, 
I’ve looked at Haiti and for every single development that takes place where we 
didn’t sweat for it, it does not last long.” 
“When we think we’re helping, what we are really doing is 
development a culture of dependency whereby all of Haiti, everybody has their 
eyes outside, looking for support, for donations, for gifts, and its horrible,” said 
Marie, a Gonaïve, Haiti native. She also pointed out that good intentions were 
sometimes behind these negative results. “The culture of dependency, I think, is 
more a byproduct of goodness and of good intentions,” she admitted, citing the 
Haitian diaspora’s generosity as an example of good intentions gone bad. “[The 
diaspora] just giving, giving, giving [and] people are just waiting to get more and 
more. The more they are getting, the more they’re getting impoverished. Because 
all of a sudden, you’re not learning to really rely on yourself.” Paul, an American 
  122 
minister, noted similar incidents with his congregations. When his group makes a 
trip to Haiti,   
“everybody wants to bring their used clothes to me and I tell 
them ‘No’. Reason being our container is full of lumber, 
metal and things we’re needing for our schools. Number two 
is it’s a lot of work to fool with that but everybody wants to 
empty out their closets and send their used clothes to Haiti. 
[There’s a] Haitian man, a principal of one of our schools. 
[His] wife is trying to build a sewing shop to make clothes. 
We have a sewing lab in our school, to teach folk to make 
clothes, but again, just about the time maybe this man’s wife 
gets a little business, here comes the Christians pushing off a 
load of clothes off the back of the truck. Well, who’s going 
to buy her clothes when they can get all the free clothes they 
need from the Christians?” 
 
Martine, an American emergency coordinator, saw dependency 
manifested as “social jealously” and saw her share of it in the tent camps 
particularly - “A lot of it. ‘Somebody gets a distribution, I didn’t get a 
distribution. Somebody got two tarps, I don’t have any tarps.’” A reason why 
grassroots organizer Josué is ready to see work opportunities take the place of 
handouts.   
“I am not in agreement with the thinking and practice that 
people should be given free food every day. That’s not good 
at all. To me, it seems like it’s just another way of keeping 
people enslaved. It’s not good at all. Yes, unfortunately 
we’ve lost people, we’ve lost all that we own, and ok, 
they’ve given us free food for a month or two and that’s 
great. But now what needs to be created is work. It’s should 
now be about teaching people to how building themselves. It 
shouldn’t be that, ‘Oh, stay here and we’ll bring you water, 
food. Just stay here.’ That’s ridiculous.”  
 
 When it comes to the rebuilding effort, Virginia wants these paternalistic 
attitudes and policies to change. “Let’s not implement these policies that have 
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really been detrimental to Haitian society in years past. You can look back and 
see where they’ve been unsuccessful and they’ve done things to really just further 
perpetuate the chain of poverty versus develop and empower,” she said. Marie 
believes the culture of dependency has created a mentality that “has to be totally 
revamped. And unfortunately, it won’t be easy because... the mindset is so much 
into receiving.” Likewise Able shared, “There have been people that have shared 
that Haiti is the hardest place for them to work. And I think that’s partially due to 
the past, where organizations have come in and said ‘Yes, we want to help, we 
want to give’ and they give. ‘We want to do this for you’ and they do that for 
them.’” 
3b. Counteracting Culture of Dependency 
Several participants shared their personal and organization’s 
observations, suggestions, and efforts to offset the philosophy, practices, and 
effects of dependency in aid work. 
Able found that working with grassroots organizations helped curb 
dependency. “USAID created lots of dependencies. That was hard work to work 
through the scars left by USAID.  We’re now working with NGOs with grassroots 
approach and are now doing much better,” he reported. For Marie, a Haitian-
American social worker it was about “how can the people grow based from a 
strengths perspective?” She notes however, that “it is very difficult” and “it’s 
extremely hard.” Tom also believed counteracting the culture of dependency 
would be difficult saying, “Sustainable development is not easy, it takes time, it 
doesn’t always work, not textbook, no formula.”  
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 Martine believed that “When you [do for people,] people don’t learn. 
When you leave, the skills aren’t there,” adding that at her European-based 
nonprofit, “We’re very much about capacity building.” Able, who works with an 
agriculture nonprofit, shared his organization’s philosophy:  
“When I work with NGOs that work in Haiti I encourage 
them to never give anything away. Encouraged dependency 
encourages a entitlement mindset. Going to encourage 
people to plant trees? Sell it. Even if for a few pennies. 
Cause the people will say ‘Why are they giving me this tree? 
If it’s of no value to them, it’s of no value to me’. They may 
plant it, they may not plant it. It may grow, it may not grow. 
But if the people are educated to see what those trees are for 
and they’re put up and say ‘Ok, these trees are 5 gourdes 
[Haitian currency] a piece but we’re going to sell it for 1 so 
you can buy them and afford them.’ Then they’ll buy them. 
If they spend a piece on it to buy it, they’re going to make 
sure it’s planted, it’s fertilized and it grows. They’re going 
to make sure the goats don’t eat it and they’re going to take 
care of it because they want their investment back.” 
 
 Tom’s organization also employed an empowering philosophy in their 
work where they “enable people themselves to carry [the project] on” and tries to 
“have [the] community be as self-sustained in this regard as possible” because 
“you can’t keep relying on all these [outside] people to come in and do stuff.” He 
shares,  
 “Our activity is different, our intention is to work with the 
communities to help materialize projects that they think 
their communities need. Haitian people [are] intricately 
involved from the beginning to the end. When it’s done it 
turned over to Haitian people that are able to maintain it”  
 
Key for his organization’s work is to enable people themselves to carry it 
on from that point.” 
 Elsie, a 26 -year-old president and founder of a diaspora/grassroots 
  125 
organization, said, “I’m trying to work against the degrading type of aid where 
people are always waiting and having their hands open waiting to receive instead 
of giving people a form...of working for their living, working to be able to save 
money to build homes, to send their children to school.” Bernel, a Haitian-
American, saw that there was a “cascading effect when you put money in 
somebody’s hands - by giving him a job, not through welfare...” 
Viriginia’s diaspora/grassroots/foreign hybrid organization looks to 
their Haitian partners for direction.  
“We really do see that we have nothing to provide but 
resources and training. Basically we just let the grassroots 
come to us and say ‘This is what we need- this, this and 
this’ or ‘We need a new boat to improve our fishing 
productivity’ so it’s really using them. They’re the ones. 
They know their communities. They know the people 
they’re working with and they know their names. We’re not 
the people that come in and dictate that. It’s really truly just 
to help and kind of an assistant. ‘Here’s your resources, 
here’s your training’, and let the Haitians do what they will 
with it.” 
 
3c. Aid and Its Effects on Haiti’s Economy  
Several participants, including two community meeting attendees, gave 
examples in which aid and international policies have adversely affected Haiti’s 
economy. Two grassroots, two hybrid (one diaspora/grassroots and one 
diaspora/foreign), and three foreign organizations shared their views on this topic.  
Haiti’s dependency on foreign aid, whether through NGOs or 
bilateral/multilateral corporations, has decimated her economy. From an NGO 
perspective, Tom, an American, saw that  
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“some of this [benevolence] has really screwed up the 
economy. How can the rice farmer expect to make money 
and grow rice and sell it if people are constantly bringing it 
in and dumping it on the market for free or on the black 
market and people don’t have to buy his rice when 
someone else is giving it away. From an economic 
standpoint it keeps it from developing when this kind of 
thing goes on and it goes in many different areas.” 
 
 Haiti’s economy fairs no better from the angle of bilateral or 
multilateral aid. Jelsen, a grassroots political activist, is part of an organization 
which 
“fight[s] against Haiti’s indebtedness. The external public 
debt. You’ve heard of the movement to forgive the debt of 
countries in the developing world through the program 
PPPE or HIPC [Highly Indebted Poor Countries]. So each 
country that wants to benefit from this initiative has to 
submit a plan for a strategy to reduce its debt. Haiti has done 
that and a portion of her debt has been forgiven. We’re 
fighting that. It’s a debt we’ve already repaid a thousand 
times and we continue to pay. We call that an odious debt.” 
 
At the community meeting, one attendee said, “We’re an état mendiant 
[state dependent on charity]. You don’t produce anything, you don’t do anything, 
everything comes from abroad.” Another added, “The production system of Haiti 
has always been to take from the land and then ship it out elsewhere.” Jelsen 
noted the same trend -and the effect it’s had on the nation. He shared,   
“Today the rhetoric is that Haiti has two principle resources, 
tourists and agriculture. So all the projects about Haiti focus 
on that. So when you look at agriculture and the push to 
have this sector grow, do the plans stress agriculture for 
national consumption or exportation? It’s always for 
exportation. So that means that this model of economic 
growth is one based on extroversion. That is, it’s not about 
strengthening the services here in the country, that serve 
national interests but rather, an economy that works to 
satisfy the needs of foreign nations. And these models are 
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neoliberal. Since the 80s there has been a huge push to have 
countries, particularly in the south privatize their industries. 
This was done under the guise that the government of these 
developing nations were corrupt. So there was a call for 
industries to move out from under direct government control 
and that privatization would encourage free economics and 
result in development. And that explains all the privatization 
in Haiti. So all the services are privatized. Where are the 
public services? So now the market controls everything. The 
government has been put out. That’s the model we’ve been 
proposed for development. A neoliberal model - a dependent 
capitalist extrovert model. So that’s where we are now.” 
 
Marie observed that Haiti’s economy was mostly one of “consumption 
[since] we do not produce.” But that wasn’t always the case. Paul, a 56 -year-old 
American remarked,  
“During Papa Doc time, Haiti produced 80% of their food. 
After all the political problems, there was an embargo that 
the US did in early 90s that was very difficult for the 
country. Things have not improved much since then. My 
understanding now is that Haiti is only producing 20% of 
their food needs. That has inverted completely.”  
 
This is why Raul believes we should “boost agricultural productison... we’re still 
too dependent... a good part of our imports are food products.” Marie had a 
similar point of view, saying, “When we finish feeding our people, and we have 
excess, we can export.” 
Daniel, who holds a degree in international economics, identified two 
old ways of thinking about development that have stalled economic progress in 
Haiti. He said,  
“The trickle down economy- the belief that if you make the 
people that are already rich, richer because they are the 
ones who create jobs, they are the ones who invest, 
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[therefore] the richer they become the more likely you will 
have an injection of cash into the economy. [This] trickle 
down economy where the richest should get a break as an 
incentive for them to create jobs, that way the poorer 
members of society will be exposed to better opportunity... 
over time it has proven to be false. The type of business 
class we have in Haiti, la bourgeoisie, they don’t have any 
intention to invest in Haiti. They’re sitting on cash but they 
believe it’s too risky for them to invest in Haiti so they 
invest in other countries, like the DR, and other Caribbean 
countries.”  
 
Echoing Jelsen’s thoughts on the two pronged sector approach to development, he 
added that there is the  
“belie[f] that key sectors such as agriculture and tourism... 
are sufficient to generate the type of revenues the State 
relies on to execute viable development programs and 
that’s not true. Some people even use the analogy of the 
Middle East like Dubai and Saudi Arabia and think that 
these countries rely totally on revenues from oil, one 
natural resource, petroleum. But sustainable development 
requires that all sectors of a society be in sync. It’s a 
comprehensive execution, when one sector should be the 
enabling factor for the other... For instance if you invest 
heavily in tourism but neglect security and national 
defense, no investor is going to come for your tourism if 
you lack security. Nobody will take you seriously. Its a 
fallacy to rely on just one sector.” 
 
Haiti’s economy, already barely performing, was dealt another huge 
blow by the earthquake and doesn’t seem to be improving. While street markets 
are full, they are no indicator of growth as Josué points out. “What I see... are 
people buying in bulk from the US, the D.R., or elsewhere and reselling them. So 
with such an economy, it won’t budge.” An entrepreneur himself, Maxime took 
issue with microlending as it is often the means market vendors secure start-up 
funds.  
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“One of the things that people don’t realize is that the 
microcredit/microlending only allows the individual 
entrepreneur to enter a very finite market- retail or selling 
food or selling mangoes. If you have forty mangoes, you 
sell what’s there. Within the Haitian economy, it is 
chopped up into three: you have top market which is 
crowded by monopolies, you have mid-market, and you 
have lower market which is microfinancing efforts. The top 
market [is] crowded by monopolies and whatever they do 
they have a major ripple effect throughout the entire 
economy. The only body of the economy that was lacking 
funding and attention was the middle market. The middle 
market is very important, [representing] small to median 
sized companies, [and] middle market companies can bring 
in new talent and new services that encourage monopolies 
to alter the way they provide or do business.”  
 
Jelsen noted, “We’re in a situation of sorrow because everything that we 
consume comes from abroad. That’s not good for the economy of the country, it’s 
not good for those that work.” Projects that create industries in Haiti tailored only 
for U.S. consumption hasn’t worked in Haiti either.  
“The American plan for Haiti: that is, every time the 
Americans have projects for the entire region, their project, 
that respond[s] to their foreign policy interests, [and] 
stretch over their vast zone of control which would be Latin 
America and the Caribbean. So there isn’t a shortage of 
plans for Haiti drawn up by the States. [For example] we 
have the American occupation where foreign investment is 
introduced, this well before 1915, and this started in the 
middle of the 19th century. The Civil War caused a drop in 
cotton production in the States. The then gov’t of Haiti 
used foreign funds, notably that from North America, to 
finance Haiti’s cotton production that fed American 
industries. This benefited Haiti but once the war was over, 
there wasn’t a demand for Haitian cotton anymore.”  
 
He went on to say that “J.E. Charles believed that the problem of the nation was 
that we were a feudal nation. Or neofeudal because he took account of all the 
interference of foreign capital.” Jelsen himself, however, preferred the terms 
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“satellite capitalist” or “dependent capitalist” to describe nations such as Haiti. 
3d. True Aid  
This sub-theme captures comments that pertains to the culturally 
sensitive, empowering, and holistic philosophy, roles, and work of their 
organizations in assisting Haiti in its redevelopment efforts.  
Marie emphasized that for her diaspora/grassroots organization, it’s all 
about the grassroots movement. “They would be what they are with or without 
[us], you understand? So basically, what we do, we see ‘How can we help them 
be a little better?’” Tom, whose organization has very close ties with people in 
Haiti, believes true aid “requires that on-the-ground experience to do it, to get 
how to do it.” His organization’s “long term goal [is] to be a resource to all areas 
that are basic to community development and have that available and support 
community and bring forth those aspects of their development and infrastructure,” 
for which “sustainability is key.” He said that’s the “difference between 
development and aid.” Haitian-American entrepreneur Bernel believed what was 
needed were projects that focused on “developing local economies and creating 
jobs and things like that to really help the locals.” 
Grassroots civil society animator Andrew believes that  
“If the international community wants to really help us and 
if the Americans really want to help us, they would, instead 
of going through the Haitian politicians, look to get in 
contact with the Haitian civil society. The people who think 
everyday, who write, who work for the country, they 
[foreigners] should seek to meet with those people and ask 
them questions.”  
 
In his work in agriculture, Able went to great lengths to be “sensitive to 
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local economies, cultures, and climates” and didn’t allow his organization’s 
“seeds... to undermine the local economies.” He shared an illustration of what he 
meant: 
“A colleague came back just after the earthquake and he 
said that the UN was going and they had food distribution 
programs. The sad thing is that he saw the UN truck 
distributing free food and right next to the truck were 
Haitians were trying to make a living selling food. You see 
the paradox there. And this really wreaks havoc when it 
comes to development. Support the local economy 
[instead].”  
 
It’s all about enabling communities that have “a development mindset 
and not an entitlement mindset” for this foreign organization. They want to 
“become a resource for the people to build on and not just something they depend 
on.” Able is also very cognizant of the fact that “the Haitian people, they are the 
ones that best know their situation. They are the ones to have input as to what 
should be done.” Elise agrees. “...People in Haiti are very smart they just need the 
help, the education, they need the tools to do it. And a little bit of training and 
they’ll be fine,” she said confidently. Her 2 -year-old diaspora/grassroots 
nonprofit aims to “really work with the people that are in Haiti and try to do what 
they want to do.” Likewise Daniel shared,  
“...the new thinking approaches that we embrace sincerely 
[are] self-sufficiency, delegate, [and] opportunities to the 
beneficiaries themselves. We cannot keep catering to them, 
they have to be able to fashion their reality and their futures 
themselves. We’re not just being paternalistic like some 
organizations do, we provide our beneficiaries with the 
opportunity to replace us in the future, being empowered 
and do things for themselves.”  
 
This Cap-Haïtien native, who now works for a foreign nonprofit in the 
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U.S., shared his strategy of true aid. “I personally became an active listener. As 
opposed to going to Haiti in gran pan pan [great flair and arrogance] you know?” 
he said with a laugh. Which leads “people [to] understand that you are the one, 
you are the messiah, to solve all your problems. [Rather] we became active 
listeners of the people we’re supposed to serve. And we make room for their 
involvement and participation in the process.”  
In Able’s work, in an effort to be sensitive to local livelihoods if 
introducing new plant varieties in a community, the “practitioner”, usually a 
foreigner, “takes the risk not the farmer. The practitioner uses new seed first, then 
if it grows and does well, then the practitioner devises equitable ways in which to 
distribute to community.” Furthermore, Able’s organization is a faith-based 
Christian nonprofit which practices “holistic development, dealing with the whole 
person, not just the socio-economic aspect of the person but also the health of the 
individual. The spiritual aspect of the individual as well. That’s what makes a 
complete person.”  
 Paul, an American minister said,  
“[the] nature of Christian ministry is to do the easy thing 
and the easy thing is to give a man a fish. And we feel good 
about ourselves and we go home. The harder thing is to 
teach a man to fish and it takes the investment of a lifetime. 
At my organization, that’s what we’re engaged in the better 
half, to teach a man to fish. Our ministry goes through great 
lengths to not continue to cultivate the dependency and the 
welfare mentality because it’s damaging in the long run.”  
 
He conceded that “there are places in Haiti where the people are malnourished. 
You have to give a man a fish or he will die. But somehow there has to be a 
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balance of the equation.”  
Theme 4. Haitian Society 
This theme encompasses the culture, mentality, and activities of Haitian 
society and their implication on the redevelopment efforts. Participants also 
shared their observations of helpful and harmful cultural and thinking practices 
and the role of Haitian civil society. 
4a. Haitian Culture and Psyche 
Some participants, all Haitian or Haitian American representing a mix 
of entities including the community meeting, were quite vocal about the 
hindrances in aspects of the Haitian culture and psyche. The entities they 
represented were two diaspora social ventures, two hybrid (diaspora/grassroots 
and diaspora/foreign), two grassroots, one foreign, and one diaspora organization. 
Maxime, a Haitian-American entrepreneur said, “One of the biggest 
things we have to do is change the mindset of people. Mindset change is very hard 
and very expensive to do.” Josué, a Jacmel, Haiti native who studied 
communication, law, and administration, related that one of his organization’s 
main purpose was “to change a bit the mentality, the way of thinking, the way of 
acting, being responsible, being more of a citizen” in the youth that he worked 
with. At the community meeting, one attendee noted that “we fight [each other] 
we fight, we fight, but we don’t accomplish anything.”  When discussing creating 
a congress of Haiti’s civil society, one attendee wanted the group to “stick close 
to the media. The congress is not necessarily only what takes place in the meeting 
hall but it’s about a transformation of the Haitian psyche. And a change in 
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thinking can’t take place without the media.”  
Two participants, Josué and Andrew, noted a phenomenon they 
observed pertaining to Haitians collaborating together. Said Josué, “Two people 
come together to start a business. They come together on emotional basis- a 
shared excitement for starting a venture. But when it starts to grow and be 
successful, each thinks ‘I could have done this myself.’” Along the same vein, 
Andrew related, “two Haitians come together to do something. Wait a while and 
you’ll hear that they’ve then destroyed it.” Both see this tendency as a huge 
problem. In response, Andrew’s grassroots civil society organization has  
“worked a lot in terms of changing the Haitian mentality. 
Before, I noticed that Haitians were very petty, they only 
spoke to certain people, but now we hear each other out, we 
communicate, and everyone wants change, they all say that 
we have to come together. But I wasn’t the only one to say 
this, there are quite a few organizations [who say the 
same].”  
 
The expression “marron” was also twice applied in describing the 
Haitian psyche. Andrew explained,  
“It means someone who leaves an area and hides. The 
Haitian hides all the time. He does not tell you what he 
thinks. The Haitian is a marron. Marronage comes from the 
colonial days. The slaves - that’s why they won the war - the 
slaves lived with the French but you could have the woman 
that cooks for you today be a member of the slave army. 
And marronage had many meanings. For example, I’m on 
the plantation and you make me work, one day I escape and 
I go live in the mountains - a free man. You will come and 
pursue me but you have to find me. And he was not content 
to just hide themselves in the mountains, he would descend 
from the mountains at night and burn the plantations and 
attack the white plantation owners.  But there is a 
marronage that’s psychological. That is, when the Haitian 
tells you ‘Yes’, sometimes he really means ‘No’. When he 
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says ‘Yes, yes, yes, yes’ you can be sure that he’s really 
telling you no. [laughing] So marronage has been brought 
down through the culture. They don’t tell you what they 
think.”  
 
Marie, a member of the diaspora, spoke similarly saying marronage 
was serious problem, the result of deep mistrust that is hampering progress.  
“Haitians do not trust other Haitians. At the core, it’s us. It’s 
us Haitians that are the problem.... Put the ailment on the 
Haitian, the person itself, with our own flaws. The flaws that 
are embedded in us, the lack of trust. The Haitian is a 
marron. So you don’t know what they’re thinking, what 
they’re feeling, so you should be ready.”  
 
Bernel, a young Haitian-American, echoed something akin to Marie’s 
perceptions. “Haitian people are very suspicious of things. Very non-trusting kind 
of deal,” he said. When asked why this was so he replied, “It’s pretty much a 
culture thing. If you present something they’re ‘Yeah, ok. What are you trying to 
get from me?’ kind of deal. It’s a cultural thing that we need to work on.”  
For Josué it came down to the fact that  “we need to stop being 
hypocrites, being fake.” One attendee at the community meeting believed it 
stemmed from Haitians not knowing their history well. He believed Haitians 
would “...learn to love their country more. If we knew our history well, we’d love 
each other more. And I’m not talking about the fables and legends they like to 
retell, I’m talking about our real history. We’d have more solidarity amongst us. 
We’d have a solidarity of thought.”  
Division was seen in several areas of Haitian society. “Tête ensemble 
[putting our heads together]. Division hampers us. Everyone thinks it has to be 
their project that has to work, be applied. We have to come together. If we don’t, 
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there will never be a refoundation of the state,” said Josué. Esther bemoaned the 
fact that “we have not had a unified Haiti for several decades.” Maxime saw a 
generational gap in politics causing some problems. “A lot of older minds tend to 
be polarized. ‘Follow me, follow me’ and not looking at the bigger picture,” he 
shared. In the socio-economic sphere, Leo was emphatic stating, “What we have 
to stop thinking is that the pie is only this big. There is no limit to the pie... We 
can share ideas because we can’t do it all on our own.” Maxime shared his 
observations,  
“One of the biggest things that is going to happen and 
people are going to realize is, its going to awaken everyone, 
or open up the eyes of the elites in Haiti. Because the elites 
feel that ‘Well, the business model has to work where if we 
are in competition [then]...we’re going to be squeezed out. 
In reality what will end up happening is - they are not going 
to be pushed out and get a small piece of the pie. Instead 
the pie is going to get bigger because Haitians will have 
more disposable income to consume your products. This is 
going to be a major social change that’s going to take place 
in Haiti.’” 
 
He explained his social venture’s dual approach to this problem:  
“[O]n the elites’ end we want to show them that they can 
increase the pie… We want to show them that a lot of the 
same companies just like them were doing the same things 
in China and now that more families in China have 
disposable income, now they’re buying more stuff and as a 
result of this, they’re [Chinese companies] making more 
money. At the same time parallel, changing the mindset of 
the Haitians in Haiti. For the longest they have been 
dependent on family members sending them money back 
home. Now they must start working. That’s one. And two, 
teaching people the importance of following through with a 
contract. It’s like teaching them Chinese or Japanese 
because it’s not part of the culture.”  
 
Similarly, social venture founder and webmaster, Bernel noted that 
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Haitians have to tendency to think,  
“if ‘I know something, I don’t want to share it with you’ 
type of deal and in the 21st century, there’s not of that 
anymore. [laughing] But that’s the way, it’s a cultural thing. 
Its just this idea that if I do share with you then you’re going 
to figure out how to profit from me. It’s a mentality. It’s a 
backwoods way to think because when I hang out with the 
Indians, they are always sharing. They’re like ‘Ok, I have 
this, this this, and this is how I’m doing it, this is what’s 
going on.’ They’re always sharing... They are sharing, they 
talk to each other. They run things as a family and they run 
things as a group. But Haitians, ‘if I’m doing this, I don’t 
want you to [know]’. If you succeed, somehow it affects me. 
It’s just a mentality, a cultural thing, that is why the country 
is in such a state.”  
 
When asked where this mentality came from he replied, “[It] goes back from 
where it was, in slavery and things like that. It’s a slave mentality.” Leo likewise 
believed it was the Haitian mindset of fear “that keeps us grounded in the colonial 
mentality. In fear of each other and in fear of everything around us.” 
Leo and Bernel likened this mentality to crabs in a barrel. “[The] thing 
that plagues us is the idea of not allowing one of our kind to advance. Crabs in a 
bowl. That’s what happens in any developing country - not just Haiti,” remarked 
Leo. Bernel conveyed,  
“The idea that if you’re succeeding... it’s the crab in the 
barrel type of deal. If you’re succeeding then I need to pull 
you down in my level. I don’t want you to go farther than I 
am. It’s that culture that killing us, really. Until that changes 
it’s very hard to see improvement in anything else - in 
politics or... Things [must] change down there of not caring 
for the other, and not wanting the other to go anywhere.”  
 
Marie was tired of seeing Haitians stand on the sidelines critiquing 
those that were trying to make a difference. “You cannot sit and just watching me 
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and maybe hoping that it will fail to show me that I’m an idiot because I can’t do 
it,” said she. “We’re fake,” said Josué matter-of-factly. “We’ll say ‘That’s not 
good, that’s not good, that’s not good.’ But when it comes time to act, we don’t 
come through. That’s our problem.”  
Of some contention among participants was a supposed language snare 
on the island and its effects on Haiti’s cultural fiber. Haitian Creole and French 
are the official languages however, Creole is more widely spoken on the island 
but French is used in the education system and for official government business. 
In our interview in Port-au-Prince, Andrew, an author and educator who himself 
spoke four languages, asked rhetorically,  
“You know that French is a snare to development in Haiti? 
The French language. English or Spanish [should be] the 
language of orientation for Haiti. I propose that even if we 
don’t remove French as the official language, that we use 
English or Spanish as the language of orientation. If we 
chose English, we’d be in a different situation. Because we 
are surrounded by nations that either speak English or 
Spanish. With English, we’d have a different rapport the 
United States and with Spanish [inaudible].” 
 
He continued, clearly passionate about this topic,  
“All this put in your dissertation, these are barriers to 
development. Both the French language and the French are 
hindrances to development. Because they finagle their way 
to be here. I would say English for sure, because of the 
States, but Spanish would be even better. The idea behind 
choosing a language of orientation is to in fact choose a 
country or countries with which you will partner for the 
sake of your nation’s development.” 
 
Peter, an American whose organization translates educational and faith-
based material into Creole, was of the opinion, “education in the Creole language 
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is the key piece,” he said laughing. “I think that is one of the major pieces that’s 
got to be done before anything else can happen.” Leo, a Haitian-American artist 
said with noted exasperation,  
“One thing that hasn’t been working and will never work if 
we continue on this path is our language. We are so set on 
keeping French as the official language in which we 
conduct our affairs, in which we write our laws and it’s a 
disadvantage for the rest of population! If you have 20% of 
the population speaking French, even in that 20%, I’m sure 
there’s a lot less because there are some who don’t even 
write it well and there are those who don’t even speak it 
well. So why are we insisting on keeping French as our 
official language?” 
 
He went on saying,  
“[I’m] not to say it’s not nice to know French or that we 
should dismiss it altogether. Only thing is that let’s really be 
honest with ourselves. We have a population that speaks 
practically 100% Creole. This would be the easiest way to 
get the people educated and really advance the culture and 
we should be proud of it. Creole is an incredible language. 
This is the language we use in our music, this is the 
language we use when we joke, this is the language we use 
when we’re in small informal group to really connect and 
interact. When you’re walking in the streets in the US, in 
NY or Miami or elsewhere, you hear people speak Creole 
and automatically, wow, you’re so connected. Now with 
French I don’t get this kind of connection. In poetry, you 
read Creole in poetry. It’s an incredible language and I think 
this is where we need to begin. If we start there and you 
want to include everybody so you can have everyone 
participating in this development then you have to use the 
language people are comfortable with, that they understand, 
that they know. [Yet] now you’re passing laws, you’re 
making business decisions [in French]. Who do we do 
business with mostly now? The US! So why are we still 
with French. English is better than French in terms of our 
[inaudible]. The majority of the diaspora is in the US. If it’s 
not going to be Creole it’s going to be English more-so than 
French. Language is a big issue and we have to really face 
  140 
that.” 
 
Esther, who’s lived in the United States since she was 17 years old, was 
in agreement saying,  
“From within, we can’t reconcile it from within. Our 
children who are learning right now, their school books are 
still in French but we are trying to teach them in Creole. 
They develop a real complex about it because there are 
certain environments where when they go in they will 
expect them to speak French but we were telling them that 
they should only speak Creole. We really need to reconcile 
it at home. Are we going to have French as our official 
language or are we going to go ahead and [inaudible]?”  
 
4b. Haitian Civil Society 
Haitian civil society was considered by participants to be the lifeblood 
of the nation. They expounded on the purpose and role of civil society in relation 
to the Haitian government and nonprofit organizations. They also shared 
examples of Haitian civil society’s successes and challenges in participating in the 
redevelopment discussion. 
In his correspondence, Raul, a grassroots activists focused on 
agriculture wrote, “It needs to be the Haitians who help the country advance.” 
That meant using allowing Haitians to guide the rebuilding efforts, which wasn’t 
being seen by Jelsen. “We can still do an evaluation and we’ll see that the 
population is rejecting the projects currently underway. They don’t have a voice, 
they don’t see themselves. Eleven billion isn’t for them, it’s for the 
multinationalists and international entities. You’ll see almost nothing of that will 
stay in the country,” he remarked, adding, “ when you see the way in which these 
plans were created, they left no place for the Haitian population to participate and 
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have a say.” Daniel, a Haitian-American noted something similar. “[Haitian] 
people are voicing their support for less outside government in the formulation of 
the national redevelopment plan. They say ‘We want Haitians to be leading that 
effort’ They insist that such plan has to reflect the real needs of the masses. 
Therefore Haitians should lead the initiatives.” 
Part of the problem is “despite all their efforts, the way that Haitian 
organizations work together is not really satisfactory.” Josette, a government 
employee shared, “Haitians have a lot of their own associations, like youth 
associations, and a lot have their own nonprofits. It’s not like its a society that 
doesn’t gather as a community.” Meeting was one thing though, being unified 
was another. Marie said, “We need to know how to speak from one organ, with 
one voice.” Andrew shared a similar assessment, “For organizations [of civil 
society] it’s been a wake up call. But we find that there are parts of civil society 
that there isn’t any exchange between them, there isn’t any cooperation between 
them, there isn’t direction, there isn’t a common vision.” He concluded, “It’s the 
division that ruins us. We are not poor.” He reiterated, “Let’s start from the fact 
that Haiti isn’t poor. Rather, its division that keeps us back.” His organization 
therefore appeals to Haitian civil society to “choose the path to peace, put 
yourselves together rather than fight each other, put aside violence, stop the 
political violence that just brings about destruction rather than building up the 
nation.” He firmly believes in “organize[ing] the civil society to be the force of 
change. Change in Haiti will come from the civil society.”  
Andrew said regrettably of Haiti’s past, “If we had a strong civil 
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society, one that thinks, we would have resolved the problem that I’ve already 
talked to you about - the failure of traditional powers, that is, the legislative, 
executive and judicial branches of government.” And “that is the problem,” said 
Josué, “...we’re never aware of what they’re [government] doing. And since we’re 
never aware, we don’t do anything and we can’t hold them accountable. That’s 
definitely a problem. The public should be in the know in order to offer support; 
the population must be a part of it.” Attendees at the community meeting wanted 
to “have a vision, have an organized civil society, and have a civil society that has 
recommendations/propositions so that we can then influence the actors that make 
the decisions [whoever takes office].” 
 Former elected government official Jude commented, “Developing the 
nation doesn’t have to come form the top, it could also come from la base [society 
itself].” He believed vulnerabilities in Haitian society were “ exacerbated by 
society’s stifled voice.” Virginia said her organization, a diaspora/grassroots/- 
foreign hybrid, considered it their purpose to “strengthen civil society in Haiti as a 
necessary foundation for democracy and development.” Her assertation was that 
Haitian society isn’t helpless she asserted. Through their work in rural areas she 
noted how immediately after the earthquake,  
“they [rural Haitians] were the first ones to give them 
[Haitians from affected areas] food, water, shelter, all of 
those things. And they recognized that their being 
organized is what empowered them to help their fellow 
citizens. And then on top of that they see that getting more 
organized can only strengthen their movement and their 
desires for the future.”  
 
“If you are going to bring change to Haiti,” said Marie, “you have to 
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look at the civil society.” According to Elsie, “They [Haitians] want to take the 
country in their own hands. They want to show government that they can and they 
have power to and they can do something when they [government] don’t respond 
to their needs when they should be responding to their needs.” 
Daniel relayed from his time on the ground in Haiti, “They [Haitians] 
think that the spreading, or proliferation of NGOs should be slowed down. At 
least a little bit in exchange for more partnerships among them to avoid 
duplication of services and waste of resources.” As for this concern about NGOs, 
Elsie said, “I think it’s up to the people to create the mechanisms to hold NGOs 
accountable.” Josué listed the key players for Haiti’s redevelopment saying, “Its 
with Haitians and investments and Haitian government, and the civil society, and 
the private sector and the help of the international community, [that] yes, we’ll 
have development. Not with the NGOs. With them we’ll just get a school, a 
health clinic, things that won’t last very long.”  
Josué is convinced that “when we have a problem, we should solve 
them together.” For Jean, a Haitian lawyer, his grassroots organization was 
“always working to find out how we can better the situation of the nation and 
Haitians in general.” Having brought diverse groups of people together, they’re 
now “trying to come up with a list of key solutions... And those ideas that are still 
in the reflection stage we are working to finalize and will be ready to be presented 
and discussed at the congress [being planned]. We hope that that will spur 
movement and change.”  
Marie couldn’t see Haitians coming together unless people put aside 
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their egos. “Le moi? Like a deep ego? It’s like, ‘It has to me and if it’s not me, it 
won’t happen.’ How can that be? How can that be? In the face of so much 
suffering, so much hunger, so much despair? Who are we? Who can we pretend 
to be that we would support all of these things? To me it’s just a big puzzle” She 
continued, “There is no point of denying you your strength and your ability 
because it has to be me, me, me, me, me, me, me. It can be us.” Andrew agrees. 
“What Haiti needs aren’t chefs,” he said. Likewise Bernel stated,  
“Alot of people here or abroad... they think the way they 
can help Haiti is by becoming president or having a top job. 
You don’t necessarily need to be in the top job to do that 
kind of stuff. Because Haiti needs help everywhere, at 
every level. Too many chiefs and not enough Indians. You 
don’t need to be a chief to do something. You can be an 
Indian and do your part. If you do it well, you can share it 
and help those down. Take orders and know how to do 
what you do very well. I guess that’s one thing that comes 
to mind. We all don’t have to be in charge to have a 
significant impact.” 
 
Theme 5. International Interference 
Participants discussed incidences of international interference, for better 
or worse, in Haiti’s social, economic, environmental, and political arenas. Some 
spoke directly to the “messiah” complex of some NGOs and the friend/foe 
relationship between Haiti and the United States. Other participants verbalized the 
need for NGO accountability to the Haitian government and the Haitian people.  
5a. The Hand that Gives is Always Above the Hand that Receives 
Several participants addressed the international policies that promise 
economic development but leave Haiti worse off than before. Interviewees also 
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highlighted the tendency to shape development projects to fit the needs of 
international markets rather than Haiti’s best interests. Comments represented in 
this subtheme came from one government employee, three hybrid (diaspora/-
grassroots, diaspora/foreign, diaspora/grassroots/foreign), three foreign, and two 
grassroots organizations. Statements from community meeting attendees are also 
captured by the sub-theme.  
 Jelsen, program director for a political grassroots organization said, “In all 
the American plans, what we do find? We have outlined uses of Haiti that would 
respond to and feed the American market.” Marie, a Haitian-American, noted 
with sadness, “[There has been] United States policy that ha[s] not been really 
good toward Haiti. The pig thing, the embargo, and even their fruit company in 
the early 20th century in Haiti, maybe even sooner. There was a lot of abuse. In 
fact, you know what happened? It’s like people see their interest first, no matter 
what they do.” Josette, who previously worked for a big NGO and is currently a 
government employee, said,  
“It’s the international policy towards Haiti that killed our 
agriculture. That was the big purpose so that [the U.S. 
could] regain food security. How is it that in a country like 
Haiti, we’re importing rice from [the U.S.]? President 
Clinton apologized for that. If you boost your own farmers 
with subsidies after subsidies and flood a country with your 
middle market price products, this is going to kill the 
economy in the host country. And that’s what happened to 
Haiti. With the pigs in the 80s and the rice in the 2000s.” 
 
Tom, an American, noted with disappointment, “Our government has 
done this. Sometimes its with the best of intentions and sometimes - I get a little 
cynical sometimes and think that they’re also propping up like the American rice 
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market or whatever it is, these different markets by buying these things and 
turning around and essentially giving it away, artificially pumping the American 
market.” He added, “We also have trade barriers on importing things that keep 
them from selling some of these basic food products in the US market… Our 
government and its policies are contributing to keeping Haiti from developing by 
doing these kinds of things.” 
Tom went on to say,  
“That’s what keeps happening and its no surprise then that 
things don’t change. Here’s billions of dollars coming in, 
why don’t things change? Well, how is it being spent, you 
know? You gotta pay attention to that. We’re [American 
public] just mostly ignorant is what it comes down to and 
so it requires an educational element.”  
 
 Marie was upset that “it’s not Haitians leading Haiti, it’s the international 
community.” Jelsen said, “There are no shortages of projects from the UNESCO, 
the U.S. government, multilateral corporations - all these projects were failures 
which explains why the situation in Haiti is the way it is today.” Leo shared that 
Haiti “spend[s] so much time in talks with foreign people who want to take Haiti 
in a different direction, develop Haiti in their own way with no clue what the 
culture is about and in every instance it doesn’t work. What we’re going to end up 
doing is tear it all down to rebuild it again.” Foreign policy-makers don’t really 
know Haiti, argues Marie, yet policies  
“are being enacted on behalf of Haiti. And that is such a 
huge loss for the country. Because if you don’t know me, if 
you don’t know where I’m aching, if you don’t really know 
what’s going on with me, how can you decide you’re going 
to treat me? You understand? If you’re going to make a 
diagnosis of what my ailment is to make a prescription, I 
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don’t say no, but how are you going to do it if you’re 
not...you understand? There is so much that has to be done 
in the place of those policies.”  
 
In Jelsen’s view, “Today there is a [development] model that is in place, 
not because the Haitian population has chosen it, but [because] the actors that 
push the neoliberal model of development are powerful.” Neoliberalism also 
came up in Josette’s interview. She elaborated how it was applied in Haiti:  
“Through Latin America and through the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund, there has been a big push for 
lowering trade barriers and import tariffs. Because the free 
market for others is god in [the U.S.], [however] the free 
market for U.S. farmers does not exist, ok? So you lower 
your trade barriers, there is no barrier to enter into your 
market. Parallel to that farmers in Arkansas, Louisiana, 
wherever get huge subsidies to keep producing. So they 
keep producing although the cost of production of their rice 
is unmarketable if they don’t have assistance and they’re 
able to export it. So the exporting rice countries... have no 
barriers to that export and so it floods the market.”  
 
Running alongside multilateral efforts were U.S. policies disguised as 
“so-called foreign assistance [and] gets in through 
nonprofits and their food security programs. Food security 
programs are oftentimes through USAID and Food for 
Peace, financed by a mechanism called monetization... 
Basically taking rice for instance or wheat, produced in the 
U.S, selling it and using that money to finance development 
projects. It’s all about supporting the farm industry in the 
U.S.... Look into Department of Agriculture website, their 
foreign assistance services, it’s called SAS and it’s all about 
supporting U.S. agriculture, which makes sense, but when 
you pretend that you’re helping another country when your 
clear goal and clearly stated goal is to support US farmers, it 
doesn’t fully equate. You can’t have both. The only way to 
have both is to have a really free market or have a fair 
market. When you say you have a free market but your own 
market is completely subsidized, that’s not free.” 
 
Contrary to popular perception, as far as 37-year-old Josué is 
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concerned, “The NGOs aren’t here for that [develop the nation] and will never be. 
The NGOs are not here to develop the country and create any type of 
development. Never.” Also a grassroots organizer, Jelsen’s organization  
“believe[s] in order for a country to develop freely, it must 
be independent of other countries. Sadly we have a country 
that, our Haiti, is a country that is controlled by a number 
of powerful countries. But this has been the story of our 
nation, actually. Since colonization, down through several 
different occupations, notably like the US occupation in 
1915, then again in 1991 after the coup d’etat. And a 
number of missions and occupations from the UN, 1911 - 
1916 and you’ll see sadly, another occupation by the 
MINUSTAH, that we’re under even today.” 
 
Leo isn’t a fan of the UN either. “Forget about the UN. Get the UN outta there... 
Current UN have been there for enough years and we’re still experiencing 
problems with security,” he said decisively.  
Jelsen isn’t impressed with the international pledges of financial assistance 
for Haiti’s reconstruction effort. “When they announce 11 billion to help Haiti, 
those funds are not intended for the Haitian people through socio-politico-
economic movements,” he contends. The funds would somehow find their way 
into the pockets of American contractors as Tom noted, “There are for-profits that 
can build homes and build schools and do this kind of thing. They come from the 
States and they’re looking for business in this economic downturn.” At the 
community meeting one attendee remarked, “What the international community 
would never do in their own nations, they come and do it here. And all the while 
we continue to have the international community call the shots we’ll have these 
sorts of problems.” Another shared, “All I know is, when the international 
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community gets involved, [inaudible]. The international community plays a role 
in the division of the country.” 
Virginia, a 26 -year-old American noted, “It’s been kinda the idea that 
you can go into Haiti, especially the international organizations that don’t 
necessarily have these Haitian ties, they’ll come in and think ‘Oh, we can build a 
school,’ or ‘We’ll give some people some money,’ or ‘We’ll supply them with 
clothes’ or whatever it is and ‘That will be the fix.’ And that’s not really been 
developing the country or the community as a whole.” Tom shared,  
“You have to get that you’re interfering. No matter what. 
Just being present and opening your mouth and doing 
something, you’re kind of interfering. There is sort of a 
ying-yang to all of that. It’s not however, positive [as] you 
might think it is. We’re unconscious to the other aspect of 
how we’re received, what we think is a great idea [has] 
impact on people. And they are in a place where it’s not the 
same language, not the same culture, you think it’s simple 
and they don’t think that way, because they are of a different 
mindset.”  
 
But the problem, he says, is that “people are motivated so selfishly. ‘I know 
better’ and ‘I want the power because I know better’ and its so ego-driven, it’s 
pathetic. Rather than saying ‘Ok, so what would you do’ and if you think that’s a 
good suggestion let’s discuss it.” He concludes, “The motivation as far as I’m 
concerned is nothing other than pure ego in various forms. Whether its money, 
power, being right, or whatever. It has no contribution whatsoever to making it a 
better situation.”  
Forty-six -year-old Haitian-American Leo points out fervidly,  
“If you look at who’s involved in this thing, you have an 
international community, you have the Clintons in this 
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thing, so who’s making decisions for Haiti? Even with the 
structure of this co-chair development, I mean, what kind of 
crap is that? How can you, you are an independent country, 
free for all these years, and then you have a co-chair for 
development? This is like saying, ‘You can’t take care of 
your own affairs’... And then of course, it’s because the 
international community is promising to give Haiti all this 
money, but where is the money? Up to date a very small 
amount has been collected... [then] what’s going to happen? 
They’re [international community] going to loose faith in 
Haiti. They’re going to say ‘Well, these Haitians can’t do 
anything for themselves’ But the money is not really coming 
to Haiti, you see?”  
 
Daniel, a Haitian-American, left one foreign nonprofit for another 
because he “wanted to divorce from the routine where people just go there and do 
business as usual without taking into consideration they have to change their 
strategies in the ways of doing things. We see results don’t get me wrong, we see 
results but most of the time these results that we see, they are accidents,” he said 
laughing, “...it’s not an actual result of vision in the beginning.”  
He continued, 
“For instance, when they lend some money to Haiti or 
[other] developing countries, they send technicians from 
nationalities all around the world to come and dictate to you 
how to spend the money, which program it should go to, and 
they will tell exactly who you should hire to do the job. Is 
that sustainable development? I don’t think so. The initiative 
carries its own germs of degeneration.”  
 
Along those same lines, Bernel, a Haitian-American, shared,  
“One thing that’s been going on in the past and a lot of 
people are starting to get wise about it - someone just goes 
down there and starts doing their own thing without any 
kind of local input and once their money runs out they pack 
up their stuff and go back to where they came from.”  
 
Paul, an American minister also noted that “there are still prejudices in 
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America that are deep-seated” toward Haiti. Daniel likewise noted this fact 
saying, “U.S. foreign policy is tainted with racism.” The “ethnocentrism” of aid 
Able considered just as disastrous as paternalism. “We go in, we do everything 
according to what my ethnicity is used to. I look through my rose-colored glasses 
and do things according to what I’m used to. And we do that without asking the 
people ‘How would you like to see it done?’” 
According to Josette, the purpose of “foreign policy is to keep a state 
weak so that you can have an influence and a say in what happens there and you 
can distort trade [to] comparative advantages to benefit your own [country]... We 
often look at the NGOs as the culprits but they are getting USAID money for a 
reason. Foreign bilateral aid goes to private entities for a reason. It’s not out of the 
blue.” Andrew believes aid isn’t the issue but the degrading type of aid offered to 
Haiti which he feels exemplifies “the arrogance of the international community.” 
He added, “You know that the hand that gives is always above the hand that 
receives.”  
5b. NGOs: Une Cacophonie la Plus Totale 
Here, participants describe the good works and intentions of many 
NGOs as well as the shortcomings and pitfalls of Haiti’s NGO-heavy society and 
their effects on redevelopment.  
 The proliferation of NGOs, specifically international NGOs, in Haiti was 
considered the island’s conundrum. While there were many more comments about 
the negative results of NGOs in Haiti, there were a few that acknowledged the 
helpful assistance they’ve offered. Josué, who was one of the founding members 
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of his 9 -year-old grassroots organization, admitted,  
“We can’t say that there haven’t been relief of some 
situations for certain families, particular people, some 
sectors of the population or en province [rural areas], 
particularly after the earthquake. Yes, they brought their 
support in a time when we as a Haitian society did not have 
the capacity. If it weren’t for the international community 
we don’t know where we would be following the 
earthquake. So yes, they definitely helped. They can bring 
help. Aid, yes, can do some things.”  
 
While thankful, he was clear “that with this type of aid one cannot develop Haiti.” 
He went on to further clarify that “there are NGOs who are really helping but 
there are fictitious NGOs who are purely virtual. But the ones that do good work 
are few.” Equally cautious about his praise of NGOs was Able, an American 
whose organization focused on agricultural development. “There are some solid 
rock programs going that are working with the people. Getting the people to do 
their own evaluating and resolving the problems,” he shared.  
 Josué noted how there were many “mafia” in the nonprofit world. He 
explained that a mafia nonprofit is “an institution that puts together projects just 
to get funds but do nothing.” He added that “those that are really doing something 
have a hard time getting funding because funding is taken up by mafia 
institutions.”  
Andrew, a 58 -year-old civil society activist, could hardly contain his 
indignation,  
“First of all, don’t tell me that the NGOs are going to 
develop the country. Don’t tell me that. And no, that was 
neither the Haitian thought nor their reality, don’t tell me 
that either. That’s a flat lie. And don’t think either that 
Haitians believe foreigners will come and develop the 
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country. That’s not true either... The NGOs have destroyed 
the nation. They have, in some cases, helped Haitians to 
survive but they are also stumbling blocks that keep the 
people from progressing. When they come, they come to 
make a lot of money... I worked in the department of the 
Ministry of  ———  [and] I have to tell you, that the typical 
Haitian salary cannot compete with that of the NGOs. NGOs 
pay Haitians 5X more to do less. And the NGOs work in une 
cacophonie la plus totale [total cacophony].”  
 
He couldn’t decide which was worse, giving funds to the Haitian 
government or giving funds to the NGOs.   
“The international community’s response is to bypass the 
Haitian government, and maybe they’re right about that, and 
[instead] give the funds to NGOs. [But] you give the funds 
to NGOs who work in isolation and in a cacophonous 
manner.  If you work in the country and I don’t talk to you, I 
don’t know what you’re doing, and there’s a government in 
place, the result is as if there is a multiplicity of 
governments in one country! So you can imagine...”  
 
Andrew had much more to say on the topic. “The foreigners also come here with 
an arrogance. For example, they take Bill Clinton and they propel him to the 
summit of an organization,” he noted, visibly insulted. He explained his objection. 
“I believe Bill Clinton could have been a tremendous help if he had accepted to be 
within the organization and not the chief. He’s taken a huge risk. Knowing my 
country, he’s going to fail. Knowing my country, he will fail. And I know he has 
good intentions,” he said and repeated with certitude, “He will fail. He will fail 
because he doesn’t have the culture.”  
 Tom, an American, believed the “major faults in existing aid work is that 
it falls into relief work. Without continual funding from originating sources the 
project dies.” He noted how “a lot of them, lucky for them, have a lot of money 
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but they have a commitment to spend this money and its not always a 
commitment to spend it in a way that they [Haitians] perceive that this 
development works because they need to tell their funders ‘Look at all the good 
things we’ve done.’”  
Peter, an American publisher, was puzzled at the short-sightedness of 
some NGO work. “They just say ‘We’re going to fill up these 100,000 houses and 
they last for 5 years and then the people deal with it from that point forward.’ It 
won’t last five years. It’ll last until the first big storm and then it’s a disaster 
again,” he said perplexed. Josette, a government employee offered an explanation.  
“The government says, ‘The size of the new houses should 
be’ and I forgot, but let’s say ‘16 square feet or 20 square 
feet’, I don’t have the exact figures, but the NGOs want to 
make it 12 square feet. Well, why do you want to cram? 
Why not do it well now? Why do you want to cram people 
in the one room house they had before? And the reason is 
then they can say ‘We built 10,000 houses’ as opposed to 
‘We built 7,000 houses,’ which is what a bigger size would 
mean.” 
 
She added that funds go  
“to nonprofits which do not have the capacity to spend it, 
do not necessarily want to spend it where it needs to be 
spent according to government plans, who do not want to 
cooperate, and who just want to replenish their coffers so 
that they can stay in business in Haiti. Because it is a 
business. It’s a business of helping, but it’s a business. 
They want to stay afloat; they want to stay alive as well.”  
 
Former 25-year civil servant Samuel saw no results for which so much 
funding has been disbursed. “Those that give funds don’t ask for results, they 
money is spent but what are the results?” he asked. Likewise Jean, a 28 -year-old 
Haitian, observed, “There were a lot of NGOs here with tons of money but were 
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not at all effective in their work.” 
Participants gave examples of how aid was insensitive to the local 
economies and needs. “There should have been a time when the government says, 
‘Enough with distributing free goods because it is destroying national 
production…’ NGOs brought tons of imported rice, namely Diri Tchako [U.S. 
rice] which competes with national production,” said former government 
employee Jude. “...When I was on the ground I saw for the most part... in my 
times driving in the city or touring other cities, [that] there were nonprofits 
stationed everywhere. They rented out the nicest homes, they paid top dollar for 
them, paid top dollar for the best rental cars, which caused a hike in housing, a 
hike in transportation. So people who couldn’t afford homes or transportation 
[before] now can’t afford a mortgage because of these nonprofits,” shared 
Haitian-American Elsie. Josette shared similar observations, 
“[NGO presence is] completely distorting the local markets. 
Haitians cannot find housing. There is already no housing 
and the little housing that is left is rented out to nonprofits at 
exorbitant prices. And you can’t blame the house owner 
who have lost a bunch of stuff already in a devastat[ed] 
country to want to rent their house for $5,000, ‘cause that’s 
all they can get but it crowds out the Haitian middle class, as 
tiny as it is already.”  
 
 Faith-based organizations did not escape criticism. Paul, whose faith-
based ministry has been working in the education sector in Haiti for six years 
related this story: 
“[There was a] man I saw cultivating rice in  ———. All by 
hand. Tremendous amount of intensive labor, no machinery, 
by hand. About a 2 acre rice field. That’s great! The man 
works all season. And he’s almost ready to bring in his crop 
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[when] a tractor-trailer comes to his village. It’s a Christian 
group and they push 10 tons of rice off the back of the truck. 
Now that man who’s been working to try and feed himself 
and his nation, you just killed his crop because he’s not 
going to be able to sell his crop to anybody. Why would 
anybody buy his rice when they can get it free from the 
Christians?”  
 
Faith-based or not, Josette couldn’t envision progress while all the NGOs, in such 
great numbers, were in Haiti. “I defy anyone to name a country that doesn’t have 
a strong public institution. A country is not developed by NGOs, a country is 
developed by the State! And the State fosters civil society, but if there are no State 
services and there is no government, you don’t have a developed country. Ever. 
That’s where we are.” 
Participants also noted a lone ranger culture of sorts among NGOs. 
 Martine, an American foreign organization employee who moved to Haiti shortly 
after the earthquake, said 
“Some organizations work in their own silos. Every 
organization has a different mandate, different vision, 
different mission. Depending, a lot of them are very 
similar. Some are a little different and their ways of 
working are different. Sometimes you don’t have an agency 
coordinating with you. So if there is an [another] agency 
working where you’re working, that lack of collaboration 
causes a problem.”  
 
She shares an example of the complication that can occur. “So let’s say if they’re 
building latrines but it’s not to [inaudible] standards to how latrines should be 
built. They have to be decommissioned and then people don’t have latrines,” she 
said. Marie has seen a similar problem saying, “Everybody is separate and 
everybody is reinventing the wheel.” Virginia, a 26-year-old American who 
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works for a diaspora/grassroots/foreign nonprofit, shared, “[On the] 
organizational level of the NGOs and governments and the UN – [there has been] 
disorganization and really not knowing what the right and left hand are doing,” 
she relayed. Jelsen felt organizations had the tendency to “build a fort around their 
project” rather than work in collaboration with others. Tom, another American, 
admitted that his organization didn’t “interact with a lot of organizations” - 
foreign organizations, that is. He works exclusively in close partnership however, 
with grassroots organizations and at times also with the Haitian government.  
Peter, whose organization facilitates coordination between various 
Christian groups in Haiti said, “Most are one man operations when you get to 
looking at it.” He wishes they would collaborate more but finds that a “number of 
NGOs [are] working on their own, doing their own little thing, trying to help in 
one little area of expertise or geographical area, but no interaction between the 
various groups or cross-pollination.” He said their “overall mentality was 
‘whatever we’ve mapped out as our ‘beach front’, sorta speak, we’re going to do 
it all ourselves.’”  
Some participants offered two possible explanations for the “silo” 
mentality of NGOs. Peter was of the opinion that NGOs “are all very jealous of 
their membership and their funding base and so forth” which is why they don’t 
collaborate more often. Marie agreed, “It is extremely difficult to do serious 
fundraising” and so the competition is fierce. Due to the difficulties of securing 
funding, Maxime opted to create a social venture instead of a nonprofit. “There 
are 10,000 nonprofits in Haiti. We looked at the donation movement in Haiti and 
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we looked at the way they make money... [we] opted not to be that type of 
company waiting.” Likewise, Bernel, another Haitian-American entrepreneur 
noted “aid, grants, or donations are really uneven. One year you might get 
$10,000 and you’re very happy but the next year you might get one or two dollars 
and you cry and say ‘How are we going to keep this going?’”  
5c. You Untie the Hands to Tie the Feet 
Participants voiced their discontent with the false benevolence offered 
to Haiti. They shared how the personal interests of donor countries and aid 
corporations came masked in public displays of solidarity and condition-laden 
financial assistance. 
“State entities are not forthcoming despite pledges in the billions. Only 
10-15% pledged have been dispersed to the government of Haiti so far,” said 
government employee Josette. “[It] is fake assistance when you say ‘We’re going 
to help you’ but you untie the hands to tie the feet,” she remarked. Jelsen, a 
Haitian who studied political science, expressed that the pledged “11 billion have 
nothing to do with newer strategies [of development],” rather, most of it will 
return to donor countries. “The Americans are said to have spent more than 1 
billion in Haiti to date [after the earthquake]. But more than 65% goes to their 
own troops. All these are obstacles [to development],” he pointed out. Josué, a 
Jacmel, Haiti native, similarly shared,  
“When they give 1 million dollars to Haiti, they say Haiti 
has a million dollars. And they send experts, foreigners - 
sometimes it’s not even real, good experts... they’re not 
really experts, because at times we find Haitians who are 
truly the experts compared to those they send us here in 
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Haiti. And these people, they have maybe, out of the 
million, they receive 30-45,000 per month. So the million 
arrives and returns to the donors. And there may be 
$200,000, that actually stays, for Haiti. And that’s a 
reality.”  
 
Daniel, a Haitian-American, was bothered by the strings attached to aid. 
“When they give you the donation, it’s aid, it comes with a bunch of these tricky 
obligations that you’re supposed to go with,” he said. Raul, a grassroots animator, 
who once worked for a foreign NGO, wrote, “he that gives [the funds] determines 
the use [of funds]. And aid is always tied to conditions.” He called it “masked 
aid” in which industrialized nations “give with the left hand only to take with the 
right” through logistics costs such as salaries for foreign experts and supplies.  
It came down to foreigners making money, expressed some participants. 
Andrew, a civil society activist said, “There are a lot of people who come to make 
money [in Haiti].” After the earthquake, Andrew shared that he met an Italian 
who came from the Italian branch of an NGO already present in Haiti. “Imagine 
that an Italian comes from ——— Italy after the earthquake. There is already  —
—— Haiti [branch] and other  ———  [branches]. And he comes with his wife, 
two children, in a country that is in the shape that Haiti is in now?!” he asked 
incredulously, “Why?” He was sad to report, “there is money being made on the 
back of Haitians’ misery. And they make even more money because the 
government has not taken up their leadership role. At the community meeting, one 
attendee made the observation that “Foreigners come to take from Haiti, not to 
develop it.” Josette feels the same way. “As foreigners are looting us, we have to 
look to our own [diaspora] to help.” 
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Old and New Development Thinking 
Two interview questions were used to asked participants to identify on 
the degree to which they see old development thinking/approaches being 
abandoned or reframed in the current work of redeveloping Haiti (Appendix C, 
question 7) and to what degree they see new thinking or approaches to 
development being created (question 9). Due to the small sample size, only 
descriptive statistics were performed. Table 16 depicts responses to question 7. 
Many participants, 9 of 22, across entities believed old development thinking or 
approaches were “not at all” being abandoned or reframed in the current work of 
redeveloping Haiti. Six of the 22 participants replied they “haven’t noticed” 
whether or not old development thinking or approaches were presently being 
abandoned or reframed.  
 
Table 16. Entity Type and Old Approach/Thinking Being Abandoned/Reframed 
 
 
Entity Type 
not 
at 
all 
not 
so 
much 
some-
what 
large 
degree 
haven’t 
noticed 
did not 
respond 
 
 
Total 
diaspora/grassroots 
nonprofits 
1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
grassroots nonprofit 2 0 0 0 2 1 5 
government agency 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 
foreign nonprofit 1 0 1 2 2 1 7 
diaspora/grassroots/ 
foreign nonprofit 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
diaspora social venture 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
diaspora/foreign 
nonprofit 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
diaspora nonprofit 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 9 0 2 3 6 2 22 
 
Table 17 depicts responses to question 7 based upon whether participants 
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were Haitian, Haitian-American, or American. Haitian-Americans most often 
replied “not at all.” Six participants say they “haven’t noticed.”  
 
Table 17. Participant and Old Approach/Thinking Being Abandoned/Reframed 
 
 
Haitian, Haitian-
American, American 
not 
at 
all 
not 
so 
much 
some- 
what 
large 
degree 
haven’t 
noticed 
did not 
respond 
 
 
 
 
Total 
Haitian 3 0 0 1 3 2 9 
Haitian-American 5 0 0 1 1 0 7 
American 1 0 2 1 2 0 6 
Total 9 0 2 3 6 2 22 
 
Table 18 reveals responses to question 9. Most participants (8 of 22) 
across entities believed new development thinking or approaches were 
“somewhat” being created. One interviewee responded “between 3 and 4”.  
  
Table 18. Entity Type and New Development Thinking or Approach 
 
 
Entity Type 
not 
at 
all 
not 
so 
much 
some- 
what 
3.5 large 
degree 
haven’t 
noticed 
did not 
respond 
 
 
Total 
diaspora/grassroots 
nonprofits 
0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
grassroots 
nonprofit 
2 0 1 0 1 0 1 5 
government agency 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 3 
foreign nonprofit 0 2 2 0 1 2 0 7 
diaspora/grassroots/ 
foreign nonprofit 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
diaspora social 
venture 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
diaspora/for4eign 
nonprofit 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
diaspora nonprofit 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 3 4 8 1 2 3 1 22 
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Table 19 shows responses to question 9 based on whether participants 
were Haitian, Haitian-American, or American. Haitian-Americans most often 
replied “somewhat” to new development thinking or approaches being created. 
 
Table. 19. Participant and New Development Thinking or Approach 
 
 
Haitian, Haitian-
American, 
American 
not 
at 
all 
not 
so 
much 
some- 
what 
3.5 large 
degree 
haven’t 
noticed 
did not 
respond 
 
 
 
 
Total 
Haitian 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 9 
Haitian-American 1 1 4 0 1 0 0 7 
American 0 1 3 0 0 2 0 6 
Total 3 4 8 1 2 3 1 22 
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Chapter 6 
DISCUSSION 
Assisted development is the process that helps individuals within a 
community gain the skills necessary to help themselves and to become self-
sufficient without relying on the support of outside helping organisms, which are 
ultimately destined to depart from the community. Assisted development, not 
charity is the answer to Haiti’s development crisis. Since the birth of the island 
republic, the foundation for nation-building – human, social, physical, financial, 
and natural capitals – have been exploited by the Haitian elite, political officials, 
and foreign policies toward Haiti. This groundwork not having been firmly 
established, Haiti has been made increasingly vulnerable in ways that do not 
permit the country to absorb shocks resulting from financial, institutional, 
environmental, and social instabilities. Therefore, the call for a refoundation of 
the Haitian State by some participants in this study is fundamentally essential, 
urgent, and overdue.  
In this study, discussions surrounding the vulnerability of post-earthquake 
Haiti varied by participant but not necessarily by entity. Participants from all 
entities (grassroots, diaspora, hybrid, government agency, social venture and 
foreign entities) found common ground on a number of themes that emerged from 
the analysis of interview transcripts. That being said, some participants 
representing certain entities shared more on certain topics than participants from 
other entities. For example, Josette, being a government employee, offered a more 
balanced take on the Haitian government’s performance. Likewise, participants 
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who were members of the Haitian diaspora had more to relate regarding the 
diaspora’s role in Haiti’s redevelopment than other participants. 
One explanation for the relative harmony of participant perspectives 
might be that the focus of this study attracted volunteers to participate that held 
similar perspectives in reference to Haiti and its development issues, regardless of 
place of birth, nationality, or organizational affiliation. Additionally, several 
participants had previous experience working for more than one entity type, 
adding multidimensionality to their perspectives. Raul, a Les Cayes, Haiti native, 
once worked for a foreign NGO but now works for a grassroots organization. 
Josette, who currently works for the Haitian government, used to work for a large 
international NGO. Daniel, although now employed with foreign nonprofit, used 
to work for the Haitian government. Also to be recognized was the potential 
influence of partner organizations upon participant perceptions. For example, 
some foreign nonprofits, like Tom’s, worked exclusively with grassroots 
organizations.  By virtue of being founded, funded, and headquartered outside of 
Haiti, Tom’s nonprofit was classified as a foreign nonprofit. However, because of 
the close ties with grassroots organizations in Haiti, Tom had very similar views 
to some Haitian grassroots participants.  
Some diaspora participant responses, perhaps because of the years they 
have spent in the United States, may have at times reflected a very American 
perspective on development. For example, one diaspora participant from a hybrid 
organization said education should be made available to all Haitians so they “can 
compete at any level that they want so that they can reach their full potential. So 
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they can own their own homes, drive their own cars, and be a modern place, very 
eco-friendly...” After hearing these comments, the researcher was prompted to 
record in a journal entry that said it is “impossible to have everyone driving their 
own car and have the society be eco-friendly. Diaspora superimposing American 
development views on Haiti?”  
While participant opinions concerning redevelopment were in many 
ways similar, their unique backgrounds gave a singularity to their perspectives. 
Several lessons for moving the nation toward a refoundation can be extracted 
from the participant interviews. What follows are the insights that answer the 
study’s eight research questions (see Appendix A).  
Research Question A 
In response to the first research question, “What are the redevelopment 
frameworks or thinking emerging in your entity?” the majority of participants 
believed that the way their organization approached development worked well. 
They believed there was no need to change either their thinking about how to 
approach development or the way they proceeded with their projects. Some 
participants noted their organization were still in relief mode. Occupied 
principally with providing basic needs and services to those displaced by the 
earthquake, there were no redevelopment frameworks emerging from their 
organization.  
Of the entities in this study, one, a social venture created shortly after 
the earthquake, was applying a new redevelopment model. This venture focused 
on expanding Haiti’s overlooked and undervalued middle market as a way of 
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strengthening the nation’s financial, social, and human capitals. According to this 
participant, a narrow understanding of Haiti’s markets exacerbated Haiti’s 
economic and social vulnerabilities. Presently, the economic pie is dominated by 
elite-owned monopolies with a small sliver representing small microfinance/ 
microcredit-funded businesses. To augment the number of mid-size business 
entrepreneurs, increase disposable income, and provide a new source of funds for 
social projects, this social venture organization is providing start-up capital, 
business education, access to networks, and mentorship for aspiring Haitian 
entrepreneurs. Couched within their model is the active participation of the 
Haitian diaspora to “reverse the onset of brain drain virtually” in the hopes that 
one day “we’re going to see a lot of these diaspora going back to Haiti physically 
and starting their business.” 
Research Question B 
When asked “To what degree are traditional development frameworks or 
thinking being abandoned or reframed?,” many participants replied that traditional 
development frameworks were still being applied and were not at all being 
abandoned or reframed. One participant noted that there was a pervading 
emphasis on having market vendors sell foreign-produced goods rather than 
expanding local production of goods and services. He believed that with such 
heavy reliance on foreign products, the Haitian economy “won’t budge.” Other 
participants noted that as was its custom before the earthquake, the Haitian 
government was waiting for donations and directions from the international 
community before taking action. According to one participant this was the most 
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significant and prevailing traditional development framework. He was of the 
opinion that the “belief that the injection of a major donation in the billions for 
instance, will solve all the problems in Haiti… [is a] mentality [that] has affected 
the government itself [and] has crippled the drive and effort to become less 
dependent on foreign aid.” Other participants observed past development projects 
that created industries that served international markets (such as garment 
assembly) were being reintroduced as viable development options. Such emphasis 
on feeding external markets rather than bolstering local markets to meet local 
needs makes Haiti vulnerable to external market shocks well outside of Haiti’s 
control. 
Research Question C 
Many participants replied “somewhat” to the third research question, “To 
what degree are new frameworks or thinking being created in other 
organizations?” Of those participants who responded “somewhat”, some said 
other organizations were still in relief mode and their primary focus at the 
moment was to provide basic needs and services to those displaced by the 
earthquake. Other participants thought the repackaging of old development 
projects could itself be considered as new redevelopment frameworks or thinking 
being created. Several participants said new frameworks or thinking were “not at 
all” being created or “not so much.”  
One participant wants those in charge of rebuilding to “think big” and 
have a “much larger” vision when it comes to the “building – not rebuilding” of 
the nation. He believes planning should reflect a long-term development strategy 
  168 
and not just simply meet the immediate needs of the people. Others wanted the 
government in particular to have a grand vision for Haiti and to communicate that 
vision clearly to the Haitian masses. Many participants wanted to the government 
to outline what they envisioned Haiti to be in the next 5, 10, 50 years and how 
they propose to meet these short and long term development goals.   
Research Question D 
In response to the question “How are new frameworks focused on helping 
to minimize the vulnerabilities of Haitian society?,” most participants reported 
there were no truly new frameworks to speak of. One social venture participant’s 
work, as previously discussed, did seek to address Haiti’s social and economic 
vulnerabilities through the creation of mid-market entrepreneurial ventures.  
Research Question E  
The SL framework recognizes that sustainable development happens as a 
result of relationships. In this light, this research question asked participants to 
share some challenges to and victories of collaborative efforts between entities.  
Challenges to collaboration included organizational “silo” mentality, lack of 
follow-through, and difficulties working with the Haitian government. 
Participants noted a “silo” mentality among many nonprofits where collaboration 
with others was avoided. One participant said nonprofits were in the habit of 
“carving out their own little areas” and “working on their own, doing their own 
thing, trying to help in one little area of expertise or geographical area but [there 
is] not interaction between the various groups or cross-pollination.” This lack of 
collaboration and lack of communication between organizations causes a 
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duplication of services and lends to the unnecessary proliferation of NGOs on the 
island. Several participants noted that even when collaboration between 
nonprofits was agreed upon, lack of follow-through brought an end to the 
collaborative effort. The third challenge, working with the Haitian government, 
was one that especially frustrated several participants – particularly those from 
grassroots nonprofits. One participant from a grassroots nonprofit believed change 
in Haiti could “only happen through relationships” which is why his organization 
continues to reach out to the government despite little success. “If you have a 
project and you go and share it with them, it just sits there. If you have an event 
and you invite a government representative, they don’t come.”  
Conversely, some organizations have had success collaborating with the 
Haitian government. One participant, from a grassroots/diaspora/foreign hybrid 
organization who has had success in collaborating with the Haitian government 
admitted that it was a struggle, but one worth fighting for. This organization made 
it a part of their policy to keep local government officials informed of the projects 
they were undertaking in the region. This show of respect for the sovereignty of 
the local government’s jurisdiction was rewarded in the form of open 
communication and collaboration with this local government office. Another 
victory of collaborative efforts between entities was evident in the growing inter-
entity partnerships that seemed to be springing up, albeit not in large numbers. 
Some participants conceded they did not know if this was a trend that was going 
to stay or if it was being used as a strategy to share resources in a tight global 
economy.  
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Research Question F 
Responses to the sixth research question, “What do entities perceive as the 
greatest barriers to Haiti’s redevelopment?” fell into one of two categories: 
internal and external barriers. Internal barriers are those found within Haiti itself.  
External barriers are those that stem from the international community and have 
implications in Haiti. Participants considered government corruption as being a 
major internal barrier to Haiti’s redevelopment. Much of Haiti’s future is 
dependent upon the creation of a strong and sovereign national government. 
Cultural dysfunctions, some with roots reaching as far back as Haiti’s colonial 
times, were another internal barrier. Participants noted how social distrust and 
division, for example, hampered progress. Trust and mutual support play critical 
roles in development according to the SL framework. If there is to be a 
refoundation of Haiti, cultural dysfunctions that gnaw away at the nation’s social 
capital must be addressed. Several participants noted their entity’s efforts to 
“change the mindset of the people” and to bring about a “transformation of the 
Haitian psyche” in this regard. Lack of political leadership was also cited as an 
internal barrier to redevelopment as was the absence of a shared vision for the 
nation. Lastly, the lack of a comprehensive development framework leaves 
Haitians with no idea of what is to come of their nation’s future.  
Impatience on the part of the international community with the Haitian 
development process was identified by participants as an external barrier to 
redevelopment. This phenomenon was closely related to lack of commitment, 
another barrier cited by participants. Development is a process, not a destination 
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and as such will take time. Impatience and lack of commitment to projects hinders 
the change process of change and discourages rather than encourages 
development. Yet another external barrier cited was cultural ignorance. While 
assistance from the international community is welcome, their use of development 
models that attempt to superimpose their values in Haiti and on Haitians lack the 
cultural sensitivity and cultural relevancy that makes for national progress. One 
participant from a grassroots nonprofit showed sympathy for Bill Clinton, co-
chair of Haiti’s Rebuilding Commission by saying, “I believe Bill Clinton could 
have been a tremendous help if he had accepted to be within the organization and 
not the chief. He’s taken a huge risk. Knowing my country, he’s going to fail. 
Knowing my country, he will fail. And I know he has good intentions [but] he 
will fail. He will fail because he doesn’t have the culture.”  
Another external barrier identified by the participants is prejudice towards 
Haitians. One participant from a U.S-based organization shared how he was often 
having to dispell the myths some American have concerning Haiti. He says, “I 
bristle when I’m in church when I speak [about the work I am doing in Haiti]. I 
will warn them ‘Don’t say to me, ‘They’re this way because they are lazy, or 
they’re Black.’’” He shared that, “there are some prejudices in America that still 
believe they are lazy and that’s why the country is the way it is.” This sentiment 
can also be evidenced in some of the foreign policy drafted for Haiti. As one 
participant noted, “US foreign policy is tainted with racism.”  
Lastly, paternalism, the tendency for the international community to do for 
Haitians rather than to empower them to do for themselves, was seen as a 
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counterproductive development method. According to the SL framework, 
development must be responsive, participatory, empowering and conducted 
partnership if it is to have any chance of success. One participant said she thought 
the international community “miss[es] a huge opportunity when they come in 
with their mentality that ‘I know your problem and I know your solution’ instead 
of actually working with the people in the area to come up with a solution to their 
problems.” At its birth in 1804, Haiti was subject to isolation, hostility, and 
racism from the world’s most powerful nations. Haiti’s refoundation is an 
opportunity for the international community to express their solidarity with the 
Black republic. Solidarity with Haiti was expressed in the international 
community’s outpouring of donations following the earthquake but that is not 
where it should end. Solidarity with and good will towards Haiti must be 
evidenced also in the foreign policies, international trade agreements, and 
development programs created for the island nation.  
Research Question G 
 This two-part question asked “a) What do entities believe are Haiti’s 
greatest strengths and b) how do they envision these strengths playing a role in the 
redevelopment effort?” A consistent and pervading theme emerging from the 
participants was that the Haitian people were the nation’s greatest strength. 
Haitians were described as being bold, creative, intelligent, artistically gifted, 
hardworking, highly motivated, entrepreneurially minded, having a lot of dignity, 
patient, proud, courageous, and dedicated to their children and their country. 
Participants believed Haitians should be called upon to take a central role in the 
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planning process and execution of redevelopment projects. A refoundation of a 
nation can only take place if the real needs of the citizenry are acknowledged and 
the citizenry is engaged.  
Research Question H 
Participant responses pertaining to the research question “What 
implications do these new frameworks or thinking have on development policy-
making?” again reiterated the lack of truly new frameworks emerging and 
therefore having insignificant implications on development policy-making. Some 
participants attributed the lack of new frameworks to the repackaging of old 
development projects while others perceived that it was a bit too soon after the 
earthquake to ascertain whether new redevelopment frameworks or perspectives 
were emerging. As a result, there was a concern that the changes needed to move 
the nation forward were not taking place, and perhaps not take place in the near 
future.  
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Chapter 7 
TOWARDS A REFOUNDATION  
The theoretical thinking driving traditional development has often focused 
on increasing income or financial capital as the means of raising people out of 
poverty. The method of choice for these poverty alleviation models have been 
top-down approaches that were not people-centered, sustainable, nor empowering. 
Such has been the case for Haiti. This research, which studied perceptions of 
representatives from a cross-section of entities dedicated to Haitian development 
revealed the kind of transformative processes that should be taking place if a 
refoundation of the nation is to occur. Participants described refoundation as 
relaying the groundwork of the country and then building from the bottom up. 
Refoundation demands that Haiti’s inherent human, social, physical, financial, 
and natural capitals be safeguarded and strengthened. These capitals would serve 
as the core for the nation’s development and buffer the nation against the risks 
and vulnerabilities (social, institutional, environmental, and economic) to which it 
has been –and will continue to be – exposed.  
Haiti’s current condition illustrates three things: 1) a narrow focus on 
accumulating financial capital does not pull a nation out of poverty 2) the 
depletion of other capitals in favor of financial capital increases, rather than 
decreases, vulnerabilities, and 3) trade-offs should be decided upon by the people 
they directly affect (bottom-up, rather than top-down approach). It is well 
understood that a world free of vulnerabilities does not exist but heightened 
exposure to them weakens a community’s ability to recover from shocks such as 
  175 
the earthquake experienced in Haiti. The assumption behind traditional models 
propelled financial capital as supremely important in development rather than 
recognizing it is just one of several important components of sustainable 
development. Just as important in Haiti’s case is understanding that Haitians 
themselves should decide which capitals they would like to invest in more than 
others. This trade-off is unique to every community and is the key to managing 
vulnerabilities.  
The goal of development should be to improve the capacities of a nation. 
In summary, four transformative processes emerged from participant reflections 
that are deemed essential to the refoundation of Haiti. The first is that of 
communication and collaboration with the Haitian government. Despite the 
government’s weak structure, poor history of governance, reports of corruption, 
and overall instability, it must be the starting point for any refoundation effort. As 
stated by one participant, “I defy anyone to name a [developed] country that 
doesn’t have a strong public institution.” And indeed, there are none to speak of. 
The groundwork for a refoundation of Haiti, therefore, must start with the 
strengthening of the Haitian government. Without this new foundation of a strong 
public institution, government instability will continue to derail any development 
interventions implemented. In the past, traditional aid projects did one of two 
things:  (1) bypassed the government all together or (2) when the government was 
included, there wasn’t a strong focus on strengthening government capacity. 
Communication and collaboration with the Haitian government would signify the 
acknowledgement of and respect for the sovereignty of the nation, a key element 
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for refoundation. On the government’s end, officials must work to establish their 
credibility as a public institution and win the confidence and respect of their 
constituents and the international community.  
The second transformative process is the engagement of the Haitian 
people and the Haitian diaspora in the redevelopment work. “We’re here. We’re 
available. You have but to call [on] us!” exclaimed a Haitian participant. A 
symbiotic relationship exists between these two groups that has neither been 
officially recognized nor fully appreciated. Yet, both yearn for a better future for 
Haiti. The Haitian people through their civil society organizations should set the 
agenda for any redevelopment plans. Sustainable development requires that 
policies and projects be people-centered and engage the direct beneficiaries. A 
development plan of action that is representative of the people curbs paternalistic 
tendencies of international aid, reduces the culture of dependency of the host 
country, and because there is local buy-in, increases long-term commitment on 
the part of the people. The Haitian diaspora, because of their invested interest in 
Haiti, their skills, and their networks and other resources, stand as one of Haiti’s 
most undervalued assets. Their role is to collaborate with the Haitian people and 
bolster the nation’s progress toward self-sufficiency by providing resources to 
facilitate that quest.  
Broad vision of development is the third transformative process necessary 
for refoundation. According to participants, long-term planning was absent from 
both government and NGO work. Entities worked to meet the needs and demands 
of the present and neglected to set up systems and infrastructure in preparation for 
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the future. A refoundation of the nation calls for a new development culture that 
builds with future generations in mind. To achieve this, participants outlined three 
development measures that need to be implemented. The first is an investment in 
Haiti’s education system. Participants regarded education as an essential 
ingredient for development that has no equal or substitute. Second, participants 
made it clear that efforts must be made to bolster all sectors of the Haitian 
economy, not just one or two (such as tourism, agriculture, or garment assembly). 
A sustainable model of development necessitates growth in multiple sectors 
recognizing that one sector can be the enabling factor for others. The third 
component is an investment in the expansion of Haiti’s middle market. This 
would entail educating those who hold monopolies in Haiti that the economic pie 
increases rather than decreases with the introduction of competition. This measure 
would also do away with the so-called “trickle-down economy where the richest 
should get a break as an incentive for them to create jobs [so that] the poorer 
members of society will be exposed to better opportunities,” as one participant 
stated.  It is believed that an augmentation in the number of mid-size business 
entrepreneurs would increase disposable income, generate more taxes, as well as 
provide a new source of funds for social projects.  
The fourth and final transformative process calls for a coordination and 
collaboration among NGOs. This process is critical to Haiti’s refoundation. The 
presence of thousands of NGOs working in isolation of each other results in the 
duplication of services, waste of funds, and use of valuable resources that could 
otherwise be made available to the Haitian people (such as housing, for example). 
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NGOs in Haiti have been likened to parallel state-like institutions that circumvent 
the Haitian government’s expressed wishes and take over their responsibilities. 
One participant described the work of NGOs as being “cacophonous” in nature, 
which has very real and devastating implications on the Haitian people. 
Coordination and collaboration among NGOs, or “cross-pollination” as one 
participant viewed it, would be an important first step in addressing such 
problems.  
Within each transformative process is found the means to identify, 
acknowledge and strengthen Haiti’s inherent assets – the building blocks for 
refoundation. Taken together and should they be applied, these transformative 
processes have the potential to transform Haiti into the strong, self-sufficient 
nation the Haitian people hope for it to be.  
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SLF Framework Principles 
P1. Responsive & Participatory: Outsiders need processes that enable them to 
listen and respond to the poor. Is new thinking a result of communication with 
Haitian citizens? 
P2. People-centered: External support focuses on what matters to the people. 
Does new thinking make the priorities of the Haitian people the organization’s 
priority? 
P3. Multi-level: Poverty can only be overcome by working at several levels. New 
thinking should incorporate multi-level actors and mechanisms.  
P4. Conducted in Partnership: Key to success are transparent partnerships 
between public, private, and nonprofit sectors. Partners should be united by 
shared goals. Does new thinking reflect multi-sector collaboration and 
communication? 
P5. Sustainable: Economic, institutional, social, and environmental sustainability 
are fundamental. 
P6. Dynamic: External support must develop long-term commitments and be 
flexible to changes. 
P7. Empowering: New thinking should result in amplified voice, opportunities, 
and well-being for the Haitian people.  
P8. Disaggregated: Realization that the poor are not a homogenous group. New 
thinking must take into account the vulnerabilities unique to subgroups (such as 
women, children, elderly, urban slum dwellers, rural dwellers; Carney, 1999). 
 
Framework Inferences 
Ia. Manage the vulnerability context by helping people to become more resilient 
in the face of shocks, changes in trends, and seasonality (DFID, 1999). 
Ib. Take advantage of unique opportunities/leverage points presented by current 
situation.  
Ic. Note the operational context and development factors that determine what is 
feasible (Carney, 1999).
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Research Questions 
(a) What are the redevelopment frameworks emerging among organizations in 
Haiti? 
(b) To what degree are traditional development frameworks being abandoned or 
reframed? 
(c) To what degree are new frameworks being created?  
(d) How are new frameworks focused on helping to minimize the vulnerabilities 
of Haitian society? 
(e) What are some challenges to and victories of collaborative efforts between 
organizations? 
(f) What do organizations perceive as the greatest barriers to Haiti’s 
redevelopment? 
(g) What do organizations believe are Haiti’s greatest strengths and how do they 
envision these strengths playing a role in the redevelopment effort?  
(h) What implications do these new frameworks have on development policy-
making? 
 
Table 1.1  
*P = Framework Principle; I = Framework Inference 
Research Question A SLF Principles/Inferences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What are the redevelopment 
frameworks emerging among 
organizations in Haiti? 
P1. Responsive & Participatory: 
Outsiders need processes that enable 
them to listen and respond to the poor. Is 
new thinking a result of communication 
with Haitian citizens? 
P2. People-centered: External support 
focuses on what matters to the people. 
Does new thinking make the priorities of 
the Haitian people the organization’s 
priority? 
P6. Dynamic: External support must 
develop long-term commitments and be 
flexible to changes. 
P7. Empowering: New thinking should 
result in amplified voice, opportunities, 
and well-being for the Haitian people.  
 
Table 1.2 
Research Question B SLF Principles/Inferences 
 
 
To what degree are traditional 
development frameworks being 
abandoned or reframed? 
 
P5. Sustainable: Economic, institutional, 
social, and environmental sustainability 
are fundamental. 
P6. Dynamic: External support must 
develop long-term commitments and be 
flexible to changes. 
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Table 1.3 
Research Question C SLF Principles/Inferences 
 
 
To what degree are new frameworks 
being created? 
P6. Dynamic: External support must 
develop long-term commitments and be 
flexible to changes. 
Ib. Take advantage of unique 
opportunities/leverage points presented by 
current situation 
 
Table 1.4 
Research Question D SLF Principles/Inferences 
 
 
 
 
How are new frameworks focused on 
helping to minimize the 
vulnerabilities of Haitian society? 
P6. Dynamic: External support must 
develop long-term commitments and be 
flexible to changes. 
P7. Empowering: New thinking should 
result in amplified voice, opportunities, 
and well-being for the Haitian people. 
P8. Disaggregated: Realization that the 
poor are not a homogenous group. New 
thinking must take into account the 
vulnerabilities unique to subgroups (such 
as women, children, elderly, urban slum 
dwellers, rural dwellers) 
Ia. Manage the vulnerability context by 
helping people to become more resilient 
in the face of shocks, changes in trends, 
and seasonality   
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Table 1.5 
Research Question E SLF Principles/Inferences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What are some challenges to and 
victories of collaborative efforts 
between organizations? 
P3. Multi-level: Poverty can only be 
overcome by working at several levels. 
New thinking should incorporate multi-
level actors and mechanisms. 
P4. Conducted in Partnership: Key to 
success are transparent partnerships 
between public, private, and nonprofit 
sectors. Partners should be united by 
shared goals. Does new thinking reflect 
multi-sector collaboration and 
communication? 
Ib. Take advantage of unique 
opportunities/leverage points presented 
by current situation  
Ic. Note the operational context and 
development factors that determine what 
is feasible 
 
 Table 1.6 
Research Question F SLF Principles/Inferences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What do organizations perceive as the 
greatest barriers to Haiti’s 
redevelopment? 
P3. Multi-level: Poverty can only be 
overcome by working at several levels. 
New thinking should incorporate multi-
level actors and mechanisms.  
P4. Conducted in Partnership: Key to 
success are transparent partnerships 
between public, private, and nonprofit 
sectors. Partners should be united by 
shared goals. Does new thinking reflect 
multi-sector collaboration and 
communication? 
Ic. Note the operational context and 
development factors that determine what 
is feasible 
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Table 1.7 
Research Question G SLF Principles/Inferences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What do organizations believe are 
Haiti’s greatest strengths and how do 
they envision these strengths playing 
a role in the redevelopment effort? 
P1. Responsive & Participatory: 
Outsiders need processes that enable 
them to listen and respond to the poor. Is 
new thinking a result of communication 
with Haitian citizens? 
P2. People-centered: External support 
focuses on what matters to the people. 
Does new thinking make the priorities of 
the Haitian people the organization’s 
priority? 
P7. Empowering: New thinking should 
result in amplified voice, opportunities, 
and well-being for the Haitian people.  
Ia. Manage the vulnerability context by 
helping people to become more resilient 
in the face of shocks, changes in trends, 
and seasonality  
Ib. Take advantage of unique 
opportunities/leverage points presented 
by current situation  
Table 1.8 
Research Question H SLF Principles/Inferences 
 
 
 
What implications do these new 
frameworks have on development 
policy-making? 
 
P3. Multi-level: Poverty can only be 
overcome by working at several levels. 
New thinking should incorporate multi-
level actors and mechanisms. 
P4. Conducted in Partnership: Key to 
success are transparent partnerships 
between public, private, and nonprofit 
sectors. Partners should be united by 
shared goals. Does new thinking reflect 
multi-sector collaboration and 
communication? 
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Table 2. Research Questions & Interview Questions Informed by Framework 
  SLF Framework 
  Principle Inference 
Research 
Questions 
Interview 
Question(s) 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 Ia Ib Ic 
A 8 x x    x x     
B 6     x x      
7     x x      
C 9      x    x  
10      x    x  
D 12      x x x x   
E 13   x x      x x 
14   x x      x x 
F 15   x x       x 
G 16 x x     x  x x  
17 x x     x  x x  
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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT OF THE QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW 
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The Emerging Redevelopment Frameworks in Post-earthquake Haiti 
 
Date 
 
Dear ______________________: 
 
I am a graduate student under the direction of Dr. Richard Knopf in the School of 
Community Resources & Development in the College of Public Programs at 
Arizona State University.  I am conducting a research study to catch a snapshot of 
organizational thinking or approaches for redevelopment as reported by 
grassroots, diasporan, Haitian government, and foreign organizations. 
 
I am inviting your participation, which will involve an interview lasting about 1 
hour or so. Our interview will consist of three parts.  The first will consist of your 
organization/agency’s demographics – such as its mission, length of service in 
Haiti, and date of establishment. 
 
The second part will consist of 13 questions, some with several parts. There are 
no right or wrong answers. It would be helpful if you could answer each question 
with as much information and details as possible. Examples and even stories are 
very much welcome. I am interested in understanding the emerging 
redevelopment frameworks among organizations in Haiti through your 
organization's experiences. After you answer a question, I may ask you to say 
more on the subject or to clarify something if I don't fully understand and I may 
also take some notes.  
              
The third part will consist of demographic questions - your age, position at your 
organization, and place of birth. This will help me to document the diversity of 
the participants in this study. You have the right not to answer any question, and 
to stop the interview at any time. 
 
Your participation in this study is voluntary.  If you choose not to participate or to 
withdraw from the study at any time, there will be no penalty. 
 
There are no foreseeable risks or discomforts to your participation. 
 
Your confidentiality would be protected. You will be assigned a pseudo name and 
this interview and all the information you provide will be identified by that 
pseudo name and not your real name. No one will have access to your identity or 
the identity of your organization so feel free to share openly concerning this topic. 
Your responses will be anonymous. The results of this study may be used in 
reports, presentations, or publications but your name will not be used. 
 
I would like to audiotape this interview and record your consent to participate. 
The interview will not be recorded without your permission. Please let me know if 
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you do not want the interview to be taped; you also can change your mind after 
the interview starts, just let me know.  
Data will be managed using Microsoft Word and Digital Voice Editor software. 
The Digital Voice Editor will be used to store the audio-recorded interviews and 
facilitate the work of transcription. The transcriptions of the interviews will be 
saved to separate Microsoft Word documents using psuedo names as identifiers 
and which can only be accessed by the researcher. Identifiers will be separated 
from the data once a pseudo name has been given to you, the participant and your 
organization. I plan to keep the data indefinitely since no identifiers or master list 
will be kept.  
 
If you have any questions concerning the research study, please contact the 
research team: 
 
Richard Knopf, Ph.D - 602.496.2148; Richard.knopf@asu.edu 
Darlye Elise Innocent – 305.600.2432; darlyelise@gmail.com 
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this 
research, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of 
the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board, through the ASU Office of 
Research Integrity and Assurance, at (480) 965-6788. Please let me know if you 
wish to be part of the study. 
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Section A. Organization Demographics 
1.  What organization/gov't office do you work for? 
2.  Is [organization name] a 
a.  grassroots - Haitian created and led organization 
b. diaspora - organization led or funded by members of the Haitian 
diaspora 
c. government - Haitian government agency 
d. foreign - organizations founded, funded, and headquartered outside 
of Haiti 
*Note where org/gov’t office is headquartered 
3. How long has [organization name] been working in Haiti? OR When was 
this gov't office established? 
4. What is the mission of [organization name/gov't office]? 
5. What are the major programs or activities at [organization name/gov’t 
office]? 
a. Can you give me an example? 
 
Section B. Interview 
6. What are some of the old ways of thinking about developing Haiti? 
7. To what degree are you seeing old development thinking/approaches 
being abandoned or reframed in the current work of redeveloping Haiti? 
a. On a scale of 1 to 5 – 1 being not at all; 4 being to a large degree; 
and 5 being haven’t noticed- to what degree are you seeing old 
development thinking/approaches being abandoned or reframed in 
the current work of redeveloping Haiti? 
b. Can you give me an example? 
Not At All Not So 
Much 
Somewhat Large Degree  Haven’t 
Noticed 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. To what degree do you see new thinking or approaches to development 
being created? 
a. Can you give me an example of that? 
9. Have you seen changes in the development thinking or approaches of 
other organizations/agencies? 
a. On a scale of 1 to 5 – 1 being not at all; 4 being to a large degree; 
and 5 being haven’t noticed- - to what degree do you see new 
thinking or approaches to development being created? 
b. Can you give me an example? 
Not At All Not So Somewhat Large Degree  Haven’t 
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Much Noticed 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. What implications do you think this new thinking or these new approaches 
will have on development policy-making? 
a. Within your organization? 
i. Can you give me an example? 
b. As it relates to international aid policy-making? 
i. Can you give me an example? 
11. How do you see this new thinking or these new approaches minimizing 
the vulnerabilities – whether economic, institutional, social, or 
environmental – of Haitian society? 
a. Can you give me an example? 
12. What are some of the successes of collaborative efforts between other 
organizations/agencies and [org/agency name]? 
a. Can you give me a few examples? 
13. What are some of the challenges of collaborative efforts between other 
organizations/agencies and [org/agency name]? 
14. What does [org/agency name] perceive as the greatest barriers to Haiti’s 
redevelopment? 
a. How so?/Why is that? 
b. Tell me a story about that… 
15. What does [org/agency name] believe are Haiti’s greatest strengths in the 
redevelopment efforts? 
a. Tell me a story about that… 
16. How has [list of strengths identified by participant] guided [org/agency 
name]’s new thinking about redevelopment in Haiti? 
a. Tell me more… 
17. What else can you tell me about the emerging redevelopment thinking or 
approaches in your organization that we haven’t discussed so far? 
 
Section C: Informant Demographics 
18. For the purposes of getting a picture of the diversity of this study’s 
participants I’d like to ask you a few questions about yourself: 
a. How long have you worked for [org/agency name]? 
b. What is your position or title at [org/agency name]? 
c. How old are you? 
d. What is your place of birth? 
e. Do you hold citizenship outside of Haiti? Where? 
f. Have you received formal education? Where? What was your field 
of study? 
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APPENDIX D 
AS GREEN AS IT GETS 4 ECONOMIES MODEL 
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Primary Economics 
Production or extraction of raw 
materials 
Example: mining, agriculture, 
fishing  
Secondary Economics 
 Manufacturing & processing 
Example: Turn coal into 
electricity, corn into corn 
flakes, fish into cans of tuna 
Quaternary Economics 
 Research & Development 
Example: Create ideas and 
inventions that assist the other 
three economies  
Tertiary Economics 
 Retail, distribution, service 
Example: Grocery store sells 
corn flakes, trucking company 
transports corn flacks to store 
  
 
 
 
 
